Alec Yenikomshian

The 2020 Artsakh war and subsequent developments drastically changed the strategic balance of the South Caucasus.

Before 2020: A Russian-Centric Managed Equilibrium

Multilateral but Hierarchical

• Russia: the system manager.
• Türkiye: a constrained secondary actor—militarily excluded and operating within Russian red lines.
• Iran: a status-quo power—capable of disrupting developments it considered threatening, but generally deferring to Russia in matters of regional escalation.
• The United States: a distant legitimizer—tacitly accepting Russian primacy in matters of hard security.
• Azerbaijan: a revisionist-in-waiting—strategically constrained without Russian acquiescence.
• Armenia: a protected but dependent state—its survival largely outsourced to Russia, with part of its sovereignty traded for security guarantees.

After 2020: A Turkish-Led Revisionist Order

Externally Tolerated, Weakly Contested

• Türkiye: the principal strategic actor.
• Russia: a degraded balancer—no longer controlling outcomes and increasingly reacting tactically rather than arbitrating strategically.
• The United States: a selective stakeholder—diplomatically active, economically embedded through connectivity projects and TRIPP-type frameworks, anti-Russian in intent, unwilling to assume responsibility for escalation control, and not only unwilling to contest Turkish primacy but increasingly building its regional policy around acceptance of that predominance.
• Iran: a defensive firewall—alarmed by corridor logic and pan-Turkic expansion, rhetorically assertive and capable of disruption, but structurally unable to reverse the emerging regional order.
• Azerbaijan: a forward executor—the operational arm of Turkish strategy, exercising initiative largely within Ankara’s strategic framework while retaining a degree of autonomy.
• Armenia: a strategically exposed state—its deterrence hollowed out, without a reliable patron and facing a structurally hostile security environment.

Iran on the Strategic Defensive

Within this post-2020 framework, Iran has essentially been playing strategic defense in the South Caucasus.

Its objective has been less to reverse the regional balance of power than to prevent its further deterioration.

Iran’s principal red lines have been:

• preservation of the Armenia–Iran border;
• opposition to an extraterritorial “Zangezur corridor”;
• opposition to excessive Israeli penetration of Azerbaijan;
• prevention of the complete Turkish-Azerbaijani geopolitical encirclement of Armenia and northern Iran.

But there is an important distinction between having red lines and possessing sufficient political credibility and power to enforce them.

Before the 2026 war, Iran was under enormous pressure.

The prevailing regional perception was approximately the following:

Iran was weakening.

Its allies and affiliated forces were weakening.

Israel was ascendant.

The United States was backing the emerging regional order.

Russia was preoccupied with the war in Ukraine.

And Türkiye and Azerbaijan held the initiative.

The Iran War Changes Regional Perceptions

The Iran war has damaged that perception.

Iran has demonstrated something strategically important: it can absorb enormous punishment without capitulating, retain significant retaliatory capabilities, impose economic costs through the Strait of Hormuz, and force the United States back to the negotiating table.

This does not automatically translate into a proportionate increase in Iran’s capacity to project power or construct a new regional order in the South Caucasus.

But it does strengthen something immediately relevant to the region: Iran’s credibility and capacity to obstruct further geopolitical changes detrimental to its interests.

That changes calculations in Ankara and Baku.

Perhaps not radically.

But materially.

To begin with, the most important consequence may be psychological and perceptual.

But real, tangible changes may follow.

Geopolitics depends not only on material capabilities, but also on expectations.

Before the war, Azerbaijan and Türkiye could reasonably calculate that the regional trajectory was moving continuously in their favor:

2020 → Armenian defeat in the Artsakh war + Russian accommodation with Türkiye and Azerbaijan.

2021–2022 → incursions into the territory of the Republic of Armenia.

From 2022 onward → Armenian accommodation with Türkiye and Azerbaijan with the support of the EU and the United States.

2023 → elimination of Nagorno-Karabakh as an Armenian-populated region and geopolitical entity.

2024–2025 → continued weakening of Russian influence.

2025–2026 → American penetration of the South Caucasus through TRIPP.

Meanwhile:

Iran appeared increasingly isolated.

Russia appeared increasingly weakened.

The Iran war may have interrupted this linear expectation.

Türkiye and Azerbaijan must now ask themselves:

How far can we push?

Because Iran has demonstrated that it remains a serious regional power capable of absorbing extraordinary pressure and imposing significant costs on much more powerful adversaries.

This could directly affect Azerbaijani behavior toward Armenia.

Four Possible Consequences for the South Caucasus

First: Military Pressure Against Syunik Becomes Riskier

Not impossible.

Not unthinkable.

But riskier.

Iran’s warnings concerning territorial changes around its northern borders now carry somewhat greater credibility.

Second: The Maximalist Corridor Concept Becomes More Difficult to Pursue

Even if TRIPP proceeds, Azerbaijan’s original objective—a route subject to minimal Armenian sovereignty and control—becomes more difficult to impose if Iran adopts a more confident and assertive posture.

Third: Iran May Increase Its Engagement with Armenia

This is particularly important.

Iran does not need to become Armenia’s ally.

It simply needs to conclude that preventing further Turkish-Azerbaijani expansion requires strengthening Armenia’s capacity to remain a sovereign state.

That could translate into greater cooperation in:

• energy;
• transportation;
• North–South infrastructure;
• trade;
• military-industrial cooperation;
• intelligence cooperation;
• diplomatic coordination.

This convergence of interests should not, however, be mistaken for complete strategic alignment.

Iran may simultaneously favor a stronger Armenia vis-à-vis Türkiye and Azerbaijan, oppose an expanding American presence in Armenia, and seek greater Iranian influence over Armenian strategic choices.

Iranian support for Armenia’s sovereignty does not necessarily imply Iranian support for maximum Armenian strategic autonomy.

Nevertheless, for a strategically exposed Armenia, the important fact is that Iran’s interest in preventing further Turkish-Azerbaijani expansion may increasingly require preserving and strengthening Armenia’s capacity to function as a sovereign state.

Fourth: Further Irreversible Transformations May Become More Difficult

This is perhaps the most important consequence.

Türkiye and Azerbaijan may become more cautious about attempting another irreversible geopolitical transformation.

This is the crucial distinction.

The post-2020 period has consisted of a succession of irreversible transformations.

Each transformation has moved the regional balance in approximately the same direction—in favor of Ankara and Baku.

The Iran war may have interrupted this process.

Not reversed it.

But interrupted it.

TRIPP: The Framework May Survive While Its Geopolitical Content Changes

This shift could have important implications for TRIPP.

The TRIPP framework exists. The United States has invested political capital in it. And Türkiye and Azerbaijan have strong interests in its implementation.

TRIPP therefore remains the most likely institutional framework.

But the continued existence of the framework and its ultimate geopolitical content are two different questions.

The regional environment in which TRIPP was conceived is changing.

A stronger and more self-confident Iran, a potentially more cautious United States, Russia’s persistent capacity for obstruction when completely excluded, and the inherent ambiguities of implementation could interact in ways that cannot yet be predicted.

The range of possible outcomes has therefore widened considerably—from implementation substantially along present lines, through prolonged renegotiation and dilution, to a much more significant transformation of TRIPP’s geopolitical content.

The project may survive while its governance, security arrangements, timetable, relationship with Iran and Russia, degree of Azerbaijani privilege, and implications for Armenian sovereignty change substantially.

Russia Weakened - but Has Not Disappeared

And here Russia becomes important.

There is little doubt that in 2020 Russia prioritized its accommodation with Türkiye and Azerbaijan over the defense of vital Armenian interests.

Because of its own problems, Russia was already in a tactical retreat from the South Caucasus. Türkiye, by contrast, was increasingly prepared to advance strategically.

In addition, faced with its growing confrontation with the West and the Ukraine conflict in the late 2010s and early 2020s, Russia was increasingly looking for alternative geographic, commercial, diplomatic, and other outlets.

Türkiye and Azerbaijan became more valuable.

Artsakh and Armenia paid a heavy price.

But that does not mean that Russia has lost interest in the region or is comfortable with the continuous expansion of Turkish strategic influence.

Therefore, a stronger Iran in 2026 does not operate alone.

Russia and Iran have overlapping interests in:

• limiting Turkish expansion;
• limiting American penetration;
• maintaining the Armenia–Iran connection;
• preventing complete Azerbaijani-Turkish dominance.

Their interests are not identical.

Nor should their overlapping interests be mistaken for a coherent or permanent strategic alliance.

But they overlap sufficiently to create obstacles to the consolidation of an uncontested Turkish-Azerbaijani regional order.

The Cumulative Effect: A Less One-Sided Regional Order

The real significance of these developments may therefore be cumulative:

a stronger Iran + surviving Russian influence + more cautious US involvement + the newly exposed limits of Israeli power projection.

None of these factors, taken individually, transforms the balance of power in the South Caucasus.

Together, however, they may produce a less comfortable geopolitical environment for Türkiye and Azerbaijan.

And that brings us to Armenia.

This is the most important conclusion.

Armenia’s Fundamental Problem: Every Structural Trend Was Moving Against It

For several years, Armenia’s fundamental geopolitical problem has been that almost every structural trend was moving against it simultaneously.

Türkiye was rising.

Azerbaijan was rising.

Russia was declining.

Iran was weakening.

The United States and the EU were entering the region primarily through a regional architecture compatible with Turkish-Azerbaijani interests.

Europe was strategically weak.

Armenia was militarily vulnerable.

This produced an extraordinarily narrow strategic space.

The question of how far the cumulative effects of these developments could have been mitigated by more appropriate Armenian strategies and policies since the 1990s remains pertinent.

But that question does not change today’s reality.

The Iran war may represent the first significant development in several years to slightly reverse the direction of this cumulative process.

And in geopolitics, even a small increase in maneuvering space can be enormously important for a small state.

From Continuous Deterioration Toward a More Contested Equilibrium

The post-2020 order:

Türkiye and Azerbaijan dominant.

Russia weakened.

Iran on the defensive.

The United States advancing opportunistically.

After the Iran war:

Türkiye and Azerbaijan still strong.

But Iran less defensive.

The United States more constrained.

Russia more tempted to re-enter.

Armenia slightly less isolated.

The Iran war has probably not changed the hierarchy of power in the South Caucasus.

Türkiye and Azerbaijan remain the strongest geopolitical bloc.

But the war may have changed the momentum of the regional system—from continuous Turkish-Azerbaijani expansion toward a more contested equilibrium.

And for Armenia, the distinction between an albeit unfavorable equilibrium and an unfavorable but continuously deteriorating equilibrium is enormous.

Because in the first situation, Armenia can potentially maneuver.

In the second, Armenia can only retreat.

The Central Question: Will Armenia’s Current Government Recognize This New Momentum and Respond Accordingly?

The great question is whether the current Armenian government possesses the strategic doctrine, diplomatic skill, and political willingness to exploit this newly emerging space rather than continuing to behave as though the post-2020 Turkish-Azerbaijani advance were historically irreversible.

The concern is structural.

The government’s post-2020 doctrine treats acceptance of Türkiye’s and Azerbaijan’s conditions as the principal path to state survival.

Yet the emerging geopolitical environment requires precisely the opposite intellectual reflex: recognizing newly available opportunities for balancing and exploiting them without abandoning normalization or peace.

The question is not whether Armenia should suddenly become anti-Turkish, anti-Azerbaijani, pro-Iranian, or pro-Russian.

Nor is the alternative to the government’s current doctrine a return to rigid alliances, geopolitical dependency, permanent confrontation, or the abandonment of peace.

The question is whether the government possesses the strategic flexibility to revise and adapt its policies when the external balance changes—to pursue normalization where possible, resistance where necessary, diversification wherever available, and balancing whenever opportunities emerge.

Or whether it has become intellectually, ideologically, and politically locked into a doctrine developed during the particularly unfavorable period of 2020–2025.

If the Iran war has indeed begun to transform a continuously deteriorating regional environment into a still unfavorable yet more contested equilibrium, then Armenia’s principal challenge is no longer merely to endure the existing order.

It is to recognize that the strategic environment may be changing—and to possess the doctrine, capacity, and political will to maneuver within it.