Alec Yenikomshian

(Pt. 2 of five-part series entitled (Armenia's Last Chance to Ensure Its Survival)

For Armenia to genuinely preserve sovereignty over the transport routes crossing Syunik (TRIPP – “Trump’s Route”), it is essential that the provisions presented below be explicitly enshrined in an official agreement.

After presenting this sovereign scenario (“A”), scenario “B” follows—outlining the consequences if these provisions are not secured.

Both scenarios were elaborated with the participation of artificial intelligence.

If the Armenian government’s commitment to sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the supremacy of national legislation is genuine and unwavering, then these provisions should become its clear policy stance.

They must also form the core of an honest opposition platform on this critical issue.

Protective Safeguards Armenia Must Secure to Ensure Sovereignty over TRIPP

1. Explicit Assertion of Armenian Jurisdiction

* Armenian criminal/civil law applies along the route.

* Final authority rests with Armenian courts (or arbitration located within Armenia).

2. Armenian Border and Customs Control

* Armenian authorities administer all checkpoints.

* “Unhindered passage” means predictable Service Level Agreements (SLAs) and green-lane procedures, not absence of checkpoints.

3. Exclusion of Foreign Uniformed Presence

* No third-country military/police forces along or near the route.

* Private security only with Armenian licenses.

4. Right to Suspend in Emergencies

* Armenia retains the right to halt transit under defined procedures and for limited time periods, for security or public order purposes—subject to a review mechanism that both preserves sovereignty and prevents abuse.

5. Operator Model

* Any construction and/or management consortium operates under concession powers (as defined     by Armenian law), not sovereign authority.

* Fees/tariffs are set by Armenia (or a joint tariff board where Armenia holds veto power).

6. Exclusion of Extraterritorial Easements

* Land use is regulated via servitudes/leases registered under Armenian law.

* No immunities outside commercial arbitration.

7. Clarification of Reciprocity Clause

* Armenia must receive a mirror package of benefits: upgrades/expansion of east–west rail links to Georgia/Iran, north–south connectivity, export routes, and financing.

 8. Dispute Resolution

* State-to-state disputes handled through neutral arbitration, with no automatic injunctive relief that could override Armenian sovereign authority.

Following enshrinement of these provisions with the U.S. and with the “mutually agreed third parties” (as per the August 8 agreement), Armenia must:

• Ensure National Assembly ratification of the final agreement within a short timeframe.
• Obtain a Constitutional Court ruling confirming that TRIPP operates fully under Armenian law.

Additionally:

• Amend the Constitution to stipulate that no infrastructure zone may function as “de-facto extraterritorial territory.”
• Establish a special “Lex TRIPP” law, granting the government extraordinary powers to suspend or revise TRIPP’s regime if Armenian sovereignty is violated.

Any attempt to bypass Armenian customs or border control automatically triggers Lex TRIPP’s emergency clause and temporary suspension of the route.

Outcomes Secured by These Safeguards (with Next Steps in Each Area)

1. Geopolitical Balance

* Deepened U.S./EU cooperation, while transparently demonstrating to Iran and Russia that TRIPP       does not erode Armenia’s sovereignty nor constitute a    “corridor.”

Additional steps:

• Annual Armenia–U.S. TRIPP review conference with neutral participants.
• If Moscow or Tehran apply pressure: activate trust-building measures (e.g. technical monitoring), without delegating authority to foreign powers.

2. Regional Stability

* TRIPP is presented as a peace-enhancing tool, with emphasis on sovereign control and rejection of “corridor logic.”

Additional steps:

• If Azerbaijan obstructs or promotes “corridor” rhetoric: initiate multilateral arbitration (e.g. OSCE technical format).

• By end of Year 4: secure UN/EU confirmation that TRIPP strengthens Armenian sovereignty.

3. Economic Positioning

* Armenia positions itself as a multi-directional logistics hub, channeling TRIPP revenues responsibly     while also developing routes through Georgia and Iran.

Additional steps:

• Within 2 years of launch: establish an annual sovereign customs and

          payments system.

• Within 3 years: introduce a transparent transit fee model with public reporting.

• If TRIPP freight exceeds 25% of total east–west land flows: automatically direct 20% of revenues to a Sovereignty Reserve Fund.

4. Democracy and Governance Stability

* TRIPP becomes a sovereign democratic governance stress-test, operating under state oversight     and transparent accountability.

Additional Measures:

• By the end of Year 5, publish quarterly TRIPP monitoring reports to the National Assembly and the public.
• If public trust falls below 50%, convene a Civic Oversight Council empowered to propose reforms.

5. Diaspora and Innovation

* TRIPP builds confidence and opportunity for diaspora capital to flow into adjacent Free Economic Zones, dry ports, and supporting infrastructure.

Additional Measures:

• Within 2 years, establish a Diaspora–TRIPP Investment Instrument.
• If TRIPP revenues underperform (by more than 30%), a diaspora co-financing mechanism is automatically triggered.

Concise Summary

• TRIPP becomes a sovereignty-strengthening project, ensuring controlled economic benefits, domestic democratic stability, and deeper international support. Armenia’s trajectory tilts toward “active sovereignty”, transforming vulnerabilities into legally enshrined sources of strength.

Scenario B: De Facto Corridor

The absence of the above-mentioned provisions ensuring Armenia's sovereignty and the establishment of other provisions will lead to a de facto corridor, with their worst consequences.

General Description

TRIPP develops as a de facto corridor: Armenia's jurisdiction exists only on paper, but checkpoints are open or symbolic, the foreign operator enjoys immunities, and Armenia’s ability to conduct inspections, policing, or suspension is limited. In practice, international actors (e.g., Azerbaijan, Turkey, EU, Russia) have influence over corridor management.

Threats and Consequences

1. Sovereignty Distortion

• Armenia will not have the ability to suspend operations. Its right to do so will be formulated as an international violation.
• Armenia’s jurisdiction will be weakened through arbitration and operator immunities.

2. Security Threats and Risks

• Turkey and Azerbaijan (most important consequence): Azerbaijan gains a new pressure tool—it will consider any “obstruction” as “hostile action.” Both will definitely try to expand their control and will turn this into a tool of political blackmail against Armenia, fully controlling the “corridor” at the opportune moment. They will gain the opportunity to more easily pursue their other threats—"Western Azerbaijan”, Armenia’s demilitarization, $150 billion in “damage compensation”, etc.
• Iran: Sharp dissatisfaction. It will consider what happened as corridor logic and a step to exclude it from the game.
• Russia: Initially may be satisfied, as long as it has a role in control. But when other forces (EU, Turkey) strengthen, Moscow will begin applying pressure on Yerevan.

3. Economic Consequences

• Initially Armenia will receive investments and income from transit fees.
• In the medium term, dependence will increase on external forces—in terms of investments, transport connections, and political “seal of approval”.
• In the long term, it will be subject to the prospect of becoming not an independent hub, but simply a transit zone, where real economic added value remains in others’ hands.
• Overall, payments are limited by contract/operator.
• Armenia will bear security and operational risks with limited control capabilities.

4. Internal Political Destabilization and Polarization

• Initially the government may present itself as the “architect of economic opening”—gaining short-term support.
• When economic dependence and sovereignty issues deepen, state and regime stability will weaken.
• Polarization will deepen; part of society will resist “hidden” capitulation.

Conclusion

Scenario B may, at best, offer short-term economic or diplomatic benefits, while it will erode sovereignty and open the door to Turkey’s and Azerbaijan’s final assaults.

Top photo: Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan meet in Istanbul on June 20, 2025 to discuss normalizing relations between their countries.

Pt. 3: The outlines of a strategic resilience program — a comprehensive plan to acquire defensive depth and reduce vulnerability in all sectors - that Armenia should adopt under the circumstances of pan-Turkic threats.