The joint statement of the foreign affairs ministries of the Republic of Armenian the Republic of Turkey and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs issued on April 22 sent shock waves through the Armenian domestic political scene and the public sector.

Why were people in Armenia shocked?

Such a reaction was based on two primary reasons.

First, that statement was signed on the eve of the anniversary of the Armenian Genocide which, in turn, signaled that the U.S. president would not keep his promise and describe the events at the beginning of the 20th century as genocide. Thus, Turkey clearly obtained a very important tactical victory at the minimum: by indefinitely halting or freezing the process leading towards the international recognition of the genocide, a process that would have experienced a new impetus had Obama used the proper term. On the other hand, this statement was a carte-blanche for the Armenian regime to remove its foreign legitimacy problem from the agenda in the West. U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden’s telephone call to Serzh Sargsyan and his expression of “praise” regarding the policies of the Armenian president, as well as the statement of the press spokesperson of France’s Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs “welcoming the joint statement of Turkey, Armenia and Switzerland on the development of a roadmap for normalization of relations between Ankara and Yerevan” affords the RoA regime a golden opportunity to finally free itself from this complex. Second, the signing of the tripartite statement was somewhat unexpected. No one in Armenia was effectively informed about it. Just three days after the statement had been publicized, RoA President Serzh Sargsyan, at a session of the RoA Security Council, merely stated that, “This statement is confirmation of our efforts directed towards improving Armenian-Turkish relations.” Such an evaluation permits one to conclude that it is not merely the foreign minister who is responsible for the signing of the statement as it is the president of the republic himself and that it is the result of state policy. However, the fact that such a watershed statement was signed in such an unexpected fashion, and that neither the Security Council, the ruling coalition members nor the national assembly were informed about it, gives rise to a great deal of political and internal social mistrust regarding the statement and the objectives it seeks to pursue and to the actions of the Armenian authorities on the Armenian-Turkish “front” in general. This mistrust, which clearly appears ready to deepen, is much more dangerous than the statement itself. In this context, the vulnerability of Armenia is well understood in Turkey and Azerbaijan and they are trying to take advantage of it.

Consecutive traps of Turkish manipulations

Despite the fact that no interpretation on an official level has been forthcoming regarding the statement’s most key point, the “road map”, immediately after being published the Turkish press, in particular the newspaper Sabah published a list of five principles allegedly contained in the road map. These principles seemingly comprise a plan of action or a program. Each of these five principles, taken on their own, fully contradicts the interests of the Armenian side. Immediately afterwards, it was officially reported that a telephone conversation had taken place between the presidents of Turkey and Azerbaijan, Abdullah Gul and Ilham Aliyev. Hurriyet reported that President Gul, taking into account Azerbaijan’s relations with Turkey, told Aliyev that, “There is no difference of opinion in our relations. All that is being done is being done for Turkey and Azerbaijan.” The two presidents agreed, according to Milliyet, not to ratify decisions that would oppose each other’s interests, on a reciprocal basis. This means that Gul effectively convinced Aliyev that the statement regarding the “road map” not only doesn’t go against the interests of Azerbaijan but that “it is being done for Azerbaijan”. These news streams, when coupled with the policy of keeping the Armenian authorities off guard, turn into a real propaganda onslaught against Armenia and a wonderful tool of information terrorism. It is primarily directed at aggravating the internal social situation, the onset of a new crisis of mistrust between the society and the regime and, in the end, a further weakening of Armenia’s position.

Armenia: an unwitting pawn or team player?

In this context, there are at minimum a few questions that the regime in Armenia must answer as quickly as possible and in a manner that is convincing and well-argued. 1. Preceding the signing of the statement, why didn’t the government of Armenia fail to organize a debate of the issue on a public or at least political level, within the framework of the RoA National Assembly? In other words, why did the signing of such an important statement take place so unexpectedly? 2. What is the reason for not publishing the essence of that document now? 3. The RoA Foreign Ministry proclaimed that the “road map” is a framework for the on-going process. However, the parameters of the framework haven’t been elucidated. RoA President Sargsyan, during a meeting of the Security Council just a few days ago, declared that in the near future the public will be given the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the document and that they will be convinced that it is in our best interests. However there was no reaction forthcoming regarding the veracity of the “road map” as published by Sabah. At the very least, an assessment of this propaganda manipulation could have been made, but this too was lacking. 4. Just how accurate is the reported precondition stipulated by Turkey in the “road map” that Armenian must recognize the Treaty of Kars? What is the official position of Yerevan regarding that treaty and its signing? 5. To what extent are important issues for the Armenian side incorporated in the “road map”? These include the confirmation of the Armenian Genocide, independent of the creation of any committee, the mandatory participation of Armenia in any regional communication network plans and a guarantee for unrestricted border openings? 6. Does the Armenian government certify that an improvement of Armenian-Turkish relations will not take place at the expense of sacrificing Armenian interests when it comes to the settlement of the Karabakh conflict and will it not serve as a precondition for the settlement of the Karabakh-Azerbaijan conflict? 7. If the problem wasn’t to free Obama from the headache of using the term “genocide”, then why was the tripartite statement issues a mere two days before April 24? Thus, can’t it be inferred that Turkey and the United States jointly used Armenia to pull their chestnuts out of the fire? In other words, what is being demanded of the Armenian government is to formulate and present to the public, as soon as possible, the perimeters of the essential principles for the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations. These will serve as a boundary that Yerevan will never cross in terms of making further concessions. The exposition of such principles is vital, in the first instance, so as not to allow a new round of internal social and political tension, the prerequisites for which already exist, in Armenia during this complex and contradictory time.

A reshuffling of the political map?

Most noteworthy is the decision of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) to pull out of the governing coalition. This means that the ARF didn’t receive adequate explanations from the president of the republic to calm their concerns. For the most part, the ARF’s leaving the coalition will not upset the composition of forces within the government because the other forces in the coalition will continue to defend the policy line of Serzh Sargsyan regarding a thaw in Armenian-Turkish relations. Generally speaking, none of the three remaining coalition parties ever had a particular principled position regarding the issue and this, contrary to the ARF, affords them a wonderful opportunity to show off their skills of adaptability and maneuvering. Thus, in a purely political sense, a major reshuffling at the top level is most unlikely. The influence on the public expectations regarding the ARF stance will be much greater however. It can lead to a new set of corrections in relations between Armenia and the Diaspora. In addition, the SRF will be automatically thrust into the opposition camp. Armen Rustamyan, a member of the ARF Bureau, stated that in the event that the ARF quits the coalition the party will enter the ranks of the constructive opposition. This state of affairs especially fashions advantageous preconditions for the creation of new, non-formal relations between the Heritage Party and the ARF, especially if we take into account that these two parties take a fairly conservative approach to the Armenian-Turkish and Karabakh issues. These two forces will be afforded the possibility to consolidate the social and political potential in the national-conservative camp that is presently unorganized and doomed to neglect. It has the potential to transform these forces into a serious political factor and essentially change the domestic political landscape. If we take into account the new, more passive tactical approach of the radical opposition, then it becomes clear that the level of political confrontation towards the authorities becomes that more powerful. As to what these processes will lead to is mostly dependent on the degree of open and frank dialogue that the regime in Armenia will initiate in the coming days and weeks.