A member of parliament and chairman of the Republican Party of Georgia, David Berdzenishvili was one of the decision-makers during the Georgian revolution, a comrade-in-arms of President Mikhail Saakashvili; they had formed a united block during the November 2003 parliamentary elections. Berdzenishvili's party was created in 1978 and operated underground during the Soviet era. It opposed the election and subsequent policies of the first president of independent Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, and was sharply critical of President Edward Sheverdnadze. Today David Berdzenishvili is in opposition to Mikhail Saakashvili as well.

- Does it turn out that you are an eternal oppositionist?

- Two and a half a year ago, together with Mikhail Saakashvili the Republicans formed a national movement, the Democratic Front; together we won the elections to the Tbilisi City Council. Sahakashvili was elected chairman of the Tbilisi Sakrebulo (City Council) and I became the chairman of the Democratic Front faction. Today the degree of our opposition to Sahakashvili is determined by the degree of his democratism. Sahakashvili has certain problems with democracy that became apparent after the slogans " Georgia without Shevardnadze" and "Adjaria without Abashidze" were realized. By the way, these were our, Republican, slogans. We managed to solve those problems together with Sahakashvili. On June 20, 2004 elections to the Supreme Soviet of Adjaria took place and we began to criticize Sahakashvili's National Movement. The elections that were conducted in Adjaria were nowhere near democratic standards, with a high degree falsification. We don't consider Law on the Status of Adjaria that was adopted acceptable, since virtually nothing is left of the local self-government. According to this law, Saakashvili has the right to nominate the candidate for prime minister to the elected parliament of Adjaria. In other words, the president of Georgia has done what Vladimir Putin is going to do with the Russian regions. We have disagreements vis-à-vis the Ossetian problem as well. We were not happy with the conduct of new Georgian leaders during the worsening of the situation there in August 2004. I think that the Saakashvili regime swallowed the provocation by Russia . But we must also give him his due - eventually he understood what was going on and didn't allow the Georgian-Ossetian antagonism to develop into a large-scale war. He gets credit for making the mistake and for correcting it.

- The new Georgia authorities have declared on many occasions that they have a new approach to the settlement of the Abkhazian problem. Is it the settlement that you offered earlier?

- No one has been seriously engaged in the Abkhazian problem in Georgia , with the exception of the Republican Party and some non-partisan experts. And from within the political spectrum of Georgia , ours were the only proposals known to the Abkhazians. Thus, many people considered that since Sahakashvili was in the same block with the Republicans and since he appointed Georgi Khaindrava from the Republican Party as his State Minister on Abkhazia and South Ossetia , our concepts and approaches would be assumed as the basis for the settlement of the Abkhazian problem. There exists a sizeable document drafted by Georgian experts, most of whom represent our party, where the idea of federalism in Georgia , with some elements of a confederation, is developed. Although the Sahakashvili regime doesn't have a concept of the Abkhazian settlement itself yet, our proposals are not considered to be new Georgian leaders' plan either.

- Do you think that a federation with elements of confederation is possible at all?

- Yes, it is possible. Three or four years ago I suggested the variant of forming a common Georgian state. Meaning that relations would be horizontal, but within the framework of one state.

- Something similar to what the OSCE Minsk group mediators proposed to the parties of the Karabakh conflict?

- Yes I know about this proposal for the settlement of the Karabakh problem, but our variant has been worked out more accurately. There are various legal mechanisms envisaged in it. We cannot wave it away and say that there is only a struggle between Georgia and Russia vis-à-vis the Abkhazian question. This is true, but it is not the whole truth. First of all, it is a conflict between Georgians and Abkhazians. The key to stage-by-stage resolution of the conflict lies not in Moscow , nor in Brussels , nor in Washington , but in Tbilisi and Sukhumi . We are not going to remain in captivity to the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. Georgia should and can develop before a settlement to the conflict is found. Thus, I believe that there are no prospects for the reintegration of Abkhazia into Georgia before serious successes in building a democratic society, introducing European democratic standards, and developing a liberal economy in Georgia are achieved.

- Besides the mistake Shevardnadze committed when he waged the war against Abkhazia, what other mistakes did the former Georgian authorities make that Sahakashvili cannot avoid dealing with?

- President Gamsakhurdia did not the best legacy with regard to Georgian-Abkhazian relations. An image of the enemy was created among the Georgians, and the Abkhazians sought different points of orientation. The Georgians decided to secede from the Soviet Union , to create their own national state, without offering the Abkhazians anything realistic. A place for the Abkhazians was not defined in the new independent Georgia . The rhetoric of Georgian ultra-nationalists did not in any way attract the Abkhazians; therefore they chose Moscow as their point of orientation. It's not only Gamsakhurdia and Shevardnadze who were to blame. The Georgian society in its turn was unprepared; blame lies on those Georgians who, though they understood how disastrous confrontation would be, did not use their authority to prevent the war. Shevardnadze thought he could pacify the Abkhazians with the help of Russia and thus committed his principal mistake - Shevardnadze intended to resolve a problem that could not have arisen without Russia 's involvement with the help of Russia itself. By the way, I never thought highly of his political intelligence or resourcefulness.

- And what about Sahakashvili?

The November 2003 events in Tbilisi and the May 2004 events in Adjaria underscored the huge role Sahakashvili has played. I don't think that he has exhausted his positive potential. Georgia is facing the problem of liberalizing the tax code and the economy. The level of corruption has certainly decreased, but there has been no systemic reform in this area so far. True, the president of Georgia 's approval rating is decreasing, but it is still rather high. Most probably, Sahakashvili believes that today's Georgia needs a strong, centralized power first of all. I disagree with him, and I think that what Gamsakhurdia and Shevardnadze were unable to achieve, Saakashvili won't be able to achieve, either. Now Sahakashvili is facing a very serious problem - his majority in the parliament, with just a few deputies taking the floor, and a long line of hands being raised to vote at his command.

- There are very mixed reactions in Georgia to the phenomenon of former officials being taken into custody and then set free after they make considerable payments into the state treasury. The size of payments is commensurate to the damage inflicted to the state, from the point of view of the new authorities.

- This lies outside the framework of justice. It's some kind of a bargain - if you pay you won't go to jail, or vice versa.

- But people evidently like such measures.

- People liked Gamsakhurdia very much. They elected Gamsakhurdia as president through fair elections, but then the same people didn't want to die with him. People also liked Shevardnadze in 1992. Just because people like something it doesn't mean it's right. Besides, many people who sincerely voted for Sahakashvili and constituted the nucleus of the revolution are now disappointed. Sahakashvili is undoubtedly the number one politician in Georgia, but nevertheless his approval rating and the trust in him are not the same as they were six or eight months ago.

- Many people call the power change in Georgia a revolution, a term which is also frequently used by the current Georgian political elite. However, is changing regimes by revolution a democratic standard?

- The national rebellion in Georgia was deliberate. People were defending the votes they cast in the November 2003 parliamentary elections. They did not vote for an ultra-nationalist or an ultra-populist. And they didn't see a new idol in Sahakashvilli (of course there were and still are people who do). But the most important thing is that practically all the democratic resources in Georgia - NGOs, mass media, intelligentsia, stood by him for three weeks. Sahakashvili will never become an idol for them.

- There is an opinion that because of the strong support by the West during the revolution and during the post-revolutionary period, Sahakashvili is now compelled to work off the Western dollars.

- I don't share that point of view for the simple reason that I was in the thick of things and took part in the decision-making with Sahakashvili. We, the National Movement block, had much less money then, probably some ten times less than the Burdjanadze-Democrats block. Even since the parliamentary elections we haven't felt any special support from the West. I always had the feeling that if Burdjanadze had received more votes, many Western structures would have been happier. But after the election results revealed that the National Movement had received about 27 % of the votes, and the Burdjanadze-Democrats block had gotten about 9% of the votes, after people put their trust in Sahakashvili and Burdjanadze herself supported Sahakashvili, the Western structures did not oppose Sahakashvili. As for the powerful financial support (about $1 billion), the decision about which was made last summer, it is not a gift to Georgia . Certain concepts and proper structures are needed in order for the Georgian economy to utilize this sum. Generally speaking, the events of November 2003 and May 2004 have brought about a sharp growth of interest toward our region as a whole. Georgia is not a self-sufficient geopolitical entity and, naturally, the interest in Georgia is perceived as an interest in the South Caucasian region in general. If Sahakashvili is able to cleverly lead the country, to expand democracy and to create a liberal economy, he will get even more support from the West.

- You said once that the problem of Djavakheti is of a social and economic nature. Is there any other component there?

- The Djavakheti problem is multifaceted. The Armenian government and, as far as I know, the Armenian society as a whole acknowledge that it is an internal problem in Georgia . I don't know whether the Dashnak (Armenian Revolutionary Federation-Dashnaktsutiun) program of creating a Greater Armenia which would include Djavakheti is still valid, but I would like to say that it is not a friendly attitude toward Georgia . Nevertheless, we don't think that Armenia and the Armenian society as a whole wish for Georgia to disintegrate. There are problems with local self-government in Djavakheti. However, such problems exist with every national minority in a semi-democratic and transitional country. Georgia is not going to create an ethnic Armenian autonomy for the Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda regions. But there is a serious problem with the integration of the citizens of Djavakheti into national structures. Therefore, unless there are elective regional authorities in Samtskhe-Djavakheti, unless there are real municipalities in Ninotsminda and in Akhalkalaki, serious problems will remain there. Another part of the problem is the corruption that prevents transporting goods from this region to other parts of Georgia. And the third part of the problem is the Russian military base in Akhalkalaki. Traditionally it has been considered to be a protector for the Armenians and many people in Djavakheti work there and make their living. If there is no Russian base, the Georgian state will have to offer its citizens other alternative jobs. I am familiar with this region and I am convinced that there is no separatism there.