By Pietro A. Shakarian

On Friday, 10 October, Armenia officially joined the Eurasian Customs Union.  It was more than a year ago since the Caucasus country made its fateful decision to join the Moscow-backed union and to turn down a potential Association Agreement with the EU.

The decision by the Armenian government has sparked debate in Armenian society about the respective benefits of the two rival blocs.  It is true that Armenians have long sought to integrate their country with Europe and, like their northern neighbors the Georgians, they point to long historical associations with Europe.  These include their shared Christian roots, the left-to-right directionality of the Armenian alphabet, the mutual contact between the old Armenian kingdoms and the West, and even the very personality of Charles Aznavour.  In fact, to an Armenian or Georgian, the idea of possibly joining the EU represents the culmination of a centuries-long quest for Europe.

However, even though an Armenian or Georgian nationalist would never admit this, it was the Russian Empire in the 19th century that effectively reconnected both Georgia and, at least, eastern Armenia with Europe directly for the first time since the Middle Ages.  It was also the Soviet era that helped develop the infrastructure and national culture of both countries.  In Armenia, this included, among other things, the development of the Armenian capital Yerevan from a dusty backwater into a modern, European-style metropolis, under the guidance of Aleksandr Tamanyan.

Today, Russia continues to play a major role in Armenia's economic and energy sectors.  However, the most significant factor in the Russo-Armenian relationship is security.  Russia maintains a military base in Gyumri and it guards the country's borders with Iran and Turkey.  It was Russia that served as a deterrent against a possible Turkish incursion against Armenia during the war over Nagorny Karabakh in the 1990s.

Today, Russia's position as Armenia's security guarantor remains.  It continues to act as a deterrent to Turkey, but perhaps even more significantly, to neighboring Azerbaijan as well.  Baku, and its authoritarian leader Ilham Aliyev, continue to threaten Armenia's national existence on a daily basis.  In this context, Russia's security partnership and friendship with Armenia is a major vector of Yerevan's foreign policy.

In fact, the arrangement is beneficial not only for Armenia, but for Russia as well.  Moscow needs Armenia as part of its security structure and views both Armenia and Georgia as its traditional pillars in the Caucasus as fellow Christian countries.  With the recent turn of Georgia toward Western structures, the significance of Armenia in the region has only increased, though Moscow hopes to also lure back Tbilisi too.  Ongoing concerns regarding Islamic rebels in the North Caucasus and ISIS in Iraq and Syria, combined with Western efforts to expand NATO, have only increased Moscow's need for a regional security strategy.  Armenia plays a key role in this.

By contrast, even though the EU offers Armenia infrastructural improvements and institutional reforms, it is not a "magic bullet" or a "cure-all" remedy for Yerevan.  In fact, the EU is still struggling in its recovery from the Eurozone crisis and cannot afford to over-expand itself without threatening the very viability of the European project.

The economies of its newest East European member states – Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia – have performed horribly since the financial crisis began and have stopped converging with their Western counterparts.  These three have likewise remained thoroughly corrupt and another, Hungary, has moved backwards toward illiberalism under Viktor Orbán.

All of this indicates that the EU is no guarantee for the automatic improvement of Armenia's state institutions.  Simply joining the EU does not make a society "democratic."  It must ultimately go through this process on its own.  Consequently, democratization does not depend solely on outside forces like Brussels as much as it ultimately does with the people of Armenia.

There are demographic concerns with the EU too.  Since joining, many of the new Eastern European member states have experienced massive emigrations to the more developed Western countries.  Proponents of the EU point to earlier examples, such as Ireland, and argue that such a phenomenon is merely temporary.

However, since the Eurozone crisis, there are indications that these emigrants are not returning, especially because there are so few employment opportunities in their native countries.  The emigration rate has been particularly high in the Baltic states, especially Latvia, which is facing a demographic crisis.  A common joke among Latvians is that when "the last Latvian leaves Riga International Airport, he or she should not forget to turn off the light."  Birthrates are also low in much of Eastern Europe, while in Russia they are actually on the rise.

Even more alarming, the Eurozone crisis and the major rise of unemployment have triggered a mass emigration of southern Europeans from Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy to the more prosperous West and North, again, without any immediate signs of return.  For Armenia, a country already experiencing a problem with emigration, it is difficult to imagine how opening the door to Western Europe will help the country.  Large numbers of Armenians would pack their bags and leave for the West, many never to return to their homeland.

Most significantly, the EU lacks security mechanisms to help Armenia in the case of an attack by its neighbors.  Even if it did, Brussels is too far away, whereas Russia is not only ready and willing to protect Armenia's security, but is also in a geographic position to do so.  In the end, while faraway Western Europe may have a marginal interest in Armenia, Russia and its President Vladimir Putin would be willing to pay any price to keep Armenia in its security structure.

Therefore, it is increasingly clear that given Yerevan's geopolitical position, its simultaneous pursuit of both the EU Association Agreement and the Moscow-backed Eurasian Union was likely a gambit by President Serj Sargsyan in order to secure the best possible terms for Armenia.

Judging by the body language at Sargsyan's Moscow meeting with Putin, at which his decision to join the Eurasian Union was initially announced, this seems to be the case.  Indeed, it is far more likely than the standard narrative by the Western media and pro-Western Armenian oppositionists who claim that Putin simply "pressured" Armenia to join its Eurasian project.

Instead, it is more probable that Moscow put forward a deal of enhanced security guarantees for Nagorny Karabakh, which along with Armenia itself is constantly being threatened by Azerbaijan.  This would explain why Sargsyan, himself a Karabakh native, was grinning at the Moscow meeting, as if he had won concessions from Moscow.  He did not appear to be a man under pressure and, in fact, seemed quite pleased.

After Yerevan made its initial announcement in September regarding its decision to pursue the Eurasian Union, six days later, Georgia's Bidzina Ivanishvili announced too that Tbilisi may consider joining the Eurasian Union, provided that it be "advantageous for our country."  His statement was followed by a promising thaw in Russo-Georgian relations, culminating in Putin's invitation to newly-elected Georgian President Margvelashvili for a future meeting, announced at the Sochi Winter Olympics.

However, interrupted by the crisis in Ukraine, that summit was postponed indefinitely.  Neither Moscow (which hopes to secure its regional standing) nor Tbilisi (which hopes for a peace deal on its breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia) have completely given up on a future rapprochement.

Meanwhile, officials in Yerevan moved quickly to ensure rapid accession of Armenia into the Eurasian Union.  However, the process was slowed by the fact that Armenia does not share a common border with the Customs Union and thus had to seek special economic concessions from Moscow.  Additional complications arose when Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev raised concerns about the lack of a clear boundary between Armenia and Karabakh, insisting that a customs post had to be erected.  Primarily concerned with maintaining and securing its position in the Caucasus, Moscow acted as the chief advocate for Armenia in its Eurasian accession process, compromising with Astana and ensuring that Yerevan would ultimately enter the union.

Yet, this saga is not over.  If the Caucasus is to find peace and stability, then Russia and Georgia need to come to the table and begin talks.  Only after Tbilisi and Moscow are reconciled can there be real security and stability in the region, not just for Moscow, Yerevan, and Tbilisi, but for the international community as well.

Pietro A. Shakarian is an MA graduate student at the Center for Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies (CREES) at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. He earned his BA in History from John Carroll University in 2012 and his MLIS from Kent State University in 2013. He also serves as a member of the editorial board for the Gomidas Institute in London and has written analyses on Russia and the former USSR for The Nation and Russia Direct.