Alec Yenikomshian

The government of Armenia officially announced that defense expenditures in the 2026 state budget draft will be reduced by 15% compared to the previous year.

After the devastating defeat of the 44-day war, a discourse was put into circulation/entered in Armenia according to which, "if we do not want a new war and consequently a new defeat, then we must strive for establishing peace and normal relations with Azerbaijan (and Turkey)."

Currently, and especially after the Washington initialing and agreement of August 8, it is being proclaimed from the highest platforms that "peace has already been achieved" and "there will be no war."

Naturally, no one, especially if defeated and weak, can consider war preferable to peace.

But currently the "war or peace" choice is false, and the assertion that "peace has already been achieved" is utterly wrong. Both (the second one, even more so) are extremely dangerous because they dull and divert from the awareness of necessary action.

They are false and utterly wrong because achieving peace requires that both conflicting sides want it. Whereas, in the given case, Azerbaijan and Turkey want and pursue not peace, but the absorption of Armenia.

To avoid misunderstandings or manipulations, let us reaffirm once again:

Yes, Armenia MUST strive for normalization of relations with its two neighbors. It is the defeated side. Moreover, even after the defeat, it stands before existential threats. It has no alternative.

But normalization cannot be an end in itself or self-deception. It must at least ensure the conditions for the country's and state's survival. The defeated side is forced to pay a heavy price. But the limit of the price's heaviness is the guarantee of its survival. Beyond that limit, "normalization" becomes absurd and deceptive.

Now, do Azerbaijan and Turkey truly strive for genuine normalization of relations with Armenia, such normalization that, despite Armenia's high price paid, would guarantee its survival?

Answer: NO. As they say, thrice NO.

Why?

On the day when the "Peace Agreement" is signed with Armenia, Azerbaijan will have achieved the first of its goals: Armenia's official, interstate treaty recognition of the fact of its complete dominance over the territories of former Soviet Azerbaijan, and consequently the legal exclusion of any future claims by Armenia and Armenians over some of those territories.

On the same day, Azerbaijan will have officially recognized on paper Armenia's territorial integrity and Armenia's sovereignty over those territories. But the signing of the agreement absolutely does not mean that the two countries' relations will thus become "normal" and that from that day Baku will be ready to live peacefully with Yerevan. On the contrary.

First, the 17 points of the pre-signed agreement already contain possible "traps" for Armenia, and it is not coincidental that Ilham Aliyev personally insisted that these points were formulated at his demand. But much more important is that the articles of the "Peace Agreement" are not Baku's only conditions. It is known that the latter openly presents other demands that will not only make the recognition of Armenia's sovereignty a piece of paper but will also present the most serious threats to its existence.

Azerbaijan:

• Together with Ankara, demands free transit through Syunik without Armenia's practical right to any control.
• In the person of Aliyev, demands that Armenia's armed forces be prohibited from arming themselves with heavy weaponry, i.e., practically denies Armenia's right to have a real army.
• Demands from Armenia's authorities the removal of symbols of Armenian identity and the erasure of historical memory.
• Keeps hanging in the air the threat of a claim for allegedly 150 billion dollars in "damage compensation."

And if the above were not sufficiently convincing in terms of threatening Armenia's existence, here’s the following:

• At the official level, considers Armenia a "stolen from Azerbaijan," "artificial" country and state. Aliyev personally considers Armenia's current territory as "Western Azerbaijan," as well as considers the "return" of 300 thousand Azerbaijanis "forcibly displaced" from there, with "security guarantees," the "most important condition for establishing peace." Armenia's current Armenian population is presented as non-indigenous, as “gypsy” communities that has settled there over time.

The formulation and pursuit of such demands alongside the signing of the "Peace Agreement" means nothing other than that in reality Azerbaijan aims for Armenia's de facto elimination. Baku doesn't even hide this.

This goal-setting is not an "emotional outburst” on its part. It is not the result of intoxication from the victories it has recorded since 2020. It was formed at least more than two decades ago, from the days when Ilham Aliyev came to power, and was openly expressed from that time, when Azerbaijan was still far from even having the prerequisites secured for reconquering Artsakh.

Their own testimonies about this goal-setting are so numerous that they could fill volumes. Here are some of the first and latest official statements in this regard:

• Starting from 2003-2004, Azerbaijan's then Defense Minister Safar Abiyev called Armenia "a state created on lands seized from Azerbaijan."
• The Defense Ministry's chief spokesman, Colonel Ramiz Melikov, declared in 2004: "In the coming 25 years, there will be no Armenian state in the South Caucasus. Present-day Armenia is built on Azerbaijan's historical lands. I think in 25-30 years this territory will have returned to Azerbaijan's jurisdiction." This statement has never been retracted.
• Ilham Aliyev began in 2010 to publicly present Armenia as "our land" and speak about "returning" it. He also formulated this idea very clearly in 2018.
• After the war, in December 2022, he declared: "Present-day Armenia is our land. I say this as a historical truth. We must collaborate with specialists on the concept of return to Western Azerbaijan. AFTER RESOLVING THE KARABAGH CONFLICT, THIS IS OUR AGENDA [emphasis ours]. Work in this direction has already begun."
• On June 18, 2025, he declared: "The return of Azerbaijanis to Armenia is the most important precondition for establishing peace."
• And on September 14, 2025 - that is, one month after the preliminary signing of the "Peace Agreement" in Washington on August 8 and the conclusion of an agreement on corridors passing through Syunik - he again declared that "peace must be based on historical justice."

After all this, the highest instances of political power in Armenia do not cease to declare, that "peace has already been achieved" and "there will be no war," while the defense budget is being cut by 15%. Should one be astonished, angry, or lamented?

In 2025, Azerbaijan allocated $5.03 billion to military expenditures, which corresponds to 6.6% of its GDP. In the 2026 budget, these expenditures have increased by 3.4%, reaching $5.12 billion, 6.5% of the expected annual GDP. Meanwhile, Armenia allocated $1.73 billion for the same purpose in 2025 (5.9% of GDP), and in 2026 has reduced it by 15%, bringing it to $1.47 billion (4.7% of GDP). The comparison of absolute military allocation figures grows from 2.91 times in Azerbaijan's favor in 2025 to 3.48 times.

While it is being announced in Armenia that "peace has been achieved," Aliyev does not mince words: he proclaims Armenia as "our land," "Western Azerbaijan" as the "main agenda," and the issue of return as the "most important condition for establishing peace."

How will Aliyev try to implement these intentions? Either through war or without war. If without war, it will mean that Armenia has reconciled itself to this demand without resistance, that is, to its death. In that case - yes, the prediction that "there will be no war" will become reality. What great consolation: to die not because of war, but "without war."

And if Armenia does not reconcile itself to this demand, then Azerbaijan will undoubtedly resort to force again. That will already be war, not "there will be no war." But if Armenia is not prepared for that war, the consequence will be the same - defeat and final destruction.

Only in one case can "there will be no war" become a true prediction - when Armenia has acquired sufficient resiliency and resistance capacity and thereby prevented Azerbaijan's adventurism.

Alongside what has been mentioned, one can be equally astonished by the continuing assertions that in the case of making concessions on the Artsakh issue, it would have been possible to avoid war and defeat. Azerbaijan, when it was still in a definitively weaker state than Armenia, had decided from 2003-2004 not only to bring back its "dear" Karabagh, but to eliminate all of Armenia. And we, instead of recognizing these open and public threats and making that prospect unrealizable through concentrated efforts, naively argued and continue to argue that in case of concessions around Artsakh, it would have been possible to prevent war and defeat and keep part of it, criminally indifferently ignoring that Azerbaijan had set the goal of conquering not only all of Artsakh, but all of Armenia.

Azerbaijan's aforementioned intentions are also Turkey's. Apart from the "Zangezur Corridor" and partly the demands to renounce symbols and historical memory, Turkey seemingly has no connection with Azerbaijan's other objectives. But this impression is deceptive. Baku's aforementioned goals at first glance serve the programs of Azerbaijani extreme nationalism; this perception is not wrong. But in a larger sense, they will serve Turkey's pan-Turkish program. The realization of the "corridor," which is not only Azerbaijan's but also Turkey's demand, is itself the first step on the path to realizing Turan. But Baku's other demands ("Western Azerbaijan," prohibition of army armament, etc.) complete for Turkey the path to realizing the old and reborn dream of Turan.

Turkey today does not publicly repeat Baku's demands. Open support, instead of helping, could harm that goal. But the slogan "One nation, two states" is not just a slogan, but an operational guideline. It is not in vain that Ankara reminds at every opportunity that the normalization of its relations with Yerevan is conditioned by the latter's acceptance of Baku's conditions. Turkey can sometimes even have disagreements with Azerbaijan regarding certain tactical issues, for example, the choice of timing for implementing some step, etc. But on the question of the necessity of implementing the strategic goal of Pan-Turkism, their positions coincide.

Therefore, yes, Armenia must strive for establishing peace and normal relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. But the latter do not have the same desire. On the contrary, their goal is to achieve Armenia's de facto elimination over time. Neither the preliminary signing nor the presumable final signing of the "Peace Agreement" changes anything from this reality.

Armenia, if it wants to live in peace with its eastern and western neighbors, has only one path: through mobilization and concentration of its own and all Armenians' capabilities, to acquire resiliency and resistance against that real threat whose goal is the elimination of its existence.

The implementation of this single and last possibility for Armenia is difficult, but not impossible. This primarily requires:

• Deep awareness by decision-makers, the political class and society in Armenia, as well as old and new structures and individuals in the Diaspora, of this existential threat to Armenia and consequently to all Armenians.
• Based on this awareness - mobilization and concentration of all possibilities of Armenia and the Diaspora in the direction of a single agenda: acquiring resiliency for present-day Armenia.

Acquiring this resiliency, in turn, implies:

1. Remediation/recovery of Armenia's state system, political class, and society, as well as state-society relations. Similarly, through the mentioned deep awareness - recovery of homeland structures-Diaspora relations.
2. For this recovery, but also independently from it and as an independent goal, to develop and implement state policy based on the principles of genuine social and legal justice, modern and healthy comprehensive education, and upbringing, and sustainable, developing modern economy.

Alongside these two preconditions that ensure internal strength, Armenia's survival doctrine must also be built on the following four pillars that are interconnected and mutually enriching:

3. Asymmetric security and defense capability - making invasion extremely costly.
4. Multilateral diplomacy - making Armenia demanded and even indispensable for numerous powers.
5. Resilient economy and infrastructure - to ensure national sovereignty and stability during wartime.
6. Unification of the Homeland and Diaspora in a united security ecosystem.

Alongside and parallel to all this, it is necessary to ensure Armenia's complete sovereignty over the corridors passing through Syunik.

From Armenia's society and citizens, as well as concerned and involved Diaspora Armenians, the following is expected:

• Rise above the largely artificial and long outdated "former/current" and similar conceptions and false dilemmas.
• Even -if judged necessary- while maintaining their own convictions regarding the assessment of those responsible for failures and defeats, focus on what needs to be done. From their position toward authorities and opposition according to the positions of the latter regarding the imperative of resistance and survival strategy.
• Undertake pressure and demand from them to adopt and implement such a strategy.
• Self-organize and form political-social thought, current, movement, force for the purpose of adopting and implementing the strategy.

The document presents a comprehensive analysis of the false dilemma of "war or peace" facing Armenia, and argues that:

1. The core thesis: The "war or peace" choice is false because Azerbaijan and Turkey don't want true peace but Armenia's elimination
2. Evidence provided: Extensive documentation of official Azerbaijani statements from 2003-2025 showing consistent goals of claiming all of Armenia as "Western Azerbaijan"
3. The reality: Azerbaijan's demands go far beyond any peace agreement and threaten Armenia's very existence
4. The solution: Armenia must build comprehensive resistance through internal strengthening, asymmetric defense, multilateral diplomacy, resilient economy, and homeland-diaspora unity
5. The call to action: Citizens and diaspora must organize politically to demand and implement this survival strategy