Dear Compatriots,

I had promised to you during our rally on September 26 to reveal and explain in detail the strategy of the Popular Movement or the Armenian National Congress without concealing anything from you. Today it is the time to fulfill that promise, therefore, I ask you to be patient and to listen carefully to every word of my speech.

I have already had the opportunity to draw your attention to the unprecedented geopolitical situation in which Armenia has found itself lately, putting special emphasis on the fact that our country has never been as vulnerable to external pressure in the 17 years of its independent existence, as it is today.  

It is in this dangerous situation that instead of thinking about the interests of our state and the well-being of our people, Serge Sargsyan is worried exclusively about clinging on to power and having his legitimacy recognized. What is more, his recent steps demonstrate that in order to attain his goals he is ready to revise Armenia’s foreign policy doctrine, and instead of preserving the policy of maintaining a balance between Russia and the West, gradually to lean toward the latter.

How can we explain Serge Sargsyan’s sharp turn toward the West? After all, he was known up to recently as the most pro-Russian statesman in Armenia. Let us not forget that he is the main architect of the “Property for debt” deal, which ensured the transfer of Armenia’s entire energy system to Russia. Let us also not forget his significant activities in the context of the “Organization of the Collective Security Treaty,” as well the stubborn rumors about his connections to both the Russian intelligence service and the world of organized crime in that country.

So what has forced Serge Sargsyan to reject the Russian orientation and tilt toward the West? The reasons, obviously, have nothing to do with Armenia’s strategic or state interests, but rather the simple benefit of solving his legitimacy problem.

Russia never questioned Serge Sargsyan’s legitimacy. President Vladimir Putin was among the first to congratulate him even before the official results of the elections had been announced. Sargsyan on his part violated certain diplomatic norms and expressed his gratitude to Russia in such an exaggerated form that it created a difficult situation for that country’s diplomacy.

Serge Sargysan has a legitimacy problem in the West. The US president George W. Bush has still not congratulated him. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, meanwhile, continues to threaten sanctions against Armenia, which would seriously undermine Serge Sargsyan’s legitimacy.

What this means is that Sargsyan has no expectations from Russia in this issue, and his only hope is to get the West’s endorsement for which he is ready to make any concession. And since given the absence of mineral resources, transit routes and an attractive market, Armenia does not have much to offer the West except for its state interests, he has decided to sacrifice those interests. This claim is supported not only by the conciliatory position he has assumed on the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict and on the issue of normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations, but also - and this is even more important - by his intention to make Armenia’s foreign policy “orientationalist.”

Throughout the entire period of independence Armenia has adhered to the principle of maintaining a balance between the West and Russia. Having adopted the Western values of democracy, liberalism, and market economy, Armenia never allowed itself to come under the West’s unilateral influence. On the other hand, having a close economic and military relationship with Russia, Armenia nonetheless did not become the latter’s political satellite. In other words, Armenia has tried to be neither pro-Russian, nor pro-Western, but rather pursue a policy based solely on its state interests.

During my presidency this position was called the policy of “balancing,” under Kocharyan it was called the policy of “complementarism,” but the difference here is rather terminological.

Serge Sargsyan is thus sharply changing this established order of things, and, in order to protect his personal interests, he is trying to flirt with the West. I consider it a waste of time to assess the advantages or disadvantages of Western or Russian orientations, because I consider any orientation dangerous. What has convinced me in that first and foremost is the experience of the traditional Armenian political thinking, which has had catastrophic consequences for Armenia in the past. In the final analysis, both the genocide that our people was subjected to and the territorial losses the first Republic of Armenia incurred were the consequences of the flawed “orientationalist” thinking. What also convinces me in this is today’s reality. In front of our eyes the adoption of the Western orientation by Georgia confronted that country with a national disaster, which it could have avoided had it pursued a more balanced policy with Russia. If we ignore the empty demonstrations of solidarity and the bluster of anti-Russian rhetoric, the West was unable to do anything to help its junior ally.

The politics of orientation is not just an abstraction or a theoretical construct for us. It has a very specific and practical content. By turning his back to Russia and embracing the West, represented by the USA and its ally Turkey, Serge Sargsyan is entrusting the unilateral solution to the most crucial problem of Armenia’s foreign policy - the Karabagh conflict - to them. The basis for reaching such a conclusion is the West’s obvious effort to exclude Russia from the process of resolving the Karabagh conflict. It is most clearly manifested in the transparent statements of Western diplomats, as well as the fact of trilateral negotiations on Karabagh between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey, especially in the context of conversations regarding the inclusion of Turkey’s representative as a co-chairman in the Minsk Group. By the way, Serge Sargsyan is so dependant on the West now that he could hardly resist the demand to replace Russia with Turkey in the Minsk Group co-chairmanship if such a demand was pressed on him.

As a result, there is a threat to the very existence of the Minsk Group, which for the last sixteen years has been the only international mechanism for resolving the Karabagh conflict. Despite its many flaws, the Minsk Group has been the most convenient or optimal format for us, both because the USA and Russia were equally represented in it, and also partly due to the competition that existed between them. It is no coincidence that Azerbaijan has spared no effort for discrediting the Minsk Group as a forum for settling the Karabagh conflict and to replace it with other international fora.

Unfortunately, the danger that the integrity of this format will be violated and that Russia will be excluded from it is real, because Russia, being preoccupied with the developments following the conflict with Georgia, will hardly be able to resist the West’s increased involvement in Karabagh. It goes without saying that in case of a resolution to the Karabagh conflict that has been unilaterally sponsored by the West, Russia will be excluded also from the international peacekeeping force that will be deployed there. And that means if not complete eradication of Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus, then its substantial weakening, which entails serious and unpredictable geopolitical consequences, such as suspension of both Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s participation in the CIS, removal of the Russian base and the Russian frontier troops from Armenia, etc.

The change of the Minsk Group format thus implies a unilateral Western solution to the Karabagh problem, with active Turkish participation to boot, which can never be beneficial for Armenia. By the way, realism on this issue demands to say also that a unilateral Russian solution would also not be in Armenia’s interests, since Russia has stated on numerous occasions that it sees such a solution only within the confines of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. This, however, is an abstract observation, since there is no threat of a unilateral Russian solution to the problem, mainly because Azerbaijan would never agree to that.

Whereas, the opposite, i.e. an exclusively Western, or more specifically American and Turkish, solution is an entirely real prospect, as I tried to demonstrate.

Does Serge Sargsyan realize the dangers of jumping into the West’s embrace and granting it the monopoly of resolving the Karabagh conflict and that such a step can lead to a national catastrophe? There is no doubt that he does not. He is trying to play the same game with the West as Robert Kocharyan has played for the last ten years. The essence of that game, which I have explicated in detail in my speech on October 26, 2007, was to pretend that Armenia was genuinely interested in resolving the Karabagh conflict, but in reality to try to sabotage that process and to maintain the status quo.

And even though the OSCE mediators have in their turn pretended to believe the sincerity of the Armenian side, it does not mean that they have not understood the latter’s not very sophisticated game. The fact that they have not expended much effort to get the conflict resolved is because on the list of great powers’ priorities Karabagh had an extremely secondary importance. International terrorism, North Korea, the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and a multitude of other questions have always obscured the Karabagh problem.

If Serge Sargsyan thinks he can continue to play this game, he is fatally mistaken, because he is not taking into account three substantial changes in the geopolitics of the South Caucasus:

1. However paradoxical it may seem, after recognizing Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence, Russia’s influence in this region is showing tendencies of diminishing rather than increasing in strength;

2. Russia is being forced out of the Minsk Group format, therefore, it is losing its role in the process of resolving the Karabagh conflict;

3. In contrast to the last ten years, the Karabagh problem today has become a priority for the West.

The logic driving the West’s policy toward Russia relies on the following: “Very well, you solved the problems in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, now we are going to solve the problem in Nagorno-Karabagh.” What is frustrating about this situation is that as the West could do nothing to prevent Russia from solving the problems in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia in all likelihood will be unable to prevent the West from solving the Karabagh problem. The deepening of the international financial crisis and the threat of that crisis becoming uncontrollable can become the only impediment creating certain obstacles on the path of implementing the West’s plan for resolving the Karabagh conflict.

The factor of confronting Russia, however, is only one of the many motives conditioning the West’s behavior, and certainly not the main one. The main factor is Serge Sargsyan’s weakness and the unprecedented opportunity to exploit it. The presence of such levers as the absence of legitimacy, the degree to which he is corrupted, and the vulnerabilities that exist in his moral character, are like a treasure the West has found. Which other leader of Armenia would agree to jump to the West’s embrace so unreservedly, to deepen the cooperation with NATO, to turn its back to Russia, to contribute to its exclusion from the Minsk group, to endorse the creation of the forgotten proposal of a commission of Armenian and Turkish historians, which would raise doubts about the factual veracity of the genocide and torpedo the process of its international recognition, to agree to hold trilateral Armenian-Turkish-Azerbaijani negotiations, and finally, literally to put Nagorno-Karabagh up for sale?

In exchange for all of this, the West is naturally ready to turn a blind eye on Serge Sargsyan’s all aforementioned flaws, to forget the scandalous elections of February 19 and the atrocity of March 1, to pretend not to see his dictatorial domestic policy, to tolerate the curbs put on constitutional liberties and the wide-spread human rights violations, and to have the resigned attitude toward the fact of the existence of political prisoners in Armenia. Serge Sargsyan has in essence received a green light from the West to do as he pleases in domestic affairs, which is evidenced by the recent escalation of police violence against the people. This behavior of the West, aside from being immoral and demonstrating that the West is ready to compromise on its values for a very low price, contains an element of conspiracy that is being hatched against Karabagh.

Serge Sargsyan either does not feel this danger, or he cannot imagine another method of retaining his power. He has gotten himself into the cauldron of a geopolitical game, the consequences of which are going to be if not catastrophic, then at least unfavorable for Armenia and Karabagh. After the presidential elections in Azerbaijan on October 15 the West and Turkey are going to increase the pressure on Armenia and to speed up the process of resolving the Karabagh conflict, simultaneously, as I already mentioned, trying to exclude Russia from it.

Russia will certainly try to counteract against such developments, which are undesirable for it, but how effective, and how beneficial for Armenia Russia’s steps will be, is not clear. We should not ignore the Iranian factor either. Although it is the only country, which has to date pursued a balanced policy in the South Caucasus, having tried to maintain normal relations with Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, the increased Western and Turkish activism cannot cause a certain level of anxiety there. And it has already done so, which is evidenced by the hastily organized visit of Armenia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs to Iran.

Only God knows how Serge Sargsyan is going to figure a way out of this complicated geopolitical situation. If he thinks that by ingratiating himself to the West he can win time and even evade a resolution to the Karabagh conflict, and later somehow mend the fences with Russia, then he really does not understand anything in politics. And if Sargsyan is pinning hopes on the idea that being preoccupied with presidential elections and with the problem of dealing with the financial crisis America is not going to engage in a serious effort to resolve the conflict, he is going to be disappointed, because resolving the conflict in the newly created circumstances is not going to demand too much of the USA. One also cannot fail to take into account the possibility that the outgoing American administration would like to crown its departure with such a success as the resolution of the Karabagh conflict and the normalization of the Armenian-Turkish relations.

Thus, it is perfectly obvious that we are standing on the brink of a resolution to the Karabagh conflict. It is also beyond doubt that the Madrid proposal, which the Minsk Group gave to the parties in December, 2007, and which is based on the idea of reconciling two principles of international law - the right to national self-determination and the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity - will be the basis of the new proposal. As for the essence of the resolution or the specific program, it will consist of approximately the following points:

1. Withdrawal of Armenian forces from the Azerbaijani regions surrounding Nagorno-Karabagh;

2. Resettlement of these regions with Azerbaijani refugees;

3. Return of Azerbaijani refugees to the territory of Nagorno-Karabagh itself;

4. Provision of an overland link connecting Nagorno-Karabagh to Armenia through the Lachin corridor;

5. Deployment of peace-keeping forces on across the borders of Nagorno-Karabagh;

6. Demilitarization of the territories that have been returned to Azerbaijan;

7. Lifting of the blockade of Armenia’s and Karabagh’s external communications, and reopening of the Armenian-Turkish border;

8. Definition of an interim status for Nagorno-Karabagh Republic;

9. Conduct of a referendum on the final status of Nagorno-Karabagh in some undefined, future date;

10. Provision of international financial aid for the restoration of the conflict zone.

Considering also that apparently an effort is underway to resolve the Karabagh conflict and normalize the Armenian-Turkish relations in a package, we should not rule out the possibility that the package will include the question of the creation of a commission of historians to study the genocide. Since Serge Sargsyan has swallowed the hook on this issue, they are not going to let go of his collar.

Of course, we can discuss which of the points listed above are beneficial for Azerbaijan and Turkey and which ones for Armenia, but it is a pointless endeavor, because they can only be appreciated in their entirety and interconnectedness. It is more essential to figure out which points are going especially to complicate the negotiations. Points 3, 4, and 9, which respectively deal with the return of Azerbaijani refugees to Karabagh proper, the definition of the legal status for the Lachin corridor, and the conduct of a referendum in Nagorno-Karabagh are going to be the hardest to resolve. But taking into consideration the latest geopolitical developments, I think these difficulties are not going to be insurmountable for the mediators.

What we need to understand is that if up to recently the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group have followed the principle of achieving an agreement among the parties, now the West has the opportunity to impose its preferred solution, i.e. to implement the Dayton variant. It is sad that the same Dayton logic implies that Nagorno-Karabagh will not participate in the resolution process, and its interests in the upcoming fateful negotiations will be represented by Armenia, as the interests of the Bosnian Serbs were represented by Yugoslavia. Soon we are probably going to become the witnesses of Armenia and Azerbaijan participating in a Dayton type conference initiated by the USA and Turkey, where Russia and France as co-chairing countries of the Minks Group will participate, but at best as observers. In this regard, I don’t think the timing of adopting a final resolution on Armenia by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe - January, 2009 - is chosen by coincidence. That is how much time has been given to Serge Sargsyan to fulfill the promises he has given regarding the resolution of the Karabagh conflict, otherwise the threatened sanctions will finally be imposed.

Of course, Serge Sargsyan alone should not be saddled with the responsibility for the current situation. In the final analysis, this is the consequence of Kocharyan administration’s eight-year-long deplorable policy on the resolution of the Karabagh conflict and the normalization of the Armenian-Turkish relations, and for which the responsibility should be shared also by the all coalition governments that came one after the other, the criminalized National Assembly, the official press, the intelligentsia that was fed from the government’s trough and the pocket political parties. Today we are eating the bitter fruits of that policy, as well as the criminal behavior of the kleptocratic system created under Kocharyan.

It is beyond doubt that the West is not going to miss this most convenient opportunity to resolve the Karabagh conflict, which threatens to confront the Armenian authorities with extremely serious problems. It is not clear from the latter’s behavior and statements whether they realize the seriousness of the situation, and if they do, what measures they are taking to confront this dangerous challenge. Meanwhile, there are certain obvious steps that can be taken to blunt the external pressures and to improve the Armenian authorities’ positions in the upcoming negotiations. By measures I do not mean the empty calls to unity directed at the Armenian nation, which Serge Sargsyan recently made in his address to the representatives of the Armenian community of the USA, but very specific political initiatives, such as:

1. Alleviating the political and social tensions in Armenia, ensuring the primacy of the law, ceasing to put curbs on democratic freedoms, stopping the unrestrained violations of human rights, uprooting the wide-spread corruption, stopping the plunder of the country’s wealth, which goes on unpunished, getting rid of unscrupulous and criminalized officials, restoring the independence of legislative and judicial branches of power, starting a constructive dialogue with the society - in a word, neutralizing all those things that have become levers in the hands of the outside world for putting pressure on Armenia;

2. Improving the relations with Russia and work out the disputes that have lately arisen in those relations. Doing everything to prevent Russia’s exclusion from the Minsk Group on the basis of the simple realization that violation of the balance between the West and Russia in the process of settling the Karabagh conflict promises nothing good;

3. Making an effort to achieve clarity on the issue of the referendum on Karabagh’s status, demanding specificity on the following points in particular:

- Who is going to organize the referendum? The UN, the OSCE, Azerbaijan, or Karabagh?

- When is the referendum going to take place?

- What territory is the referendum going to cover?

- Who is going to participate in the referendum?

- What is going to be the formulation of the referendum question?

- What kind of legal consequences is the referendum going to have?

4. Abandoning the discredited practice of Armenia speaking on behalf of Karabagh in the negotiating process, and demanding instead to restore the previous format of those negotiations, where, following the decision adopted during OSCE’s Budapest summit in 1994, Nagorno-Karabagh was recognized as a full party to the conflict. It should not be allowed to decide Karabagh’s fate without its participation, because one can hardly imagine a worse violation of the right to self-determination than that.

5. Taking into account the disconcerting fact that after the recognitions of Kosovo, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia the problem of Karabagh in a certain sense has been left out of the general context of resolving the frozen conflicts, perhaps it is time to think about the possibility of the National Assembly putting forward an initiative to recognize Karabagh’s independence. Serge Sargsyan should not feel obligated to react to that initiative. But having the National Assembly’s decision, while leaving the question of ratifying that decision suspended, he will get a big opportunity to maneuver in response to the external pressures during the upcoming negotiations. The situation is not an ordinary one, and hence it demands extraordinary steps, diplomatic magic and flights of imagination.

Being one of the most influential forces in Armenia’s political life, the Popular Movement or the Armenian National Congress has an obligation to outline its position in this situation. If you remember, in one of my previous speeches I had stated that in our political struggle we put national and state interests above everything, and that in case of a military threat against Karabagh I would appeal to the participants of the movement and ask them to suspend their activities and take up the sacred cause of the national struggle. The imminent resolution of the Karabagh conflict is equivalent to a military threat given the dangers that it contains, and, therefore, I think it makes the fulfillment of that appeal imperative.

We are not talking, of course, about a complete suspension of the activities of the movement, but only about a temporary stop to the mass rallies and marches throughout the republic. Especially, since the suspension is not going to last long, because the untangling of this process is a matter of two-three months. And if that process is extended due to new circumstances, for instance, because of the deepening of the international financial crisis, we will always have the opportunity to make corrections in our strategy and resume the actions of mass protest whenever necessary.

I confess that this is a momentous decision, which is difficult to accept at first glance, and which will become subject to all sorts of judgments. It should therefore be easier to understand how serious and well-founded the reasons are that have determined the need to make such a decision.

To appreciate that need we have to take into account the following. The activity of the movement automatically weakens Serge Sargsyan’s positions and expands the opportunities for putting pressures on him from the outside in the current context of a sharp turn in the process of resolving the Karabagh conflict following the Russian-Georgian conflict. In other words, there is danger that the opposition can unwittingly become a tool in the hands of the external forces. The behavior of these forces, therefore, could be considered as doubly immoral: on one hand they tolerate, or one could even say they encourage the repressions unleashed against the opposition by the Armenian authorities, and on the other hand they are trying to exploit that same opposition’s activity to their sinister ends.

To fall into this trap would be an inexcusable mistake and a case of political shortsightedness. Moreover, it would fundamentally contradict the Popular Movement’s main tenet, which rests on the principle of the primacy of state interests. Consequently, being sincerely in favor of both resolving the Karabagh conflict and normalizing the Armenian-Turkish relations in a speedy manner, we do not want to prevent the Armenian authorities from solving these problems. By suspending our activities we only want to shield them from external pressures and from the need to make unnecessary concessions. There are also certain tactical considerations for taking this step, but I do not consider it necessary to reveal them, since as I have had the opportunity to point out before, if tactics are revealed they cease to be tactics.

I realize very well that the governing camp is going to scoff at our decision to stop even temporarily the actions of mass protest, and that there are going to be complaints and doubts in the ranks of the popular movement. But I want to dash the hopes of the scoffers and calm the doubters. Looking for elements of retreat or a deal with the authorities in our decision is not a serious endeavor. In a few months everybody is going to be convinced how justified and well-founded this decision was.

The suspension of rallies and marches throughout the republic does not mean that the Movement is pulling out of the struggle or withdrawing the demands that it has put forward, which include the immediate release of the political prisoners, the establishment of a real democracy and the rule of law in the country, the conduct of pre-term presidential and parliamentary elections. To the contrary, we are convinced that this move is going to accelerate the realization of these goals.

In the upcoming months the Movement is going to concentrate its activities mainly on organizational work and on the formation of the structures of the Armenian National Congress in order to prepare for the founding convention of the Congress, which is going to become an important event in the political life of Armenia, and which is simultaneously going to prepare the grounds for even more populous public events if organizing them becomes necessary. Parallel to that, we are going to continue with smaller acts of protest, with participating actively in the political trials, with endorsing and defending our own candidates in the local elections, with the campaign of raising public awareness through the distribution of DVDs and through the print media, with our own investigation into the crime of March 1 and the revelation of the real culprits of that crime.

It is significant that we are taking this decision not when the Movement is in decline, but when it is in ascendancy, i.e. during the most populous rally since March 1, which is the best manifestation of both the power and the capacity to restraint of the Armenian National Congress.

Thus in the upcoming months we will become witness to very important events connected to Karabagh and to the fate of the Armenian statehood, which in this juncture make internal political problems secondary. We are going to follow very carefully the progression of those events, to assess how adequate the Armenian authorities’ moves are given the situation, to keep the society informed on the process of resolving the Karabagh conflict, and to try to prevent or minimize the threat to the interests of the Armenian side. We expect the same kind of concern from all the healthy political and civic organizations, which care about the future of the nation and the state.

In the end I would ask you not to make hasty conclusions from my speech, but rather to form an opinion about it after reading it in tomorrow’s newspapers. I hope that this speech will finally jump start a long overdue debate regarding the Karabagh problem, in the process of which many things will become clearer to you.

I thank you for your attention.