Against the backdrop of the initiative by President Serzh Sargsyan to allow Hovik Abrahamyan to be “selected” as the President of the National Assembly certain analysts detected an intention to return the reins of power to Robert Kocharyan. People point to his selection to the post of Prime Minister as the best possible resolution of the matter.

The tandem of Serzh Sargsyan-Hovik Abrahamyan-Robert Kocharyan was bandied about as the final objective and the ultimate entrenchment of the regime.

The position voiced by Robert Kocharyan in his last briefing, that he as yet has no desire to return and that he would be the first to make such a desire publicly known, really doesn’t say anything at all. The problem is that Kocharyan didn’t speak about leaving or having left the official government system for good but rather he made understood that if he entertained such a desire no one would be in a position to prevent him from doing so. In other words it is far too early to speak about his leaving the political arena. To whom was this allusion directed at?

Just days before all this the First President of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, stated at one of the rallies organized by the Armenian National Congress that talk regarding the return of Robert Kocharyan was actively being circulated by the Kocharyan camp itself. The aim of this was to solidify opposing attitudes within the regime and particularly the nomenclature circles and by thus doing so preserve the long-term governance of Serzh Sargsyan on a certain level. Put another way, Kocharyan wishes to keep Serzh Sargsyan in a constant state of fear; that he can pull the rug out from under his feet whenever he so chooses. If we pay close attention to Kocharyan’s response regarding the talk surrounding his return this completely falls within the parameters of the scenario propounded by Ter-Petrosyan.

In other words, the notion that Robert Kocharyan actually has such a desire becomes all the more realistic. Furthermore, it can become an extremely important band pivotal factor that can lead to a set of critical situations internal to the regime or to a change in the ruling coalition’s format, in the event that developments proceed accordingly.

The question remains as to how realistic is the implementation of such a plan and to what extent Serzh Sargsyan is interested in it. It is apparent that relations between Serzh Sargsyan and Robert Kocharyan cannot worsen to such an extent that things turn into an interpersonal conflict. This is the case because such an outcome would be destructive for both and they understand this to a tee. Thus, both will not let the political processes reach a critical point from which a return would be directly impossible.

Nevertheless, within the borders of these parameters both are attempting to essentially solidify their respective positions. For Serzh Sargsyan this is vital in order to guarantee the unity of the government. In the case of Robert Kocharyan it is vital first to preserve and protect certain economic allowances that he now enjoys and, in case he desires to return to government, it is also vital to preserve certain preliminary start-up resources. This doesn’t mean that Serzh Sargsyan will try to deprive him of these economic allowances.

At the same time Serzh Sargsyan understands that Kocharyan, in turn, doesn’t wish to change the rules of the game and resolve the matter of returning at the benefit of losing his political, administrative or economic resources. This would also be seen as a concrete step directed at crossing the boundary. In other words, within the parameters of these boundaries the possibilities of maneuvering and playing a unique game remain for both. And both are seeking to benefit from this. This is even more the case since for both this is vital in certain cases - to differentiate those to be trusted from the untrustworthy, to crystallize their authority.

If we pay attention we will see that news about the alleged contradictions between the two were spread throughout the duration of the Kocharyan presidency. Moreover, after this talk became enlivened, in a strange sort of coincidence, there took place a set of personnel changes that raised quite a ruckus, the most pivotal of which was probably the sacking of Carlos Petrosyan, Minister of National Security. In other words, such talk was artificial in nature and they allowed both Kocharyan and Sargsyan to clarify who was most loyal to each, who was more inclined to fall under the sway of outside “entrapments” and to generally take stock of the solidity of the personnel resources that were in support of them.

It cannot be ruled out that the talk now circulating regarding the return of Kocharyan also has a certain artificial content in the above mentioned circles. However, the difference is that one of these two pivotal players is absent from the regime today; and the one that is in power is much less preferable for the team and this is something that Kocharyan can’t help put tale into account when he makes his calculations.

His main playing card in this situation, however strange it may seem, remains the opposition. The stronger the latter is, the weaker the position of Serzh Sargsyan. For Sargsyan this means that in terms of preserving the stability of the country he will be in a position dependent on Kocharyan who, with his governance approaches of consolidation, not retreating from decisions adopted and his work ethic of not going down the road of compromise, has left the question of who, between the two, possesses the greatest capability of preserving the unity of the regime, always dangling.

Serzh Sargsyan, who is trying to resolve this matter by proposing methods of governance totally contrary, cannot escape being affected by this situation. The nomination of Tigran Sargsyan for the post of Prime Minister and forcing ministers to listen to his morality-spiced talks during government sessions were the first steps of this process.

With the ideas and approaches voiced in his first speech delivered in the National Assembly, directed to the parliament and the people, he directly attempted to openly state that, contrary to the Kocharyan regime, he is trying to adopt a transparent and public work ethic.

That all this, in reality, isn’t a qualitative change in the methods of governance but simply an attempt to set himself apart from Kocharyan, is exemplified by the fact that Serzh Sargsyan, in resolving political problems and especially in the arena of personnel policy, is absolutely not being guided by the very ideas he himself voiced regarding the public process.

In particular, it still hasn’t been explained why the resignation of Tigran Torosyan was necessary for increasing the authority of the National Assembly and why it was necessary to replace him with Hovik Abrahamyan. Also, why did the President of the ROA Court of Cassation tender his resignation without any meaningful explanation, or why are the facts and information surrounding the destruction of violations and state methods published by the Control Chamber, which enjoys a legislatively independent status, again being checked by the President’s Inspectorate Services. Can the latter enjoy a higher status than the Control Chamber and why hasn’t any official, say the Regional Governor of Syunik or one of the former Ministers of Urban Development, been subject to a measure of accountability as a result of these uncovered violations?

These “inexplicable” manifestations, however, serve to prove that Serzh Sargsyan is trying to resolve his political problems on a behind the scenes level; leaving public declarations to safeguarding the stability of the social-political state of affairs and neutralizing the essential question of his legitimacy in the public consciousness.

And what is the problem that the President wishes to resolve? In essence, he is seeking two main objectives - to create his own political team, a support structure, and secondly, to possess such an administrative apparatus, that can be transformed into a real authority power base. In terms of the first, one of the most essential problems was to deliver the governance of the National Assembly into the hands of an acceptable and totally trustworthy person; and he accomplished this. Parallel to this, he is actively making personel changes in those sectors, the judicial, tax, customs, which were essential levers in the hands of the former president.

The removal from office of Vahram Barseghyan, who headed the State Tax Service, in such a boisterous manner, was the most glaring expression of this process. Serzh Sargsyan is attempting to, one by one, free him from those pivotal personnel, who owe their career and rise to power primarily to Robert Kocharyan; that’s to say, they are his people. In this context one must also expect the Control Chamber to show a particular interest in the Ministry of Urban Construction.

One must not forget that Vardan Vardanyan, the Minister of Urban Construction, is a member of the “Prosperous Armenia” party that was created by the initiative of Kocharyan himself and that he is on close terms with Gagik Tzaroukyan, the leader of that party. Here, isn’t it possible to see the intention to pull the chestnuts out of the fire by the hands of Ishkhan Zakaryan? In any case it is difficult to believe that these developments would have taken place if Sargsyan didn’t see a potential desire on the part of Kocharyan to return.

It is possible to infer that Serzh Sargsyan is making it clearly understood to Robert Kocharyan, his main “ally” that he should try to be content with what he has and refrain from activities on a much larger scale.

Besides this, there is the important factor of the “external world” to be considered. It is a fact that Serzh Sargsyan has abruptly changed the vectors of Armenia’s foreign politics and has adopted such tactics that would have never been favorably received by Kocharyan.

The subtlety and uniqueness of the state of affairs that has been created is such that the western oriented politics implemented by Serzh Sargsyan is more preferable both for the United States and for Europe than what Kocharyan was offering. In other words, Sargsyan has also restricted the potential of the former President to put this factor into play and Russia remains as the only field on which the struggle can assume a  more heated and meaningful nature.