After Bidzina Ivanishvili's Georgian Dream came to power in a peaceful way through the parliamentary elections in Georgia, we can notice interesting developments in the foreign policy of that country. 

Both before and after the parliamentary elections the attention ofpolitical analysts and politicians was mainly focused on the changes that would happen in Georgian domestic and foreign policies after that "velvet revolution," particularlywhether the strategic development of Georgia, adopted by President Saakashvili and his team, would be changed. 

How would Ivanishvili's impressive capital gained in Russia, his connections and Russian allure influence Georgia's recent Euro-Atlantic positioning?What deviation will there be in the balance of foreign policy positions, and on average what line of force would Georgia's foreign policy adopt?

A new situation, fears and expectations from the Georgian Dream

After being appointed Prime Minister, in his interviewswithEuronews and other Western media outlets Ivanashvili reconfirmed his inflexibility in integrating Georgia into Euro-Atlantic structures. The Georgian Dream leader's curtseyswere perceived as a trend towards normalizing relations with the neighbor to the north. The gesture was even welcomed by some Western structures, which, especially after the Georgian-Russian war of 2008, were blaming President Saakashvili for not seeking solutions to resume relations with Russia.

No matter how much Ivanashvili and the Georgian Dream criticize the outgoing president and his government's wrong policy, or more precisely, wrong strategy towards Russia as well as the territories formerly subject to Georgia, they understand that his mistakes were an opportunity for Russia to intimidate Georgia intoaccelerating its Euro-Atlantic integration course and bring NATO to the South Caucasus.Ivanishvili, who promised to continue the coursewith NATO, realizes that new conflicts with Georgia's northernneighbor are possible in the future, so long as Russia continues toview NATO expansion a threat to its national interests andsecurity. And he is determined to bring Georgia closer toNATO.

 

Ivanashvili knows very well that in August of 2008 Saakashvili lost what Georgia lost long ago--the autonomous regions.He believes that Saakashvili made an unsuccessful, wrong attemptto return those lost territories though war. It would be impossible to find anyone in Georgia who believes that before and after August 8, 2008, solvingGeorgia's problem of reintegration, not to mention snatching Abkhazia and South Ossetia away from Russia,were possible militarily.

Therefore, Ivanashvili's policy concerning the reintegration of Georgia should be fundamentally different from Saakashvili's concept, at least instrategy,so similar mistakes won't be repeated. For that to work, first and foremost communications with Russianeed to be reestablished.Solutions to the conflict need to be pursued on adifferent level by increasing the size of the "pie," creating newinterests for regional neighbors and involving them in the process, while at thesame time using economicinterests and leverageas a means of influence.

In order tomove forward, Ivanashvili should avoid new setbacks and bring all potential domestic threats that could become a means of manipulation from abroadunder control. Ivanashvili realizes that in a would-be situation leading to disastrousconsequences for Georgiahe would be worse off than Saakashvili, for example if there were new territorial losses.

Particularly, the territories of Georgia inhabited by Armenians and Azerbaijanis could become activatedfor various reasons from within and externally. Armenian-Georgian tensions regarding Javakhk and Georgian Armenians is an old issue with many reasons for conflict: Georgian Armenian rights, ownership and protection issues of Armenian churches, the status of the Armenian Apostolic church, Vahagn Chakhalyan's case, demands for cultural and political autonomy and so forth.

Last year an ethnic conflict arose regarding the 6th century David Gareja monastery complex located on the border between Georgia and Azerbaijan. Other problems exist as well, such as lands belonging to Azerbaijani villages, preexisting problems concerning the Georgia-Azerbaijan border, the situation in Marneluli province where large-scale projects are carried out withthe support of the President and First Lady of Azerbaijan and increasing Azerbaijani influence.Therefore, Ivanashvili's government has to adopt a new strategy in order to contain these risks.

Besides irritating Saakasvili and his team, Ivanashvili's statements regarding the "restart" of relations with Russia could have positive or negative consequences for Georgia's neighbors. 

This new open window in Georgian foreign policy was considered by the Kremlin as a chance to influence its foreign policy and the Euro-Atlantic matter. Thus, Georgia is not a problem for Russia at all: after the Rose Revolutionthe pro-western foreign policy of the Georgian authorities together with effective reforms in the country and a big play made by theWest turned Georgia not only intoa gravitation center, but also a locomotive and compass leading the Caucasus region to Europe. Together with westernization Georgia'sprogress created serious competition for the authorities of Armenia and Azerbaijan. In order to compete with their successful neighbor, the authorities of both countrieswere forcefully or willingly infected by its foreign policy "virus," and its consequences are now clearly visible, especiallyby Moscow.

After the 2008 war Russia realized that by taking back Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it actually built a great wall between itself and the South Caucasus. Although Russia gained small separatist territoriesby winning the Georgian-Russian war, it faced a risk of losing abigger and more strategically important territory--the entire Caucasus. It is worth remembering that after the 2008 war, when asked what Washington was going to do a White House officialanswered that they were examining how Russia'stactical victory could be turned into a strategic defeat. Russia's created realities in the South Caucasus, as surprising as they are, workedagainst it after some time by significantly weakening its position and potentiallydepreciating its military presence significantly in Armenia,assuming theactual geographical connection were lost.

Therefore, Georgian Dreamwas not only a dream for the Georgians who believed it but also for Russia--to remove the great Russian-Georgian wall located in the South, stop the locomotive leading the region towards Europe and "bring Georgia back to the collective and family," as cited in theSoviet-era comedy "Office Romance." Obviously, Georgia's new authorities realize how strategically important the "restart" of Georgian-Russian relationsis for Russia, and its presence in the South Caucasus is an Achilles heel for the Kremlin.

The concept of Ivanashvili's foreign policy, especially its Russian orientation, created a positive consequence also for Armenia. It hopes that improved Georgian-Russian relations will no longermeana creation of tensions that would force official Yerevan to face complicated problems or dilemmas, as had happened during the war of August 2008. On one hand Georgia, the friendly neighboring country that was Armenia's connection to the outside world, needed Armenia's protection, while at the same time the roads vital for Armenia's survival had been blocked.On the other hand the country that put Georgia in such a perilous condition was Armenia's strategic ally, and it had raised the issue of recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia with Armenia.Yerevan, of course, succeededin keeping maximum neutrality, but getting minimum support from their partner could not please both Georgia and Russia, as both wanted the maximum.

What happened in Georgia was positive for Yerevan in the sense that according to Yerevan's forecast, due to Georgia's new foreign course the speed of the European process would decrease and there would no longer be a problem of "competing." Otherwise, Armenia'sisolated position between Brussels and Moscow could seriouslyhurt, especially when a reelected Putin demanded that its allydecide about European and Eurasian integrations and stop the deepening of relations with the European Union.

In this sense, Georgia's slight Russificationis in the interest of the Armenian authorities (but not Armenia)since, as with Azerbaijan, Armenia would no longer need toexpress how it would profit from the country's westernization and its destruction of totalitarian systems. 

Yet Armeniarealizes that a significant Russification of Georgia would deprive it of the opportunity to diversify its foreign policy and deepen mutually beneficial relations with the European Union. Additionally, Georgia's slight Russification is likelyfor normalizing Georgian-Russian relations, and as a result there would beproponents all over Georgia for reestablishing the Armenia-Russia road link, which would alleviate Armenia's blockade.

Of course, such an outlook can't be exciting for Azerbaijan, as the goals of its policy and that of Turkey towards Armenia are to weaken it, throwbackits development and impose their will regarding Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenian-Turkish issues. They used Georgia's territory for all these goals and built the oil and gas pipelines that bypass Armenia as well as the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad. Thus, the perspective of activation of the north-south axis and the opening of communicationsout of a new Georgian policy could not abstain from creating uncertainties both for Azerbaijan and its ally Turkey, as it threatens to devaluate the policy of blockading Armenia. Ivanashvili had many chances to be convinced how precious those tools of Armenia's blockadearefor Azerbaijan and Turkey and that theNagorno-Karabakh conflict and the issue of Genocide recognition are an Achilles heel for all parties. Therefore, those issues would have crucial importance in his new approach and strategy.

Another issue is Turkey's policy towards the Caucasus, which wantsto have a greater involvement in the region, oust Russia from the area and fill the vacuum created with its influence. Meanwhile, Russia has an opportunity to return not only to Georgia but also the entire region. Though, Turkey could speculate these risks and,threatening the West and raising its own importance, offer its own services in order to prevent that.

Turkey, which hasn't had smooth relations with the West, would be glad to see that it didn't place alarger bet on Georgia than on itself. Previously, during Saakashvili's reign, Turkey was openly afraid to see how a small post-soviet country was moving forward in the issue of European integration, while it struggled to join to the European Union for decades.

Hence, Russia's attempt to not only reclaim Georgiapartially (but not fully, otherwise Turkey's pipelines in the region would be closed) but also Russify its surroundings is beneficial for Turkey, which is slightly offended by the West. In the future this can indeed become an objective factor influencing Georgian foreign policy, as it will not depend on Georgia.This prospect is something worth discussing for Turkey and Russia.

In general, what happened in Georgia--the precedent of a smooth transfer of power where the regime of a country in the South Caucasus wasnot changed by revolutionary shocks but elections--threatened both Armenian and Azerbaijani authorities, especially when the societies of both countries were infected by the Georgian Dream's "velvet revolution"virus.

Given the complicated situation just how the line of force of Georgia's foreign policy will advance is unknown. It is still unclear how Georgia would succeed in maintaining its current position in parallel with a new "Russian course." But the emerging aspects of its new foreign and neighborhood policies are becoming obvious. Georgia's leader, who thinks like abusinessman, has developed a new technology that evaluates the fear (or demand) of its neighbors and increases the prices of the products they need.

To be continued

Stepan Safaryan, political analyst