About a month ago I got a copy of the book by British reporter Thomas de Waal - Black Garden: Azerbaijan and Armenia between Peace and War - that I had been interested in reading for some time. I had read excerpts from the book on the Internet and, was frankly impressed by the author’s approach-examining the Karabakh conflict not within a political context but through human emotional experience.

Before I got the book I had heard a range of opinions about it - mostly negative, from the viewpoint of an Armenian reader. In other words, those who had read the book believed that Thomas de Waal’s approach approximated that of, and was somewhat sympathetic toward, Azerbaijanis. In order to overcome this prejudice I tried, as I read, to look at the events and incidents from the opposite point of view. I must confess that in this respect, the structure of the book and the narration are simply ideal. I believe that thanks to this book, reasonable Armenian and Azerbaijani readers will be able to reevaluate what they have lived through and experienced since 1988.

My general impression as I read was that in the author’s view, both parties to the conflict, Armenians and Azerbaijanis, were defeated, the Azerbaijanis were defeated a bit worse. In this respect the Armenian readers might have confused empathy with sympathy.

The truth of this defeat has not, unfortunately, been perceived in Armenia (Karabakh) or in Azerbaijan. In Armenia it is not perceived since the result of the military phase of the conflict is separated from the calamity that took place, or, sometimes, the calamity is represented as the price of victory. And in Azerbaijan it is not perceived since they are pursued by an obsession to recover their material (territorial) losses. In either case, the main party to the conflict - the people - are left out of the game. No one asks their opinion; their aspirations and dreams have no impact on the formulation of public opinion.

Thomas de Waal concludes his documentary narrative, Black Garden: Azerbaijan and Armenia between Peace and War, in Sadakhlo. Sadakhlo is a trade fair located within the territory of Georgia where Georgians, Azerbaijanis and Armenians trade in goods side by side. In my letter to De-Waal I expressed the view that Sadakhlo as a model is not sufficiently convincing, since this zone of solidarity is located in a third country and the interrelations among the three nations are regulated by the laws of the Georgian state. In response to this observation, the author said, “For me Sadakhlo is not a model but rather a counter-argument for those who try to prove that Azerbaijanis and Armenians cannot live together.”

In reading the book, I did not expect ready solutions or models, since, in my opinion, it is not a reporter’s business to offer recipes. A reporter’s work can be considered successful if he or she makes a correct diagnosis. In this regard Thomas de Waal’s Black Garden: Azerbaijan and Armenia between Peace and War makes us think about our health, especially after the prolonged and serious operation that the two neighboring peoples have undergone.

I was fortunate to have the opportunity to interview author Thomas de Waal. 
Our discussion is printed below.

You also co-authored a book on Chechnya and are, naturally, are well informed about the conflict there. What, in your opinion, is the difference between the Chechen and the Karabakh conflicts?

As I have said before, quoting Tolstoy, every Caucasian conflict is unhappy in its own way. In Chechnya the most terrifying factor was the terrible destructive power of the Russian armed forces in a small space. Even experienced war journalists were shocked by the scale of the destruction of Grozny. This predetermined the savagery of the Chechen conflict on both sides. Relatively speaking in this regard, the Karabakh conflict was less cruel -- although of course there were also terrible tragedies in this conflict as well. In political terms I see the common factor in the failure of the Soviet system to allow dialogue about "national questions." The quieter things looked on the surface, the more terrible was the resulting anger when it burst out.

I often ask ordinary people in Karabakh: “Do you remember how the conflict began?” They don’t remember, and moreover, from what they say it becomes clear that that in the beginning they followed the events from outside. What is your impression, was it a mass conflict, or when did the people of the two countries get involved?

I believe part of the Karabakh tragedy was that only a very small minority on both sides wanted violence. But both Armenians and Azeris preferred to talk to Moscow than to each other and did not listen properly to what the other was saying. Then Sumgait changed everything and the process became unstoppable.

Did the Armenians win in the military phase of the conflict or did the Azerbaijanis lose? What lessons should the two peoples draw from this conflict?

I see the end of the conflict in 1994 as being the result of three factors: the Armenians were better prepared and more disciplined; Azerbaijan was in political chaos for most of the duration of the conflict; the Russians helped both sides but undoubtedly helped the Armenians more.

What would have happened if the Azerbaijani leadership had manifested good will by agreeing to Karabakh’s joining Armenia? What would the political and economic picture of the South Caucasus be today?

I sometimes wonder what would be the situation now if in 1988 the Soviet leadership had allowed Nagorny Karabakh to join Armenia and then Azerbaijan had occupied the region by force. Perhaps the Armenians would be talking about "territorial integrity" and the Azerbaijanis about "self-determination". The tragedy is that this has always been a disputed territory -- with a big Armenian population and deep Armenian historical roots, yet also strong Azerbaijani historical traditions in Shusha and part of Azerbaijan's economic space. And it lies right in the centre of the South Caucasus. So both sides need to recognize the importance of Karabakh for the other. If that is possible -- and it looks very unlikely at the moment -- Karabakh could become the centre of a dynamic region.

In a recent interview the last Soviet president, Mikhail Gorbachev, said that in those days the demand for Karabakh’s secession was justified. What does this belated statement mean?

Gorbachev never speaks entirely clearly, so I would be careful about this statement. Gorbachev was in an impossible situation in 1988 and I don’t think we should judge him too harshly. At least he did not start the kind of mass arrests that a previous Soviet leader would have made.

Which version of the settlement plans presented to the parties by the mediators from 1994 until now do you consider reasonable and why?

Almost all of the peace plans have their positive sides. What has been lacking is the "context" for them -- the dialogue in both societies about how peace and compromise would be better than the status quo. I firmly believe that poetapnoe uregilirovanie [step-by-step settlement] is better than paketnoe [package], because this will start to build up trust between the two sides. And it is clear that the Karabakh Armenians will not accept anything less than their current level of self-rule, whatever the formal name of the state that they are part of.

Who will resolve the Karabakh conflict if the international community doesn’t recognize Karabakh and Armenia and Azerbaijan push its representatives out?

It's clear to me that Karabakhis should be part of the peace process -- and that also includes the Karabakh Azeri community, who has lost probably more than anyone. It is absurd for me that the Stepanakert authorities are not part of discussions which will decide their future.

It is always possible to sign a peace agreement, but will it indeed mean peace? What will that piece of paper give the conflicting peoples?

The Northern Ireland experience shows that conflicts are never "resolved", they are only transformed. There is still no final agreement between the sides in Northern Ireland but violence has almost completely ended. So a peace treaty would be the beginning of a new process. A central aim of my book is to present a wide selection of voices from all sides, expressing their pain, their hopes and fears and claims. The bigger the dialogue is, the more likely that a genuine peace can take root. But it is a very painful process and will take years, probably decades.