In a strange set of circumstances this is the third September in a row that the question, “Will Turkey open the border, or not?” is being widely discussed. Surprisingly, this time around, the Armenian side is placing less significance on the question of whether Turkey will open the border during the NATO, is being given less significance, as opposed to Turkey or Azerbaijan.

Perhaps for the reason that even if Turkey temporarily opens the border will have the same effect on the Armenian public, as say, the events scheduled for September 19 at the Holy Cross Cathedral at Akhtamar. It is a half-step, an illusion, an imitation of real progress in the establishment of Turkish-Armenian relations. It cannot, contrary to the expectations of the authors of the decision to hold the exercises in Armenia, be regarded as a necessary step leading to Armenian-Turkish rapprochement.

The opposite case of the current alternative to unblocking the border is to open it for good, not to keep it closed. This is because it would mean a radical compromise of the former positions regarding Armenians, just as granting status of a working church to Holy Cross of Akhtamar would have meant handing it over to Armenian jurisdiction and to lose the  important possibility of maintain control over it.

A lone half-step taken is just that – an incomplete step, no matter how you look at it. However, if there is a desire, the general impression of just a few already made various half-steps (as the participation of Turkish army representatives in exercises taking place in Armenia; as the discussion of the opening of the Armenian-Turkish border, even if temporary; as the conducting of the Divine Liturgy in Holy Cross Church, even if just one day of the year), will assist the formulation of the necessary convictions; especially when the matter is in regards to political discourse and diplomatic and publicity instrumentation appropriate to the moment.

At the same time when the Turkish and especially the Azerbaijani media were actively discussing the political ramifications of the possible temporary opening of border, Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Feridun Sinirlioğlu was in the United States, un a formal capacity, ostensibly preparing a list of questions for Turkish President Gul in the upcoming September 9 United Nations session, but in reality, he was “fixing” the contradictions that had recently surfaced in Turkish-American relations.

This is one of the underpinnings of the quite active July-August “silent diplomacy”, quite successfully covered up by more demonstrative incidents. Of course, even the oral context surrounding the temporary opening of the Armenian-Turkish border is essential for Turkey especially in terms of Turkish-American relations.

It is not accidental that it was Turkish sources that leaked such news in the first place, giving rise to a variety of interpretations, denials and confirmations. It is possible to say the main one, without sweeping changes in the Armenian-Turkish process, is the reanimation of the uneasy issue of the border opening.

The fact that even the same, and not different, Turkish figures, were giving completely opposite answers to the question of whether the border would or would not open, within the space of less than one month, was conditioned less on the Azerbaijan factor (the accepted explanation) but rather due to the matter of focusing information interest on it for as long as possible, to extend the intrigue. However, the Armenian-Turkish border, to a large extent, has the same meaning for the Armenian and Turkish-Azerbaijani sides.

The closed border, in the first place, is the embodiment of the 17 year Turkish-Azerbaijani cooperation and the varied, as well as politico-military collaboration, in the Karabakh issue; the confirmation of the fact that the Azerbaijani armed forces, and the entire politico-military potential of Azerbaijan, essentially serves as the eastern component of the Turkish army.

The question of whether the border would open or not dovetailed with the reconfirmation and extension of already existing agreements of strategic cooperation and mutual assistance - Turkish-Azerbaijan (August 16) and Armenian-Russian (August 19). This occurred even though there were no legal requirements for either the resigning or extension of the documents; they were still legally binding and their deadlines hadn’t been reached.

There were still 10 years left on the Russian base agreement in Armenia. Similarly, the 1994 strategic cooperation agreement signed by Azerbaijan and Turkey was still binding and the same was true of a number of other military cooperation treaties signed afterwards.

To a large extent, the signing of these two strategic cooperation documents did not bring radical changes to the existing situation, given that the significance of the presence of the Russian military in Armenia, as a guarantor of security, remained untouched. And the Turkish-Azerbaijani strategic cooperation, as it had been continuing according to a number of prior agreements, will continue to develop in a similar vein.

We are convinced that had there been a radical change in Turkish-Azerbaijani strategic cooperation as a result of this latest document, it would have been especially easy to locate the complete text in sources accessible to the public at large.

But all we are able to locate are the evaluations of mostly Azerbaijani commentators who are quick to focus attention on the existence of a provision regarding Turkish-Azerbaijani politico-military mutual assistance. Approximately in the same way that the questions “Will Gul Accept the invitation of the RoA President to Visit Armenia (September 2008); “Will Turkey In Fact Attend the Signing of the Armenian-Turkish Protocols in Zurich?” September 2009), were discussed at the time, even reports regarding the possible temporary opening of the Armenian-Turkish border are being received with a great deal of pain in Azerbaijan.

However, experience shows that these stages of anxiety are also followed by steps and declaration confirming Turkish-Azerbaijani friendship; steps that quickly dissolve the memories of even the most distasteful of incidents; just as happened with the fact of the burning of Turkish flags in Baku’s Alley of the Martyrs.

The public learnt from a communiqué issued by the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry on August 31 that in September, within the framework of NATO’s Individual Partnership Plans, Azerbaijani military forces will be participating in three military exercises at the same time – “Combined Endeavor-2010” (Germany, September 3-16), “Rapid Trident-2010” (Ukraine, September 5-17) and “Medceur-2010 (Chernogoria, September 8-22). As a rule, Azerbaijan participates within the ranks of Turkish military units.