Below is the first of a two part interview with Richard Giragosian, Director of the Armenian Center for National and International Studies, based in Yerevan.

Mr. Giragosian speaks about Armenia-Diaspora relations, growing up in the AYF, the current political situation in Armenia, his hopes for the future, and, of course, the Protocols.

During the 70 years of Soviet Armenia there were little if any substantive relations between the Diaspora and Armenia. Have you seen a qualitative change since independence; especially in terms of bridge building between these two realities?

What’s most interesting is we see a significant change in form in terms of outreach with the diaspora in comparison with the Soviet period. But we see an interesting similarity and very little change in terms of substance. In other words, during the Soviet period whether it was the Soviet Armenian government or the central authorities in Moscow, the diaspora was looked at with apprehension. Misunderstanding but also there was a constructive effort in terms of the Soviet system in literature, culture, art, in terms of approaching the diaspora, to almost disseminate propaganda. We see a similar situation here, where the diaspora is looked at with misunderstanding, and sometimes scepticism. But we do see that the form has changed.

None of the Armenian governments since independence has done enough to either mobilize or harness the potential of the diaspora. But on the diaspora side there was an interesting change. In the 90’s there was the initial honeymoon period, where the diaspora, in the beginning was very active in Armenia, driven by two general trends. One was the eruption of the Karabakh issue and the war and the diaspora mobilization in terms of support for Karabakh self-determination and to support early independence of Armenia. But that honeymoon wore off. Because if we look at the trajectory of business investment of the diaspora in Armenia, most has pulled out or been expropriated, stolen if you will. In other words the system of corruption that has plagued Armenian since independence has also been a serious barrier to harnessing diaspora potential but also has surfaced as an obstacle for the diaspora to find its feet in Armenia and in this economy.

Let me quote you something that was stated by the RoA Ministry of Diaspora Affairs Hranush Hakobyan during a fact-finding visit she made to the diaspora on the eve of the recent tour made by President Serzh Sargsyan to various worldwide Armenian communities after signing in Armenian-Turkish Protocols. She stated, “…The government of Armenia was attempting to forge a free and open society where social justice and human rights would reign.” Should we believe in her sincerity?

The only reason I would cast a cynical view on such sloganeering is rooted in the reality of today’s Armenia. And not only because of March 1, 2008 and the post-election crisis that led to the tragic death of ten people and over 200 injured, but in terms of the closed nature of Armenia today.

Closed borders have also closed minds within Armenia. In terms of a very closed and very corrupt political and economic system. And that’s why even the words of the Prime Minister, let alone the Diaspora Minister, in terms of the need to battle the oligarchs, to battle corruption, and institute real reform…the words are good but they’re not enough. We have seen a contradiction between action and promises; between policies and promises.

Following up, I want to raise two watershed events in recent RoA history; March 1, 2008 and the Protocols. Regarding the reaction of the diaspora to these two milestone events, we see dissimilarity. In response to March 1, we didn’t see the gut, emotional outpouring of opposition that we saw from the diaspora towards the Protocols. Why is it that developments in the RoA, on the magnitude of March 1st, haven’t engendered the same emotional response as say the Protocols? Is it, as many have pointed out, that diaspora Armenians just don’t regard the RoA as their “historic homeland” or the presently constituted Armenia national state?

I believe that there are two fundamental explanations. The first, in a very broad sense in a very natural reflection of history, and history of the diaspora and not just of Armenia, we see that the large majority of the diaspora has little if any direct connection to the current RoA as a successor to the Soviet Armenian republic. In other words, the majority of the diaspora, like myself, have our family roots from Turkish Armenia. And having much stronger emotional affiliation with Van, Kars or Kharpert and our relation with Gyumri, Yerevan or Vanadzor is more abstract. Now, that’s a general development. However, since the onset of independence, Armenia has been at various times able to emerge as the center of gravity for the diaspora. But only in times of peril or threat – whether it’s the Karabakh war, whether it’s the continued threat from Azerbaijan or whether it’s the earthquake. In other words, the connection between today’s Armenia and the majority in the diaspora has been limited to crisis-driven activity. Hence, the Protocols in terms of, hey, wait a minute – the Armenian government which was not freely and fairly elected is assuming the responsibility to negotiate on behalf of our lineage and legacy from the Armenian Genocide. It’s not only an inherent threat to our identity and interests. And I think this explains a lot of the backlash.

That’s natural. But I don’t agree with it however because in many ways I think that for the diaspora to evolve , and not just Armenia to evolve, the connection must be based on a more modern currency – democracy, human rights, economic development, as well as the Genocide. And until now we see an incomplete picture. Part of it is also in the psychology of the diaspora, where in terms of Armenia under threat, has promoted a perception that any criticism of the Armenian government, no matter who they were, no matter how authoritarian, was helping the enemy and weakening Armenia within the international community. There is merit to the argument. However, I think that this has only fostered complacency in terms of a lack of human rights, a deficit of democracy and socio-economic injustice. In other words, that kind of blind support for the Armenian governments has only lead to a bigger question – what kind of Armenia is this country becoming? Not the kind of Armenia that the diaspora envisions, or the Armenian population either wants or deserves.

I think this is a challenge for the diaspora and, as a diasporan living here, I call them to tackle. The intensity in terms of the Protocols is a good thing, greater activity and interest, but at the same time the diaspora should understand that the reaction of the people in Armenia is one of scepticism and almost hypocrisy. Here in Armenia many ask – where was the reaction of the diaspora to the death of innocent Armenians on March 1, 2008? To be honest this scepticism is fostered by some in the diaspora who, when they come to Yerevan and stay at the Marriott Hotel, are completely happy to be able to gaze at Mt. Ararat from their hotel room, and all they want in return is a photo taken with the president or a minister, rather than demanding conditionality and real progress in democracy and economic development. The diaspora faces the challenge that it has to demand more conditionality, strings should be attached to philanthropy and engagement, but the Armenian government must be also forced to be more accountable to the diaspora. It’s a two-way street.

Do you believe that there are those on both sides of the equation, diaspora and RoA, who are willing and capable of walking down this “two-way street’? Can the diaspora ever get its act together in terms of organization? The “Knights of Vartan” signed off on the Protocols. Is that the level we’ve reached, where a fraternal organization is regarded as a representative of the people on such a crucial matter?

To be fair, I think the diaspora has usually been a very dynamic and state of flux embryonic tent where all stripes, all colors, all persuasions are reflected on different levels and strata in the diaspora. It’s always going to be like that. It’s never going to be as a monolith as the Turks think it is or as the Israelis try to portray,

But, for the Armenian side, I think that’s OK because the real future course in an optimistic sense, if it works, is that Armenia will lead and the diaspora will follow, rather than vice-versa. In terms of foreign policy, I think that over the past ten years we have seen a lot of the initiative in foreign policy coming from outside Armenia, from the diaspora, and the Armenian foreign ministries reacting. I think that is changing now. I think that the initiative is being regained in Yerevan, most visibly by the visit of the Turkish President. Whether we agree or not isn’t the issue. The point being that the diaspora must understand that it faces a new challenge – of taking a back seat to RoA initiatives. This may trigger a positive reaction where the diaspora tries to hold the RoA government more accountable for the first time.

But, if we look at the Protocol issue, a lot of the negative reaction has seemed to dissipate. It’s latent, still simmering, but it’s not as vocal. Thus, with a lack of diaspora presence on the ground in Armenia, either in numbers or in terms of power, we see that the negative reaction to the Protocols, even with the ARF leaving the coalition, is still less than many expected and less than what the Armenian government expected.

So, in terms of charting a new course for the diaspora, perhaps the diaspora will only play a secondary role and its potential will remain largely untapped until the day that segments of the diaspora are actively living on the ground here in Armenia and sharing the daily life of the average citizen. This, despite the few exceptions of diasporans living here and diaspora organizations involved on the ground. But I don’t think that this is necessarily bad because the future of Armenia, in terms of democracy or nation-building is within the boundaries of Armenia, and is not dependent as much on the Armenian community in Glendale, Lyon or Buenos Aires.

Let’s take a more objective look at what we like to call the “diaspora” or Armenians in the dispersion. Given the existence of an independent Armenian state, can we continue to speak of Armenians living an exiled existence? Those who regard themselves as being dispossessed, cut off from Armenian communal existence, due to the 1915 Genocide, have the option of resettling in the RoA, that little piece of the Armenian homeland where, for better or worse, Armenian national life perseveres.

When diaspora Armenians don’t even return to Armenia, in their quest for reintegration into an Armenian communal existence, can their demands for lands across the border in present Turkey be taken seriously?

From a very more realistic, or cynical view, we are not the Palestinians; we don’t have the demographics in Western Armenia and that makes our territorial claims that much weaker. And the separation mentally within the diaspora between what was Soviet Armenia, the Russian speaking Armenians, the eastern-Armenian speaking Armenians, and us, is not only a negative development but it’s also leading the diaspora nowhere. In other words, the real key to healthier progress in the diaspora is to focus more on the statehood of Armenia, because we have two things – the Armenian nation, which includes the diaspora, and the Armenian state. They are two very different things. And up till now, we see almost a contradiction between the Armenian nation and the Armenian state.

But the quality of the Armenian state is so poor that here in Armenia we need the diaspora more than ever in terms of reversing the negative direction in which we are going -demographically, economically or politically. At the same time, the institutions that were built in the diaspora were built to sustain it until regaining independence. But now that independence has been regained, even though it’s on a smaller portion of the historic homeland, what are we waiting for? What is the diaspora waiting for?

What I am saying is that not all from the diaspora have to move back; but some have to. In other words, the contradiction between every April 24th in the diaspora and the daily life of most diasporans compared to the absence of the diasporan presence here is so great that it begins to question the mission and the mandate of the diasporan organizations and institutions.

Can we argue that many top RoA government officials, despite the rhetoric to the contrary, see it in their best interests to keep the diaspora at arm’s length? The less the diaspora interferes and gets involved in RoA life the better? If this is the case, how sincere is the RoA government, when it speaks of repatriation?

Of course many in the government would rather not have the diaspora raise uncomfortable questions and challenges regarding corruption or the state of Armenia today. The simple reality is that if the RoA government truly wanted to encourage diasporan repatriation or involvement, one of the most corrupt element of Armenian official society is OVIR (Division of Passports and Visas), where there are Soviet-style obstacles erected to actually serve as disincentives for people like us who want to live and work here, legally and according to the rule of law.

There’s a disincentive expressed through a Soviet style bureaucracy of hoops and hurdles that are leveraged to actually intimidate and also discourage. OVIR is the perfect example, as I have experienced and I’m sure you and others have as well.

We’ve touched on the fact that many in the diaspora descended from Genocide survivors tracing their roots back to the Ottoman Empire, feel little if any emotional attachment to the RoA. But why, after so many years of living detached from that reality, to these same Armenians feel so emotionally attached to the towns and villages of their grandparents and in some cases, great grandparents? You would think the RoA would be a more realistic substitute for a time and a place that no longer exists.

There will always be an emotional attachment to the past, but in practical terms, the mythology that we see developed, say, if we look at the work of one of my favourite professors on this subject, Khachig Tololyan, in terms of examining the narrative, the mythology. The mythology was used in the Soviet period due to a lack of an alternative; to keep the myth alive – the Armenian Cause, the Armenian dream, to weather the Soviet period, when Armenia was closed off and was locked in a bigger empire.

But the time for that mythology has passed. What we need to do now is to move from mythology to more of a modus operandi. For example, if the Turkish border with Armenia opens, many in the diaspora will have a new opportunity to actually begin to either invest, or buy land, even in Western Armenia. But I don’t know if there is any interest, any willingness. Interestingly, though, in a general sense, in comparison, we have a population of slightly over two million in the RoA with no real opportunity and if we look outside of Yerevan, in the marzes (regions), we see that it resembles the Armenia of a century ago, it resemble Armenian village life in the Ottoman Empire. There’s no progress, no opportunity for advancement. If we can’t even develop the territory that we currently have, that tends to question the practical utility or rational of demanding back our lands in Western Armenia, after which everything will be OK.

Doesn’t this also call into question the sincerity of those in diaspora, individuals and political organizations that make such claims? Is it just presented as their “raison d’être”, a justification to keep fund-raising and continuing down the same road? Is it a tragic waste of scarce resources, of focus?

Well, let’s return to one of the milestones you mentioned, the Protocols. The Armenian President embarked on a world-wind tour of select diaspora communities. The interesting thing in my opinion was that he was successful. In the beginning, when he was planning on going, my initial reaction was that he was making two fundamental mistakes. The first is that he is elevating the diaspora by going to them; by placing the diaspora on the same level as the Armenian state. Secondly, he’s going there and how can he expect to change minds; it’s impossible. But I was wrong. He made it a success by going not to convince the diaspora but to listen. And he challenged the diaspora.

President Sargsyan told them, fine, you are against this. What’s your alternative? Closed borders and a lack of relations is not a policy. Not for Azerbaijan, not for Turkey, nor for the Armenian diaspora. And the Armenian diaspora failed to come up with a coherent alternative. I think that for many fence-sitters, or the vast majority of non-political or non-politicized diasporans, it showed the emptiness of some of the political organizations and some of the political leaders in the diaspora.

Now I say this not just due to the fact that I dislike this president. But I do agree with this policy despite my serious misgivings about the process, i.e. the process in terms of secret, late night declarations, the most offensive being the one on April 23 last year. In other words, the inherent flaws are the bigger picture. That’s to say, who elected these people and how were they elected. Certainly not in a free and fair election. The first free and fair election in Armenia was its last.

At least on this one issue, the Armenian president was able to manipulate the diaspora. Those sitting on the fence in the diaspora regarding the Protocols weren’t won over by the vocal opposition and the president didn’t even try to win them over and didn’t need to. But whether it’s the ARF or the other organizations, they looked at little shallow in their positions against the Protocols. However, the bigger problem here is that it also revealed the state of the diaspora, which is still finding its place. Now that the issue is of talks between Armenia and Turkey, including possibly a sub-commission on historical issues, these are fundamental challenges to the Armenian identity in the diaspora. And I think that the jury is still out on how the diaspora is to react if the Protocols are passed or not passed.

The real danger is that it is Turkey’s hands now. That’s to say that if this effort fails it will make next time much more difficult and will also embolden the radical elements, the crazies, on both sides. At the same time though, my recommendation would be if that Turkey misses this opportunity, and the ball’s in their court, then Armenia needs to exploit that and maximize the pain and punishment or penalty that Turkey should pay for failing to meet minimal expectations of countries. At the same time, Armenia may have to revisit its policy and say maybe we shouldn’t have a policy of no pre-conditions; maybe Turkey only respects strength and a hard-ball stance.

What would those pre-conditions be on the part of Armenia if there is a next time? Bringing up the situation of the Armenian community in Istanbul, preservation of historical Armenian monuments in Turkey?

No; much more hardball on the Genocide issue. The current diplomacy represents the Armenian side trading; Turkey giving up and reducing its demand for Nagorno-Karabakh by removing it from the Protocols, despite the rhetoric, and losing Azerbaijan, temporarily. But at the same time, in exchange, Armenia has tended to give Turkey a graceful way out of dealing with the Genocide legacy or a moderate way to deal with it but on their terms. It is too soon to say if this go-round will fail, but if it does, perhaps Armenia should resort to pressure tactics. Maybe that will only work with Turkey, if this present attempt fails.

(To be continued)

See also:

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• Ռիչարդ Կիրակոսյան. «Հայ բանակցողները չէի՞ն կարող ավելի կրեատիվ և խելացի լինել»
• Ռիչարդ Կիրակոսյան. «Ես 100 %-ով պաշտպանում եմ այս քաղաքականությունը»
• Ռ. Կիրակոսյան. «Պատասխանատվության ողջ բեռը Թուրքիայի ուսերին է, եւ նա շատ մոտ է կանգնած եզակի հնարավորությունը կորցնելուց»
• Ի՞նչ են Հայաստանին սովորեցնում մոլդովական դեպքերը
• Կ. Կալեչյան. «Արևմուտքին և Ռուսաստանին պետք է մաքսիմալ խաղաղ Հարավային Կովկաս»
• Ռ. Կիրակոսյան. «Պետք է աթոռ տալ Ստեփանակերտին»
• Հայաստանի վերլուծաբաններին չեզոքություն է պետք