There has been much talk about the pending EU-Armenia Association Agreement, but little in the way of objective analysis from competent commentators. To fill this void, Hetq has sought the input of experts in the field. 

What follows is our interview with one such individual, Professor Gerard Libaridian. 

While the EU-Armenia Association Agreement is to be signed in November, just two months hence, it appears that none of the parties is willing to reveal the text of the document. What, in your view, is the reason for such reluctance? Given that the Agreement will be a lengthy and detailed document, it appears that the public in Armenia will not have sufficient time to weigh the pros and cons. 

If we want to be charitable, we can argue that it is not proper to publish a document while it is still under negotiation.

Or, the parties to the projected Agreement may fear that the release of a draft version may provide the space to over-politicize or even sabotage the Agreement.

It is clear that the politicization of the Agreement has already taken place; but now it is taking place in the dark.

The EU claims that the new Association Agreement has yet to be “finalized”, and thus isn’t ready for publication. Essentially, it would seem that the finalized Association Agreement is being ironed out as we speak and that the document will have already been “agreed to” in theory by the parties anyway. The signing will be a mere formality. Is this a correct view of the process?

The fact that there is a date set for the signing of the Agreement means that there is agreement, at the least, on the principles of the association and the main areas covered. The latter could be made public. It is also possible to imagine that there are still substantial areas to be negotiated. I am not familiar enough with the details of the current negotiations to answer your last question.

The continued investment of millions of Euros by the EU in Armenia is ostensibly pegged to progress on a number of fronts - legislative and judicial reforms, strengthening of democratic institutions, transition to a market economy, respect of human rights, etc. It would seem that the EU feels sufficient progress had been made in order to take the next step with this new Association Agreement. Would you agree with this assessment?

Your premise is valid, generally speaking. The EU must make such a positive judgment in order to offer the association possibility to Armenia and to conduct negotiations that are marked for a positive conclusion in November.

However, we know that international and regional institutions often have undeclared, larger concerns regarding a country when they make their assessments regarding the market economy, democratization, human rights, etc. Just as it happens when they assess elections, or when Kazakhstan happens to chair the OSCE that has very high standards in the areas mentioned.

Sometimes such easing of standards is justified, at least in the minds of these international organizations, as a strategy to encourage the little progress that has been made. However, this easing of standards is more often tied to larger strategic and security concerns. To make things simple with an example: have you ever seen the US or the EU determining their relations with Saudi Arabia, on the basis of that country’s level of democracy and human rights?

A note on your initial assessment that millions of investments will be pouring in with this agreement: we need to learn to distinguish between investment potential, the promise of investment, and actual investment.

So much depends on the “eventualities,” the conditions, the “ifs” and the “buts,” all escape windows for the other side, in this case the EU. May be I have read too much history. But as they say, the devil is in the detail. The text may look OK, and many of us will look for the best, others for the worst in such a text, when it is signed and released. Nonetheless, the EU will have escape clauses and the responsibility for anything going wrong with the agreement will be placed on us.

In other words, the EU will not pay a price for the non-functioning of the agreement. We will.

What are the likely consequences for Armenia if it signs the Association Agreement as opposed to membership in the Russian-led Eurasian Customs Union?

It is obvious that such a document as the Association Agreement with the EU must be assessed on at least two levels. The first level is what the document offers in and by itself. Are the provisions of the Agreement advantageous to Armenia, while not harming any of its vital interests? The second level is the larger context of what is commonly known as the “orientation” issue.

There are good reasons why we are focusing on the second level: we do not have a draft of the agreement under negotiation, so we could discuss its particulars; we have tensions in our relations with Russia, our most important strategic partner; and, for me most importantly, we have a dangerous level in our conflicts with two of our four neighbors. It is understandable that we are drawn to analyzing at the second level.

I am reluctant to provide a clear-cut answer to your question until I see the final EU Agreement document.

But I can offer a couple of reflections. These choices would not have been so difficult and even so risky if we had resolved our problems with our neighbors. I know most of my colleagues do not wish to discuss the reason why all of the choices available to us are now so difficult, and potentially so costly.

I remember very well one of President Levon Ter-Petrossian’s addresses to the people of Armenia, where he made it clear that the choices available to us did not include good ones. Our choice was between bad and worse, he said. Now we are at a point where we have to choose between worse and the worst. Soon we may not have that choice either.

What should have been a relatively simple assessment of which association offers the most for Armenia’s economic and political development as a state, we will find that our options are getting narrower, and each decision has become a more difficult one.

My first comment is, therefore, that we should not have allowed the situation to reach to this point. It is difficult to discuss these issues without a historical context, even if that context is limited to our experience in our most recent independence, since 1991. I have always maintained that the goal of Armenia’s foreign policy, at least of an Armenia that is independent, should be to identify options, to create an environment where viable options exist and that such options invite the least negative side effects. Currently it appears that we are discussing options. But these are not really options if each possibility brings with it such dangers, risks, and uncertainty that we are apt to adopt a fatalistic position: Then, each side of the political spectrum—those supporting the EU agreement and those opposing it—will somehow feel that we do not really have options, that we are condemned to take this rather than that position, and then blame fate, geography, treacherous foreign powers, and most importantly, blame each other for whatever will happen, for whatever new losses we will sustain.

We want to ensure that at the end we have a relief valve for the consequences of our attitudes. The relief will be in the explanation that somehow we could not control our destiny and, therefore, we are free from political responsibility. In fact, it is we who had relinquished our responsibility a long time ago when we decided that we did not have any responsibility in resolving our own problems, that our problems were to be resolved by others, that we were guests in the region and others should offer solutions which we could take or reject, and when in that mind-set we missed opportunities to resolve these issues ourselves.

This kind of logic gives us a false sense that we are free of political responsibility, when, in fact, we did everything—all in the name of super-patriotism, under the cover of feeling right rather than doing right—that would lead us to where we are now: gradually and over as period of time, almost imperceptibly, we closed off our options. Or we were left with choices that were difficult to make. But, it seems, the important element of this kind of logic is that we are able to shed responsibility.

As if we are saying, collectively, “We will lead you to a dead end but do so in a way that others could be blamed for it.” Just look at our history and the way we write and debate it.

At each stage of this relinquishing of responsibility, options came with greater risk and more uncertainty than bearable. I am not raising this point to argue that our policies were right. Rather, it is to offer a gentle reminder to all concerned that even at this late date, we should be aiming at the creation of real options for Armenia.

Secondly, Armenia will probably be penalized for signing the Association Agreement with the EU. We may have to pay a price and that price may be on the economic front or on the Karabakh issue. We have so many vulnerabilities; faith and super-patriotism are not adequate tools to overcome these difficulties.

What are the likely consequences if Armenia does not sign the Association Agreement and instead opts for the Russian-led Eurasian Customs Union?

Armenia will have lost a great opportunity to develop its institutions and economy along more desirable lines. Armenia will have lost a sense of what it should look like as a state.

What are the likely consequences if Armenia were to reject the Association Agreement and the Eurasian Customs Union? Is this a viable option?

We would be paying double the price. We would have the negative consequences on both fronts and none of the advantages.

In your opinion, will Armenia sign the Association Agreement this November?

It appears that it will; although a short moment in the history of our people and of the region, two months is a long time when you consider that short moment.

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Professor Gerard Libaridian retired recently from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, where he held the Alex Manoogian Chair in Modern Armenian History and was Director of the Armenian Studies Program. He has authored and edited a number of books, most recently Modern Armenia (2004) and The Challenge of Statehood (1999). He has published and lectured worldwide on the modern history and contemporary affairs of Armenia, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. He was editor of the Armenian Review (1982-1988), co-founder and Director of the Zoryan Institute (1982-1990), and Director of the ARF Archives (1982-1988). 

From 1991 to 1997, Dr. Libaridian served as adviser, then senior adviser (foreign and security policies) to the first President of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian; he was First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (1993-1994) of the newly independent republic, and Ambassador-at-Large as well as secretary of Armenia’s Security Council (1994-1997) with the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. 

Professor Libaridian has returned to Cambridge, Mass., to devote his time to writing and the pursuit of other interests. He is currently working on a number of projects, including a new book, “Anatomy of Conflict. Nagorno Karabakh and the New World Order.”