Gevorg Melikyan

The nationalism, along with its moderate and radical modifications, has been one of the most criticized and targeted ideologies for civilized societies especially after the Second World War. 

The political structure and systems of governance of democratic states have been developed in a way that the implemented policies reject and limit the nationalism given its disastrous consequences both for the society and the country which practice such ideologies and for countries which become targets for nationalist approaches. 

Modern states are fighting against the spread of that ideology by showing a zero tolerance towards radical rightist ideas and limiting access of the sponsors of such ideas to the decision-making processes. 

In case of many post-Soviet countries the picture is different, where the nationalist ideologies still keep their vitality and importance both in short and long terms. Neither does it stop to contain threats inside the countries in terms of rise of radicalism and the country’s interactions with other countries and nations. 

The nationalism in those countries, including Russia, remains one of the ideologies that the political elite instrumentalizes to gain dividends. It helps keep the power, contributes to reaching strategic and tactic objectives, allows to act more freely and provides internal legitimacy. Nationalist ideology also creates and reinforces the demonized picture of an outside enemy against whom the rest of the easily-manipulated society starts fighting. A politics of us versus them is radically nourished under nationalist approaches.   

Numerous statistical data and research as well as changes in rhetoric, one-sided and biased information in class-books, edited stories, and one-sided coverage of political events argue in favor of the growing dynamics in the Russian nationalism. 

To reinforce and nurture the nationalism there a number of tools are used: media, social networks, blogs, other online resources, non-governmental organizations, unions, political and public figure, and all other possible means. 

In case of a positive dynamics, the nationalism finds deep root in the society’s consciousness when it lacks critical thinking, does not speak foreign languages to resort to other resources, easily considers the state-sponsored propaganda as the only source of truth and is more likely to understand and explain things and events mainly through a nation-centered prism. 

On the other hand, Russia lacks independent analytical centers, think-tanks, free media and journalists, independent statistical centers. The main media outlets, universities and other research and scientific institutions, statistical data and the internet are under control. There are instances where scientists, political and public figures can be punished if they express opinions and ideas going against the common and general ideology. The geography of the use of propaganda tools has gone further. 

The nation-centrism is also transforming into one of the driving forces in Russia’s foreign policy. It is expressed in a vivid wish to keep control over former spheres of influence and is presented as national and state indeniable interest which is sometimes in contradiction with those of other states. 

Russia’s political elite strives to form a new political agenda where an importance is given to the rise of Russia’s role on the international level and the necessity for others to take into account Russia’s interests in the context of global security. 

The West cannot ignore Russia’s concerns for security, neither can it easily agree on Russia’s policies aiming to respond to those concerns in case it is done at the expense of others’ security, especially in the Georgian and Ukrainian contexts where Russia’s discontent pushed it to resort to hard force. 

Since the hard force cannot be used regularly, Russia uses other tools and leverage of pressure to make sure to keep the presence of the “Russian world” in the South Caucasian states and to push its interests there. 

In Armenia, Russia’s geo-political aspirations are being materialized through economic and political leverage and pressures that Russia acquired through appropriating Armenia’s various politico-economic infrastructures and due to Russia-Armenia historical strong ties. Those tools and leverage become even more powerful when Armenia’s political elite and its state-sponsored propaganda do not stop pointing out “Armenia’s incapacity to solve its problems without Russia”, and that “Armenia will be lost without Russia”. 

Armenia’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) allowed Russia to exert even more control over coupled with larger legal framework to act freely. Through the Russia-led EEU, it wants to limit Armenia’s political and economic maneuverability and aspirations, including NATO, the EU/US and Iran, contrary to assertions by both Armenian and European parties that there are constraints and this is just a matter of choice. 

A number of local resources including political and public figures, NGOs, civic initiatives, and unions maximize the use of those leverages and make efforts to pinpoint the benefits of Armenia’s dependence on Russia. 

Russia tries to involve Armenia into “War of values” with the West, where the West is presented as perverse, while Russia is the only civilization whose orthodoxy is capable to fight against the evil of the West. A number of Armenians buy this approach especially those who had good memories with Russia from the Soviet period. There is also a growing active dynamics of giving Russian citizenship to the Armenian citizens. 

Tools and leverage used for Azerbaijan are different. Russia makes attempts to entrap Azerbaijan in its Eurasian projects such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Eurasian Economic Union, etc., by giving various promises including the arms’ sale, and support in oil and gas transit, as well as by becoming more flexible in the Caspian Sea issues. Another dimension of mutual interests between Azerbaijan and Russia is the latter’s commitment to help the Aliyev regime to keep power. 

According to some sources, Russia intends to set up a new radar station in Azerbaijan by 2017. Russia will also look for using Azerbaijan once sanctions are possibly lifted from Iran and Iran maximizes its presence in the region. In the context of Russia’s involvement in Syria, Azerbaijan can become an important partner for Russia. 

As for Russia’s policies on Georgia, priorities are different here as a number if not all Russian projects and initiatives failed in Georgia because of Russia-Georgia 5-day military clash in 2008. After having recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia indents to seriously reset its lost influence and leverage on Georgia by resorting both to soft and even more rigid methods, if needed. 

Russia hoped to “regain” Georgia with the support of the new Georgian government once Saakashvili left the office, but in the context of Ukrainian crisis and worsening of relations with the West, Russia is testing other options, tools and technology to avoid definitely losing its positions in Georgia. To do so, Russia will try to offer some new carrots and entrap Georgia into propaganda battle over values and to win minds and hearts of local more moderate Georgians. By lifting visa restrictions and economic sanctions it will also use the potential of the Georgian diaspora in Russia. 

Gevorg Melikyan is an associate fellow in the Political Developments & Stability Programme at the Armenian Institute of International and Security Affairs—AIISA. He is a policy analyst, political scientist, and political advisor with considerable personal, academic and professional experience in foreign and security policies, and domestic politics. 

“Improving Security Policy Debates in Armenia” Program (NED)