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Armen Arakelyan

Armenia's Parliamentary Election Campaign: Who's Saying What About the Karabakh Conflict?

From the very first day of campaigning for the April 2 parliamentary election in Armenia, it was clear that neither the political parties in the running nor the electorate really cared all that much about the policies and programs being promoted.

Most of the parties/alliances, including the ruling party, seem to have drafted platforms merely to ward off accusations of not having any. The electorate isn’t interested in the various platforms not only because voters don’t have the time of day to compare them, but because no one takes them seriously. They’re just seen as promises to be broken later.

Nevertheless, the upcoming election differs from previous ones because the parliament to be formed as a result will hold power in the country, in a formal sense. Those forces seeking to make it into the new parliament, and to assume power will, whether they want to or not, have to assume political accountability for the promises made during the campaign. They will no longer be able to hide in the shadows behind a powerful presidential institute, especially regarding issues vital to Armenia.

One of these issues, perhaps the most important, is the Karabakh conflict, in the context of a lack of a negotiating process and the real risk that war will resume. In contrast to other sectors, there isn’t much maneuvering room left regarding the Karabakh issue. It’s very important to understand how the parties running for parliament approach the Karabakh issue and whether they have anything substantive to offer regarding its resolution.

It’s both odd and at the same time routine that the two contenders spouting the most populist rhetoric in the campaign, the Armenian Renaissance Party and the Tsarukyan Alliance, have nothing new to offer on the issue.

The Tsarukyan Alliance has just three sentences in its campaign platform regarding Karabakh. Those sentences are lifted from the 2012 Prosperous Armenia Party (PAP) parliamentary election campaign platform. (Gagik Tsarukyan founded and served as president of the PAP). It calls for the international recognition of the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh based on negotiations seeking mutual concessions. It appears that future developments, including the outbreak of war along the Line of Contact last April, had no impact on the PAP’s position. The Tsarukyan Alliance also raises the issue of getting Artsakh accepted back to the negotiation table, but fails to provide specifics.

The Tsarukyan Alliance either agrees with political course of the current government regarding Karabakh, or simply have nothing new to offer.

The Communist Party of Armenia has no official position on the Karabakh conflict settlement issue simply because it hasn’t published its campaign platform.

The Azat (Free) Democrats have much to say regarding changing Armenia’s foreign policy and ensuring the security of Armenia and Artsakh. Settlement of the Karabakh conflict is seen in this context. The party’s main aim is achieving international recognition for Artsakh. To realize this, the party calls for Artsakh to participate fully in negotiations and for a bilateral military assistance treaty between Armenia and Artsakh. The party also wants the OSCE and CSTO to hinder Baku’s policy of rearming itself. The Free Democrats essentially reject the Madrid Principles since they see the settlement starting point as the delineation of borders between Artsakh and Azerbaijan and a resolution of territorial issues. This signifies direct negotiations between Baku and Stepanakert as a first step.

The ORO (Ohanian-Raffi-Oskanian) Alliance also prioritizes the international recognition of Artsakh as foreign policy. The territorial component is seen as something to be worked out between Artsakh and Azerbaijan. Thus, the ORO essentially rejects the Madrid Principles, and seeks to obligate Azerbaijan to accept a new philosophy of settlement by employing the resource of Armenian-Azerbaijani popular diplomacy.

The Yelk (Exit) Alliance, like the ORO, stresses the need to re-achieve military parity between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which, in principle, signifies not shying away from entering an arms race with Baku. Yelk, in principle, supports a settlement based on the Madrid Principles, since it views Azerbaijan’s acceptance of Artsakh’s right to self-determination as the starting point for any settlement. But Yelk does not specify at what stage of the settlement road map will self-determination be realized. The only reservation is that Yelk refuses to talk about concessions since Azerbaijan has yet accepted Artsakh’s right to self-determination. This is similar to the approach at the core of Armenia’s current government’s policy towards the Karabakh issue.

The Republican Party of Armenia (RPA), now in power, maintains its “status-quo” approach to the issue, while at the same time fully supporting the Madrid Principles. This means that the current government essentially supports settling the conflict by granting Artsakh an interim status – the principle of “territory for peace”. Like Yelk, the RPA regards forcing negotiations on Azerbaijan as the priority in the current stage. The RPA believes it can convince Baku to refrain from warfare as a means to settle the issue by ensuring relative military parity with Azerbaijan. The RPA says it will continue to work to see that Artsakh is included in all talks as a full member. However, given the lack of any real progress on this front, such a promise must only be regarded as rhetoric. This is understandable simply because based on the logic of the Madrid Principles and the statements of the intermediaries, Artsakh, in point of fact, can only participate in negotiations, in the best case, when Yerevan and Baku sign an overall   document on settlement principles. In other words, Artsakh, according to the RPA, can only participate in negotiations to clarify the interim status that the RPA has already decided upon.

The HAK (Armenian National Congress) Alliance campaign is based on a logic of concessions regarding the Karabakh issue, choosing the slogan of “peace, reconciliation and friendly neighbors.”

The HAK Alliance defends no settlement formula in its platform, essentially calling for a quick peace by agreeing to the demands set forth by Azerbaijan.

Proof that the alliance posits a policy of capitulation to Baku is borne out by the fact that HAK isn’t satisfied with the “territory for peace” formula already agreed to by Yerevan and demands that the government presents new proposals regarding the signing of a peace treaty.

The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) views the Karabakh issue in the context of the Armenian Cause (Hye Tad), and regards the final objective to be unifying Artsakh with Armenia. Of note is the fact that the ARF fails to mention specifics as to how this will be achieved. It also shies away from commenting on the current phase of the settlement process.

Other formulations in the ARF platform allow us to make some assumptions. First, noting that the independence of Artsakh is a tactical issue on the road to the reunification of Armenia, the party, indirectly, finds any status for Artsakh less than independence to be unacceptable.

Second, stressing in its platform that it rejects any statement regarding unilateral concessions, the ARF, in essence, implies that it is open to mutual concessions. Based on the juxtaposition of these two indirect assertions, we can say that the ARF, in essence, accepts the principle of “territorial concessions for the recognition of Artsakh independence” at minimum. 

Photo: Anush Babajanyan

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