In June 1992, during the first round of war between Georgia and South Ossetia, Georgian army divisions had reached the outskirts of Tskhinvali and could have captured the town. Russia declared an ultimatum according to which Georgian troops were to withdraw, otherwise Russian would bomb Tbilisi. The Georgian President at the time, Eduard Shevardnaze was compelled to pull back. Few credited this move of Shevardnaze as a result of his personal attributes and skills (He had gone through the ups and downs of Soviet politics and could read his Soviet colleagues better than most). Many explained this move on his part as stemming from the imperatives of Georgia’s internal situation. The primary reason however was that if he didn’t back down he would be leading his country down a suicidal path by putting Georgia’s troops up against the much more powerful forces of a country still essentially Soviet but nominally Russian.

Today, in this new round of fighting, much is different in South Ossetia. While it is correct to say that it wouldn’t take much effort on the part of Russia, which has experienced two wars in Chechnya, to rack up another success in the Caucasus, what is new this time around is that the Georgian-Russian conflict isn’t being brokered. This time, the armies of two independent states are facing off against each other (it’s another question as to the comparable strengths of the two). And despite the numerous warnings made by Russia that should have made Georgian President  Mikheil Saakashvili pull back from the road of military conflict, as was the case with Shevardnadze, this didn’t happen.

Furthermore, now the Russian Army is not only shelling Georgian military and strategic targets but residential buildings in Gori and other populated centers are being shelled as well. I cannot say if this latter shelling was intentional or happened by mistake.  (According to the situation on the ground as of August 11th, the civilian air radar installation of Tbilisi was put out of service resulting in a closing of the airport). Now, Abkhazia is making good on its promise and has opened a second military front against Georgia through the Kodori Valley. It is likely that the Russian army will assist Abkhazia units to seize control of this territory; the only area in Abkhazia that Georgia holds sway over. Refugees from Zugdidi and other western areas of Georgia who have fled to Tbilisi are demanding explanations from their government. They want to know what exactly is occurring and what will transpire down the road. They are making their voices heard publicly, out in the open, while the majority of Georgia’s populace are asking similar questions inwardly, on the brink of panic and alarm. On the one hand the Georgian media is talking about the danger looming over the motherland, while on the other, the thought that it was Georgia who started the war, fully aware of the consequences, doesn’t rest easily in the minds of most.

After the ceasefire in 1992 and after the 1996 memorandum signed by Georgia, North and South Ossetia, Russia and the OSCE to resolve the conflict peacefully, clashes between Georgia and Ossetia were infrequent. The clashes that did occur were mainly based on South Ossetian territory, amongst residents of Georgian and Ossetian populated villages. Traditionally, such clashes erupt in the summer months and are short-lived, resulting in only a handful of lives on both sides. The brouhaha would be resolved with Georgian and Russian diplomats coming to blows within the chambers of international tribunals. Now, everything is happening concurrently; both the unprecedented scale and number of victims of the military conflict and the coming to blows of Georgian, Russian and American diplomats within the Security Council of the United Nations. This, despite the fact that on August 2nd the entire matter started according to the “normal” scenario - a Georgian policeman was beaten-up in an Ossetian village and a Georgian village opened fire on the Ossetians in response.

The capture of the town of Tskhinvali by Georgian troops on August 8th came as a shock to all. Why was it in fact that South Ossetia was the reason to go to war when, unlike Abkhazia, Georgians are treated with comparative tolerance there? During the entire negotiations process in 1992 more joint agreements were signed and implemented by these two sides than during the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict. The level of estrangement between Georgians and Ossetians before these recent developments was much less the case. In South Ossetia, Georgian and Ossetian settlements are located one after the other; there are no exclusive Georgian or Ossetian territorial enclaves to speak of. Why South Ossetia then even if Georgian refuges started to return to their villages during the past years given that as of 1992 units of a mixed Georgian, Russian and Ossetian inspection committee had been in operation? The other equally important question that springs to mind is what forced Saakashvili, the Commander in Chief of the Georgian armed forces, to take this step given the Russian ultimatum and when he was facing the second round of discussions regarding Georgia’s membership into NATO, through the granting of a Specialized Program, at the upcoming NATO session in December 2008. For it hasn’t been the first time that both NATO and the United States have made it clear to Georgia that it is not the country and that this isn’t the time for them to openly oppose Russia.

However, these are exactly the circumstances in which the answers to my questions can be found.

In South Ossetia it would be much easier to display how a rearmed and better trained Georgian army conforms to NATO standards. Resistance stretching from Tbilisi to Tskhinvali, just 100 kilometers away, would be sporadic and only in areas containing Ossetian villages.

Thus, it would be only by means of a war, both unprecedented given the created state of affairs and unrealistic by the same logic, that Georgia would be able to finally and clearly show to all, above all members of the United Nations, that in its struggle to maintain it territorial integrity Georgia has long since had to deal with Russia rather than with Ossetia or Abkhazia.

In this way and for exactly this reason Georgia could quickly gain membership into NATO and even free itself from the previous obligation to resolve two internal ethnic conflicts; by presenting itself as a small and independent nation being subjected to Russian aggression.

However…this version of events, like other more or less logical explanations, is full of contradictory arguments. For instance, the complex reality in which not only neighboring Georgia , which is so vitally important for Armenia, finds itself in, but without exception the entire region of the Caucasus as well. This, however, is a separate issue entirely.