By Alec Yenikomshian

The visit of U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance to Armenia and Azerbaijan has understandably generated a wide range of interpretations. Following the signing of the Washington documents on August 8, 2025, and the January 13, 2026 agreement on the implementation of the TRIPP project, this high-level visit has encouraged certain political and analytical circles in Armenia to highlight what they perceive as Armenia’s growing importance for the United States and to draw conclusions regarding Yerevan’s strategic value and foreign policy options.

In reality, Armenia’s expectations toward all external actors—whether friendly or adversarial—should be shaped exclusively by a sober analysis of those actors’ interests, rather than by the illusion that Armenia’s security gaps can be compensated by external guarantees.

The South Caucasus: A Zone of U.S. Interest, Not a Core Strategic Priority

The United States typically commits substantial resources only to regions that constitute core pillars of its national security. The South Caucasus, like Central Asia, does not fall into that category.

From Washington’s perspective, these regions function as relatively low-cost strategic buffers against the influence of Russia, Iran, and China. The United States generally does not seek traditional alliances here. Instead, it aims to develop leverage capable of constraining competitors’ influence without assuming extensive commitments.

A key objective of U.S. regional policy is the preservation of a manageable multipolar environment. Washington tends to prefer a regional system in which actors remain interdependent, compete within limited boundaries, and must take external mediation into account. In this sense, the South Caucasus is often viewed not as a model of ideal stability, but as a space of managed competition and controlled instability.

This does not mean that the United States never attempts to influence the regional balance of power. Washington periodically applies selective balancing through diplomatic pressure, security cooperation, economic initiatives, and institutional frameworks. However, such actions are generally aimed not at fundamentally restructuring the regional order but at preserving its manageability.

The Structural Shift: Türkiye as a Primary Operational Intermediary

The 2020 war fundamentally altered not only the balance of power around Nagorno-Karabakh but also the strategic structure of the South Caucasus. Previously, the region largely operated under Russian dominance within a multi-actor yet highly hierarchical system, where Türkiye exercised influence but did not play a decisive role.

After 2020, that structure significantly weakened. Türkiye moved beyond its secondary position and became one of the region’s principal operational actors. It evolved into not only Azerbaijan’s primary security guarantor but also an active agenda-setter and promoter of regional connectivity initiatives.

At the same time, Türkiye remains a complex and sometimes contradictory partner for the United States. Disagreements over Syria, tensions within NATO, and disputes surrounding defense policy demonstrate that Ankara is not a fully predictable ally for Washington. Nevertheless, in the South Caucasus, it is frequently viewed as a functionally indispensable intermediary whose involvement is necessary for many regional processes.

Russia retained certain military and political instruments but has largely lost its ability to define the overall rules of the game. As a result, the region has gradually entered a reconfigured hierarchy increasingly influenced by Türkiye, partially revisionist in character, and largely managed rather than fundamentally counterbalanced by external actors.

These changes have also affected perceptions of Azerbaijan. Within U.S. strategic thinking, Azerbaijan maintains a degree of autonomy, particularly through its energy diplomacy and multi-vector foreign policy. However, it is often viewed as a crucial component of Türkiye’s broader security and connectivity ecosystem.

Armenia Within the U.S. Hierarchy of Regional Priorities

U.S. regional policy is structured not around a binary friend-versus-adversary framework but around a functional hierarchy of utility. Within this system, Türkiye and Azerbaijan occupy primary positions due to their military, energy, and transit roles.

Armenia holds significance primarily in specific scenarios—namely, diversification of regional connectivity, preservation of competitive balance, and prevention of monopolized regional influence.

Washington does not regard Armenia as an energy hub, a regional military operator, or an indispensable geographic corridor. Nevertheless, Armenia is important insofar as it contributes to maintaining a pluralistic regional structure and limits the emergence of absolute dominance by any single actor.

At the same time, the uncontrolled strengthening of the Türkiye-Azerbaijan axis is not in itself a primary U.S. concern. That axis has frequently served as an instrument of broader American regional objectives. Mechanisms intended to limit its dominance often function as insurance measures rather than core strategic priorities.

Formally, the United States supports Armenia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, in practical policymaking, these principles may at times be subordinated to broader regional stability and connectivity priorities. In certain scenarios, Washington may prioritize regional stability even if this constrains aspects of Armenia’s practical sovereignty.

The TRIPP Project: Reality and Strategic Misperceptions

Within certain Armenian circles, a perception has emerged that the TRIPP project elevates Armenia into a state of special security importance for the United States. In reality, the project increases the importance of all key regional actors, albeit asymmetrically.

The logic of TRIPP is based on the premise that transit routes must pass through states capable of ensuring security and enforcement.

Within this framework, Türkiye emerges as a central guarantor of corridor security and a critical NATO–Asia bridge. Azerbaijan strengthens its position as an integrated energy and transit hub.

Armenia acquires the role of a stabilizing and reliable transit segment. However, it does not become the strategic controller or principal security guarantor of the corridor.

TRIPP produces an asymmetrical elevation: all participating states benefit, but those already occupying higher positions in the strategic hierarchy benefit more.

At the same time, the corridor’s smooth functioning requires a relatively secure regional environment, which may reduce the probability of large-scale military escalation. However, this does not automatically ensure Armenia’s full operational control over transit routes[link to the article: “The TRIPP Implementation Framework Not Capitulation — But Not Protection Either”].

Syunik remains a focal point of competing pressures. U.S. and Armenian security priorities do not fully coincide in this regard. For Washington, the uninterrupted operation of transit routes is paramount; for Yerevan, full territorial and political control remains central.

The Strategic Significance of an Artificial Intelligence Data Center

The creation of an artificial intelligence data center introduces a new technological dimension into U.S.–Armenia relations. Armenia begins to be viewed not only through a political or security lens but also as a potential participant in high-technology cooperation.

Data infrastructure in the modern world carries dual civilian and strategic value. Such projects may integrate Armenia into U.S. technological supply chains and data security ecosystems.

Nevertheless, the initiative remains largely diaspora-driven and does not yet constitute a large-scale U.S. government strategic investment. It may, however, represent a preliminary stage toward deeper integration.

This initiative expands Armenia’s functional value but does not fundamentally alter its overall geographic position within U.S. strategic priorities.

Conclusion: Opportunities Without Illusions

Armenia–United States relations must be understood within a hierarchy of interests in which Armenia occupies a structurally constrained yet not insignificant position.

Washington has no interest in Armenia’s destruction or annexation. However, Armenian sovereignty is not treated as a standalone strategic objective. Armenia is important insofar as it contributes to regional stability, functional transit routes, and competitive balance.

Armenia’s strategic opportunities lie not in exclusive alliance-building but in gradually increasing its functional indispensability. Yerevan cannot compel external actors to adopt its priorities, but it can raise the strategic cost of ignoring them.

Armenia’s principal challenge is to ensure that its weakening or subordination would produce regional instability and strategic disruption. This path is narrow but realistic. Armenia’s security will depend not on external guarantees alone but on its capacity to strengthen domestic resilience and to position itself as a stabilizing factor within a regional order it does not control but cannot be bypassed.