In 125 B.C., after he learned of the wealth of the surrounding lands, Chinese Emperor Wu-Ti, who reigned from 141/140 - 87/86 BC, decided to export his country's silk by caravan to India and Central Asia. Thus, in ancient times, caravans loaded with valuables from China, India and other Eastern powers reached Western states. The paths of the caravan traffic gradually formed the Great Silk Road.

The idea of restoring the Great Silk Road began to circulate with projects initiated by the European Union (TRACECA - Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus, and INOGATE - In terstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe), the United States ( Silk Road Strategy Act), and Japan (New Eurasian Diplomacy). The Silk Road of our times was intended not only to promote the turnover of goods but to assist in the transit of energy resources and creation of an up-to-date communication system as well. The significance of the common Eurasian communication system has from the beginning been evaluated not so much by the volumes of energy resources, the length of the pipelines, or the expected profit, as by geopolitical influence.

The South Caucasus plays a key role in the Great Silk Road project. But efforts over the last years to turn the region into a unified transit zone have not yet yielded results. The problems that arose were quite complex, and were interlinked with the national interests of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Thus, in order for the South Caucasus to play its full role as communication corridor, it was necessary to solve two key problems - to settle Georgian-Russian and Armenian-Turkish relations. In the first case, it was not the issue of the foreign orientation of Georgia that had to be determined, but the withdrawal of Russian military bases from the country. In the second case, it was to make sure - through the normalization of relations with Turkey - that Armenia was no longer Russia's principal stronghold in the region. Experience has shown that no country, even Turkey, which is considered the engine of the geopolitical changes, was able to make concessions for the sake of regional integration. Moreover, a multilateral political bargaining over who was to assume the principal role within the communication system began, during which steps initiated by one country contradicted the interests of its strategic partners. And vice versa - in the struggle for influence, Russia and the US initiated steps that did not always proceed from the interests of the regional states, which unconditionally supported one or the other.

In 1995, an agreement was signed to transport oil from the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian basin to Turkey, and further, to Europe. For Azerbaijan, the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline was a means to exert pressure on Armenia; for the United States, it was a device to move Armenia away from Russian influence. The first discussions on constructing an Iran-Armenia gas pipeline began in 1992. At the time, Armenia was in a deep energy crisis - Azerbaijan and Turkey had imposed a blockade on Armenia, the Armenian Nuclear Power Station was not operating, and the gas pipeline from Russia to Armenia was being periodically blown up. But the arrangement between the governments to build an Iran-Armenia gas pipeline was not made until 1995, when Armenia was no longer in an extreme situation, and when the Baku-Ceyhan agreement had been signed. Thus, it was not by accident that the option of creating an Iran-Armenia gas route was being developed - Iranian gas would flow via Armenia to European countries, cutting through the Georgia-Black Sea-Ukraine route.

By 2000, the Kiev research institute TransGas had already calculated how much investment would be needed to transport Iranian gas from the Georgian city of Supsa to the Ukrainian city of Theodosia. At the time it was also rumored that the European Bank on Reconstruction and Development would assist in the construction of the pipeline, under the condition that the Armenian Nuclear Power Station would be closed down. In fact, Armenia, as a country isolated from the epoch-making projects, was trying to solve its own problems - theoretically contrary to the interests of Russia.

After he returned from Ankara in January 2001, then-president of Georgia Edward Shevardnadze announced the arrangement to build a Kars-Akhalkalak railroad. It was natural that taking advantage of Armenian-Azerbaijani and Armenian-Turkish differences, he wanted cargo from Turkey to Azerbaijan, Central Asia, and Europe to pass through Georgia. This arrangement between Georgia and Turkey has never been implemented. But the fact is that by making it, the two countries dealt a blow to the long-term plans of their strategic partner, the US, first of all. The United States does not aim at keeping Georgia and Azerbaijan within its sphere of influence, but at pulling Armenia away from the strong claws of Russia.

In the course of May 2004, three communication projects in the region were announced. On May 13 th , an agreement on constructing the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline was signed. The pipeline will not cross the Armenian-Georgian border, i.e. it will help to satisfy only the energy requirements of the two countries - Armenia and Iran. Within a closed cycle, Iran will export electric energy in exchange for the gas imported by Armenia. According to various sources, Russia is categorically opposed to making the Iran-Armenia pipeline a transit project, even though Russia has recently acquired control of 80 percent of the energy system of Armenia, and wouldn't suffer any economic damage. Why Russia opposed the plans of Armenia, which has great significance for Russia in the region, became clear just eleven days later.

On May 24 th , Anatoly Chubais, the CEO of the Russian Energy monopoly RAO UES, reached an agreement in Baku to construct new power grids, and to put the energy systems of Azerbaijan, Iran, and Russia into parallel operation. Azerbaijan was the only country that hadn't yet been subjected to Russian energy expansion. In the summer of 2004, RAO UES bought the Tbilisi-based Telasi, which controls Georgia's main power plants and the capital's grid. In fact, if the Baku agreements are implemented, Russia will control the energy systems of the three South Caucasian states.

How it happened that Azerbaijan, considered to be a strategic partner of the US, agreed to cooperate with Iran requires no explanation. Despite the fact that the US policy in Iraq has been compromised tremendously, no one has removed Iran from the list of "axis of evil" countries. When he returned from Ankara on May 21 st , President Sahakashvili of Georgia announced that he had agreed with Turkish President Sezer on uniting the Turkish and Adjarian railroads. Of course, this route for transporting Turkish cargo to Azerbaijan and farther to the East, via Georgia and bypassing Armenia, is not economically justified. But Georgian-Turkish communication links will be improved and diversified. If investments necessary for this project are found, Armenia will lose its status as the country with the most efficient railroad routes in the region.

Unlike those of the other countries of the South Caucasus, as well as of Iran and Turkey, the railroad network of Armenia, built at the end of the 19 th century, has been exceptional until recently. Armenia is the only country that has railway entry and exit capacities with all four of the countries on its borders. In March 2004, President Sahakashvili announced in Yerevan that he would discuss with the Turkish leadership the issue of reopening of the Kars-Gyumri railroad. This route has one important advantage vis-à-vis other projected routes - it is economically the most profitable for transporting goods from Turkey to Georgia, Azerbaijan and Central Asia. But economic illogic continues to reign within the communication realm of the South Caucasus.