By Richard Giragosian 

Richard Giragosian assesses new challenges to Armenia’s relationship with Iran, as sanctions against Iran are tightened and threats of military action mount over the Iranian nuclear programme, but also sees an opportunity inherent in this crisis.

Armeniahas always been a prisoner of its geography, serving throughout history as an arena for both competition and cooperation for larger regional powers.  Since its independence,Armenia’s geographic vulnerability became only more pronounced, as bothAzerbaijanandTurkeyclosed their borders withArmeniain a demonstration of “fraternal allegiance” over the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.  

Over time, small, landlockedArmeniagenerally adapted to its isolation by adopting economic and trade strategies aimed at overcoming the constraints of having two of its four land borders sealed.  Nevertheless, the threat of isolation was never fully addressed, andArmenia’s borders with bothGeorgiaandIran, as its primary export and import route and as the only alternative trade and energy link respectively, only grew in strategic significance. 

Concerns and Challenges 

Yet it isArmenia’s relationship with its southern borderIranthat raises concerns and poses challenges.  And as the West imposes ever tighter sanctions against Iran and the threat of military action over Iran’s nuclear programme mounts, so do the challenges to Armenia. 

Only a few months ago, during a late-December 2011 meeting inYerevan, Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian and his Iranian counterpart, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, called for a “diplomatic” solution toIran’s nuclear standoff with the West.  As hosts, the Armenian side was careful to placate Ahmadinejad during his one-day visit toYerevan, promising expanded “high-level relations” and reiterating a commitment to “good relations.”  Similarly, in a joint statement, the presidents “noted the right of all countries, includingArmeniaandIran, to the peaceful use of atomic energy,” but stressed “the importance of resolvingIran’s nuclear issue by means of negotiations and in diplomatic ways.” 

But as tension between the West andIranhas deepened,Armeniais increasingly concerned over renewed consideration of a possible US or Israeli military attack targeting Iranian nuclear facilities.  Discussion of a possible military strike againstIranhas also grown withinArmenia, fueled in part by Russian media coverage, leading many inArmeniato worry about the country’s proximity toIran. 

The Threat of Looming Attack against Iran 

Fears of a looming military attack againstIranhave grown in recent weeks, as Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak warned that there is “a wide global understanding thatIranmust be prevented from becoming nuclear and no option should be taken off the table.”  Going even further, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Moshe Yaalon, who heads the strategic affairs ministry and is a former Israeli military commander, threatened thatIran’s nuclear installations are “vulnerable to military strikes,” directly contradicting mainstream military skepticism over the feasibility of air strikes.  In response, however, US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta recently downplayed reports suggesting the “strong likelihood” that Israel was planning a military strike sometime in the coming 2-4 months. 

From a military perspective, however, any such attack againstIranwould most likely fail and may even be counter-productive.  Militarily, the fact that such an operation would target Iranian nuclear facilities that are both widely dispersed throughout the country and deep underground raise serious doubts over the success of any air campaign.  At the same time, even if an air campaign locates and neutralizes most of its target list, many experts expect only a temporary setback to an already entrenched nuclear programme.  

A military operation would also be largely counter-productive politically, for three main reasons.  First, it would tend to only embolden and even bolster a regime inTehranwhose very legitimacy is limited to posing as a perceived victim of Western conspiracies and aggression.  Secondly, it would further weaken the already vulnerable, but still significant portion of pro-American Iranians, and perhaps even drive many Iranians to unite behind their government in the face of open attack.  A third factor is rooted in the likelihood that by resorting to a military option, international support for diplomatic pressure and sanctions would erode, especially as Russia and China would most likely withdraw their support for the Western-designed sanctions regime. 

Conforming to Tighter Sanctions 

For Armenia, which has been importing small amounts of Iranian natural gas through a pipeline built in 2009, meeting the demands of tighter sanctions is also a challenge, especially in light of current bilateral energy ties and the roughly $300 million in annual bilateral trade.  The energy ties include the ongoing construction of a third electrical transmission line connecting the Armenian and Iranian power grids and the planned construction of two hydroelectric plants on the Arax River dividing the Armenian-Iranian border.  It would also complicate ambitious Iranian plans to build a $2.5 billion, 540-kilometer railway connectingIrantoArmenia. 

And sanctions have been steadily tightening and broadening, covering both more general areas of trade and economic sectors, as well as targeting more specific groups withinIran, ranging from the Iranian Central Bank to its Revolutionary Guards.  The US Congress, for example, follows this track, as the US Senate Banking Committee recently approved a new package of proposed sanctions targetingIran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps and companies involved in joint energy and uranium mining ventures withTehran.  It would also penalize companies and individuals that supplyIranwith weapons that could be used against Iranian citizens. 

But this recent trend toward tighter sanction targeting Iranian banking and financial services pose even more serious challenges forArmenia, by imposing new demands for greater transparency and higher scrutiny of Iranian banks currently operating inArmenia.  It would also trigger new, more serious complications over pending and planned bilateral projects in the energy sector, in some ways hindering the one sector that is rooted in a shared economic and strategic interest betweenArmeniaandIran. 

An Opportunity in Every Crisis 

Despite these obvious challenges forArmenia, at the same time, there is a potential opportunity from this crisis, however.  In a broader strategic context, this opportunity is rooted inArmenia’s role as a potential “bridge” or “platform” for engagingIran.  Reflecting a shared sense of isolation and a pronounced perception of hostile neighbours,ArmeniaandIranhave been both destined and determined to forge a strategically stable relationship, no matter how unnatural and contradictory.  

Against this backdrop,ArmeniaisIran’s only neighbouring country that could serve as a reliable mediator or trusted third-party broker, hosting or even facilitating a new round of talks and diplomacy between the West andIran.  And for its part, affirming the new role of “small states” in contributing to greater international security,Armeniaalso stands to benefit from offering its own unique insight into how best to engageIran.  Only in this way, canArmeniatransform itself from being less a prisoner of geography to more of a practitioner of geopolitics. 

Richard Giragosian is the director of the Regional Studies Center (RSC), an independent think tank in Yerevan, Armenia (director@regional-studies.org)