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Lena Nazaryan

Gul’s Turkey and Sargsyan’s Armenia

During last week’s roundtable organized by “Hetq”on Armenian-Turkish relations topics discussed included recent developments pertinent to the issue and the newly emerging security problems faced by Armenia resulting from these developments. Analyst Laura Baghdasaryan moderated the panel whose participants included Kiro Manoyan, who heads the ARF Bureau’s Political Affairs Department and its Hay Tad Office, Hayk Demoyan, Director of the GAA Genocide Museum/Institute and Manvel Sargsyan, political scientist.

L. Baghdasaryan - Recent developments in the context of Armenian-Turkish relations are the main focal points for analysts and political scientists. However, only a few up till now have reflected in detail on all those security issues facing Armenia that are directly linked to the possible mormalization of Armenian-Turkish relations. What I propose is that we focus on these issues. What were the security issues facing Armenia and the region up till the invitation sent to the Turkish President to visit Armenia? What prompted the President of Armenia to go along with a state of near non-contact right up till the first visit by a Turkish President to Armenia?


K. Manoyan - I believe that President Sargsyan made the invitation based on several concerns and calculations, one of which is to change the current situation regarding the Artsakh negotiations by establishing relations with Turkey. Turkey closed the border with Armenia due to the Artskah issue and I believe that in the calculations of our President an important place is given to the fact that if he can jump-start a certain type of relations with Turkey, to at least ease the blockade, this will certainly have consequences on the Artsakh negotiations. And if the Turkish President had refused the invitation, Armenia would have come out the winner in terms of publicity.

M. Sargsyan - In the eyes of our leaders the problem was something else. We had gone through the events of March 1st, a crisis situation, which was the overriding issue. Here, everything centered around this issue and the leadership lived with this problem. The invitation was made in this set of conditions and from this point of view, I believe, the invitation was similar to what Sahakashvili did. The invitation that Sargsyan publicly announced in Moscow was merely to resolve the domestic problem, to direct attention to a totally different sector.

H. Demoyan - It was a pretty bold and risky move by President Sargsyan, which essentially was greeted by the masses if not with anger than with a healthy dose of skepticism. It was also risky in the sense that if Gul accepted the invitation who would have guaranteed  the scenario according to which events would develop? On the other hand, there was a positive step, which at least gave us an advantage in the short-term. Returning to the security issue, I wish to say that we must be quite careful and in the first place safeguard ourselves from any euphoric attitudes, from getting ahead of ourselves and from any inclinations to take sudden steps both in terms of regional affairs and in Armenian-Turkish relations.

L. Baghdasaryan - I have always been convinced that there are two pivotal security issues in the South Caucasus - the Georgian-Russian contradiction and the Armenia-Turkish one. Georgian-Russian relations have deteriorated and they are worse today than ever before. In the Armenian-Turkish equation, as you have described, there is the possibility for movement. In your estimation, how vital is the Azeri factor when it comes to the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations?

M. Sargsyan
- First, let me state that I share the traditional opinion that Armenians will certainly pay a price when it comes to relations with the Turks. In other words, Russia loves Armenians from afar but when it comes directly here, Armenia becomes just a piece of territory. However, certain developments have occured that allow one to say that developments might perhaps progress along a different trajectory. I believe that there already exist new phenomena that force Turkey not to demand anything from the Armenians so long as Russia assists it in various forms regarding other matters. Turkey is in a state of alarm over the Kurdish issue, which is linked to the United States. That is why the Turks have come and cozied up to Russia. If such approaches exist, here it is possible to understand what Gul is up to. In the plane returning from Armenia Gul is recorded as stating that he was surprised that President Sargsyan brougt up the Karabakh issue. “We didn’t discuss the genocide or the roads but for some unknown reason he broached the Karabakh issue.” What does this signify? On the other hand, knowing all this, he leaves his Foreign Minister in Yerevan who is continuing negotiations solely on the issue of the roadways. The Foreign Minister has already stated that they have talked about reopening the roads and that perhaps in the future they’ll study the question of the gas pipeline. For Russia, Armenia as a road condut is very vital but for Turkey it\'s her salvation. Just by selling that condut to Russia she will obtain a military alliance over Kurdistan. And it’s no wonder that they’ve already discussed Turkey pulling out of NATO. Azerbaijan has already been told that from now on you reach Turkey by going through Armenia. This is the place allotted to Azerbaijan.

K. Manoyan - I partly agree with what Manvel has said. Yes, that’s the intention but it’s still not final. It is not surprising that Azerbaijan accepted the Cacasus Platform. The issue isn’t the Platform if Turkey already knows that it won’t be realized since even before the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict there’s the Georgian-Russian conflict looming and the two parties have already said that they’re not on speaking terms.In other words, if there’s a new failed proposal, why must it be Azerbaijan to do it. There’s a second question which is that it appears that Turkey has started to finally remove itself from the situation it placed itself in for the past 15 years when Armenian-Turkish relations were hostage to Azerbaijan. For Turkey this was a restriction of sorts on its regional politics. The fact that I remain totally unconvinced in all this is that I question to what extent the current Turkish leadership has final say-so over this matter. Yes, there appears to be a striving on their part but isn’t it possible that one day perhaps the Turkish Army will step in and say - this is as far as you can go.

\M. Sargsyan - There\'s a new playing field on which a thousand things can be forgotten. What does a railway across the territory of Armenia mean? Let\'s not forget that there are two entrances to the TransCaucasus and both pass through Armenia. The one goes through Julfa and to Armenia. It passes through Azerbaijan, Georgia and from there to Russia. The other comes from Kars. Another railway doesn\'t exixt at the moment and if you close the road through Armenia, Russia becomes Armenia\'s railway. For Iran and Turkey this means that through Armenia they have a gate towards the Caucasus and an exit from the Caucasus for Azerbaijan and Georgia. Thus, it is possible that tomorrow Georgia will request a transit road from us. Yes this is something new for Russia in the Caucasus and it has links to Russian interests and strengthens it to the level that the Karabakh conflict and other tiny matters are no longer issues. But I repeat that Turkey is also headed to this because it feels threatened from the back, from Iraq and Kurdistan. Why are they taking the Foreign Ministers to the United States. For Turkey isn\'t out to convince Armenia, Turkey will be convincing Azerbaijan to settle the matter, that this is what Turkey needs.

L. Baghdasaryan - We still haven\'t discussed the Diasporan factor in the transformation of Armenian-Turkish relations. Is it possible to view the Diaspora as a separate role-player in this context?

K. Manoyan - Yes, the Diaspora is a player. I think it would be correct for the government to calculate the possibilities of the Diaspora so that it doesn\'t become a point of contention. Thus, any given step between the governments of Turkey and Armenia or any set of relations must not serve to create division between us (Armenia and Diaspora) but rather the opposite, that we must utilize all our resources so that those intergovernmental links actually produce results. I am not saying that the Diaspora must become a "fifth column",  but I don\'t agree with the approach that claims that there are national interests and so-called state interests. The public relations advantage that Turkey got from their President\'s visit will be constantly used within the corridors of the European Union. They have already started to tell Armenians living abroad that if the Foreign Minister of Turkey comes here please don\'t organize any demonstrations since  your two nations have started talking to one another. In certain occasions this is a form of pressure.

H. Demoyan - The Diaspora is linked to the process of Armenian-Turkish relations. It plays to Turkey\'s advantage to state that the Diaspora is a hindrance to the normalization of relations. By doing so Turkey resolves a very important problem. What is our conceptual or publicity point of departure in this case, when there is a normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations. Firstly, the Diaspora must come forth as a separate structure and an independent player. It must not be represented as a body directed from Armenia but rather as a linking factor with Armenia. The Armenian came to be in that country and turned into one part of its history and memory, thus it has the right to raise such an issue and Turkey must understand that this is a humanitarian step and not a political one.

M. Sargsyan - I believe that the Diaspora is an ideologically advanced reality. There was a time when there was the matter of the preservation of the Armenian identity. Today, one segment of the Diaspora is concerned with problems facing the Armenian state, another segment is indifferent and another struggles in the name of democratic principles. If the Armenian government implements a policy and convinces others that it is correct, people will be convinced that it is so. Tomorrow the border with Turkey might be opened and they might state that those Armenians who wish to live in Van can come and do so. People can say that they don\'t want to. The Diaspora is an ideological manifestation; as citizens they live in other countries. They only comprise the Diaspora on a ideological level. And ideas and thoughts are constantly changing and will change. Armenia must be capable of putting forth the correct set of ideas.

L. Baghdasaryan
- Put another way, the Diaspora can adopt a more tolerant stance regarding the normalization of Armenia-Turkish relations without the Genocide recognition fact?

K. Manoyan
- Everything depends on the price we\'ll be paying for those relations. I\'d say the same thing for the people of Armenia. If our analyses are correct and that today Turkey has a greater need for Armenia and that the price we pay won\'t be too great, then I believe both the people of Armenia will tolerate it and the Diaspora will understand it. But if we have to pay a heavy price for relations, both now and in the future, then you won\'t find many in Armenia who will tolerate it. The expectations and approaches regarding Armenian-Turkish relations differ somewhat in the Diaspora and Armenia. It would take about a half an hour for an Armenian sitting in Montreal to ponder the issue.But half the population of Armenia sees the border every day and realizes that the enemy lurks on the other side. Having relations with Turkey will have a direct impact on the daily lives of people in Armenia and this is what must be discussed. What is the value of the border for us? I don\'t agree that our salvation lies in the opening of the border firstly because the last 15 years has proven that our economy can develop, here and there, without it. The opening of the border also signifies the potential of Turkish infiltration, something they can accomplish not by economic calculations but by geo-political ones; so that Armenia becomes totally dependent on Turkey. It was about six months ago that someone sneaked in one millon from Turkey and the place went crazy. What is one billion for Turkey? -  to buy up corporations and land, to make Armenia economically dependent in so many ways. I believe we must take a measured approach to the border issue and not permit the creation of a general impression that leads people in Armenia to believe that their only salvation lies with the opening of the border.

(For full text of interview see Armenian version)

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