Below is the second of a two part interview with Richard Giragosian, Director of the Armenian Center for National and International Studies, based in Yerevan.

Two former RoA Foreign Ministers, Raffi Hovhannisyan and Vardan Oskanian, both with roots in the diaspora have publicly opposed the Protocols in their current form. Can we assume that you do not share their concerns?

My perspective differs in the fact that I see the Protocols as a process of normalization. What they are talking about is reconciliation. I don’t see that. What I do see is only the basic minimum first step of normalization, open borders, diplomatic relations; in moving towards reconciliation. At the same time, that’s why I see it as less of a threat. The other point I would like to make here is that it is too soon to judge the Protocols. The real test is still to come. It will be, if the sub-committees are formed, including the one on history, what will be its mandated mission. That’s the real test; not the fact that we may have one. That’s to say, if I were an Armenian diplomat, I would go into the negotiations with a pre-assumption that, yes, Armenia and Turkey will have a sub-commission on historical issues. I would fight for having it based on a mandate that presupposes the reality of the Armenian Genocide and only focuses on the repercussions of the Genocide. Turkey may be willing to accept that’s not a direct assumption of guilt, but rather a way to also move towards Genocide recognition because Turkey is moving towards recognition, albeit too slowly.

Do you really see Turkey moving towards recognition? What about the recent statements of Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, that his ancestors “never committed genocide” or the quip about Sudan that Muslims aren’t capable of such monstrous acts? Don’t these and similar declarations from official Ankara, trickle down to the masses, reinforcing the denialism that has been propagandized over the decades?

Not really. We are talking politics don’t forget. The Turkish strategy is in terms of reassuring Azerbaijan and playing to the peanut gallery. But if we look carefully, analytically, at the diplomatic strategy, we have Erdogan being used as the attack dog, hard-line rhetoric, demanding Karabakh...So Erdogan plays the “bad cop” in the scenario. Every statement coming from Erdogan, a day or two after, there is a reassuring statement from Gul and Davutoglu following up with a much nuanced explanation saying that we are looking for a sign of progress on the Karabakh issue. We see a contradiction in the political rhetoric and, to be honest, I really don’t judge the Turkish strategy by the rhetoric but more by the binding text of the Protocols. It was Turkey that decided to take out Karabakh from the document, mainly because their policy failed and they’re looking for a new policy alternative. If anything, Armenia has won one victory already. The first casualty of this diplomacy was the loss of Azerbaijan for Turkey and this is also important for Armenia in ending this pan-Turkic threat that has been hanging over us for so long. In fact, this is a strategic opportunity for Armenia already. From my viewpoint, there is one fundamental flaw in the Protocols. As a form of a contract, or an international convention, the flaw is that there is no stipulation of penalty if one or both parties involved violate the terms. In the Protocols there is nothing to stop Turkey, the stronger party from closing the border a day after implementation. This is my problem with the process, not the policy. It also probably reflects the lack of negotiating skills on the Armenian side.

Hrant Dink once referred to the Genocide as Turkey’s greatest “taboo” that the society needed to address. You’re involved in projects seeking to build bridges between segments of the society here and in Turkey. Lately film makers, journalists and others have made the trip from Istanbul to Yerevan and vice-versa. Do these programs make a difference in terms of breaking down the stereotypes entrenched on both sides, in getting the two peoples to at least understand what the other is thinking and feeling?

They make a huge difference and I say this as someone who is involved in these efforts. Mental borders are opening, even if the physical ones remain closed. And the one who really paved the way was Hrant Dink, who did more in his death than he could have in life. In fact, many Turkish elite in Istanbul were the first to commemorate his death and were among the hundreds of thousands of Turks who marched in his funeral procession. He was one of their own. I see concrete manifestations of how Hrant Dink’s murder has changes Turkey. I write a column for Turkish Newsweek and give Turkish media interviews on a regular basis. They no longer have a problem publishing the Genocide reference, it’s no longer “alleged” or in quotes. In fact, the Armenian issue is no longer the taboo it used to be. The interesting thing is that it isn’t Armenian lobbyists, the ARF or the Armenian government that’s pushing this; it’s a powerful Turkish elite, an intellectual class. They are the ones who are helping Turkey move towards Genocide recognition. It’s interesting that it’s only in the past couple of years that we have prominent Turkish intellectuals now on the record recognizing the Genocide. And many have also discovered their Armenian “roots” and Armenian legacy. We have started to know each other once again. Many in the diaspora grew up the way I did, thinking every Turk was a Talaat Pasha; every Turk was an enemy to be hated. That was dominant strain in the Armenian Youth Federation milieu that I grew up in. That’s negative for us and it’s also an unfair stereotype for them. Even the Turkish government is looking to create a new, positive stereotype for itself. Now the key argument critiquing the actions of these Turkish intellectuals is that the Istanbul elite does not reflect the people now living in Anatolia. This is true. The elite doesn’t reflect the way the common Turkish peasant thinks, This is why one area that will determine whether even the Protocols can last is changing the Turkish education system. The new generation in Turkey needs to be taught the real history, addressing every aspect of the Genocide. I mean, even if the Turkish state recognizes the Genocide; it’s not enough.

What can you tell our readers, if anything, as to what transpired behind the scenes of negotiations in Switzerland? Was there anything related to the process of drafting the Protocols that our readers should be aware of?

Oh yes. There were several interesting things on the table in Switzerland including Turkish proposals to the Armenian side to give diaspora Armenians the right to acquire Turkish citizenship, to invest in Western Armenia, without restriction, and to own property on those lands. These are concrete proposals that aren’t reflected in the Protocols, meaning I’m not sure if the Armenian side rejected or didn’t respond to them. I can’t say. One idea floated by the Turkish side, while less realistic but interesting, was their explanation that Mt. Ararat, being so close to Armenia, Armenians being able to see it on a daily basis, is something bad for us, a thorn in our side. It’s something that worries us for the future. The Turks stated that from their point of view Ararat is nothing more significant than any other mountain in Turkey. And they were thinking of some kind of condominium approach to joint archaeological expeditions, joint development, visa-free travel to that area for Armenians to sightsee, etc.

Has any of this been covered in the Armenian press that you know of?

No; only in the Turkish press a bit. I believe these offers were dangled out there as carrots to seal the deal in terms of closing the lid on the Genocide issue, closing the territorial issue, etc. For all we know, these still could be secret agreements we’re not aware of. After ratification of the Protocols and no one talks about this, the next step is a treaty between the Republics of Armenia and Turkey, encompassing much more concrete details. But at the same time, just the fact that these offers were on the table, maybe to the credit of Turkish negotiating strategy; maybe it all was insincere and just a way to bring the Armenian side in. Who’s to say? I wasn’t in the room.

What’s your assessment of the activities of the RoA Ministry of Foreign Affairs? What’s their conception of regional politics and of Armenia’s place on the world stage?

To be honest, we see more missed opportunities than concrete results. In fact, we see competent Armenian ambassadors to be the exception, not the rule. Whether it’s the competent ones like Tatul Margarian in Washington and some others; they’re the exception. Bu the interesting thing about the Protocols, it revealed not only the strategic depth of the Armenian Foreign Ministry but there is an interesting problem between Armenia and Turkey. It is the same problem. The Armenian FM has been playing a secondary role. All of this is from President Sargsyan’s office. In Turkey, it’s the same. It all comes from the Turkish President office and that of the Prime Minister; not from the foreign ministry. In fact, the Turkish Foreign Ministry is still not convinced that this is a wise move, mainly because their demands regarding ASALA and the killings of Turkish diplomats is nowhere on the table. And they have been obstructing the process in a turf war with Gul and Erdogan. That’s why Davutoglu was appointed over Babacan; to bring them on board. On the Armenian side, it’s the same thing, where it’s not Nalbandian, the foreign minister, who’s negotiating for Armenia. It’s been Arman Kirakossian, the Deputy Foreign Minister. This is also interesting because it reflects the general tendency of this Armenian government that all crucial decisions are made by the president and no one else.

Getting back to President Sargsyan’s trip to the diaspora, was he surprised by the reaction he received? He was called a ‘traitor’ by some. There were times when the man looked visibly shaken. Was he?

Yes, he was shaken. He didn’t expect demonstrations and such a vocal, in your face, opposition. Mainly because the people around the president, just like the Byzantine or Soviet system, are   people who generally want to tell him what he wants to hear and don’t tell him the bad news, if there is any to tell. I think he was in the dark. But I think the interesting thing is that if he went to the diaspora not expecting such a reaction and being visibly shaken, when he came back though, in a general sense, they were surprised that the reaction was less than they expected; mainly for two reasons. It was less than expected in Armenia itself. The opposition didn’t unite around the issue; the ARF, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, etc. They couldn’t come together on the issue and that was reassuring for the government. Secondly, as vocal and vehement as the opposition was, it didn’t translate into any politically. So, this is also reassuring for the government. Interestingly enough, Turkey had expected a much stronger reaction, in a negative sense, that didn’t materialize. In a word, both sides expected more. Turkey expected more because it has a paranoia regarding the Armenian diaspora. It thinks the diaspora is a powerful elephant in Washington lobbying circles.

Let’s focus on the ARF as the most visible opposition to the Protocols. The party has come up with something called a “Roadmap to Regime Change” for Armenia. What do you make of such talk given the track-record of the ARF in RoA politics?

Let me be honest with you. While I agree with the ARF on many of the discrepancies, shortcomings and dangers from this whole process, my criticism of the ARF is why they waited for so long before leaving the coalition government. In other words, they have become too invested in the stability of the Kocharyan term, etc, and it tended to co-opt the ARF. And to be honest, whether it’s the authoritarian nature, the arrogance of power, the corruption, the lack of democracy...March 1, 2008, was the final test when the ARF should have pulled out of the coalition. All this talk by the ARF is too little, too late, in my opinion. The interesting division, though, is between the ARF outside Armenia and the party here in Armenia. Many of the leaders of the ARF now in Armenia are too close to government circles and share certain vested interest with the regime. I think the ordinary rank and file party members in the diaspora are not only unaware of the relationships between party leaders here and the government, and if they did, I think they would be very upset. As I said; it’s too little, too late. I encourage it, it’s the right move, but it’s just not enough. But again, why should the ordinary diasporan wait for a press release from a specific organization to act? They should stand up now. And the next time in the summer that they come here instead of smiling at a photo-op with this or that official, they should put these people on the carpet and raise these issues.

What are the real possibilities for positive change in Armenia? Is the opposition, such as it is, capable of formulating such change? Are the people looking for new faces, new approaches, to the entrenched and systematic problems that exist?

Let me point something out to start. When we talk about Armenia being so small, in terms of population and territory, from an American perspective, it’s usually conveyed as a negative. And it is a negative. But we always forget that there’s a positive side as well. Being so small means it’s much easier to implement real lasting change if and when there’s the political will or the political opportunity. Once we embark on true democratic and economic reform in Armenia, then it won’t be long until the country really takes off. Because it’s so small the country is conducive to real progress. The impact from real change will be doubled or tripled. Sadly, despite the end of apathy, there’s still an entrenched cynicism. No political party or figure is playing the socio-economic card of injustice. There’s no real populism. There’s no real grassroots political activity. People are used to this and are cynical and frustrated. But, if and when a true leader tries to emerge, or a true democrat tries to maximize this, then I think, people are waiting for such an opportunity. The real hope I have is that the system can no longer sustain itself. We have a political stalemate and if that was all, the system could maintain its power. But it’s the economic crisis on top of a political stalemate that will tip the scales. It will be forced to change from the pressure from within. But we don’t know what direction Armenia will go. It may go more authoritarian with a new elite that’s even worse, or, finally, we may have a new elite that has not derived from the Nagorno-Karabakh War and may take the country in the right direction. The real problem is not the opposition, nor even the government; it’s the system. Until the system is forced to open up, the opposition will only be marginalized, cannot be truly effective and the authorities won’t listen or care. But at the same time, I don’t think the authorities will be able to maintain their hold over the closed system and cracks are already appearing, like we see between the Republican Party (Hanrapatakan) and Prosperous Armenia (Bargavatch). For the first time in recent Armenian history we see in-fighting within the government itself. This confirms to me that the crisis is serious and the system is in danger of imploding. It’s not only a clash over dwindling resources. It’s about Armenian politics and politics here revolves around presidents – the first, the former and the current. That’s what this is about, and in many ways the bigger threat to Sargsyan isn’t Ter-Petrosyan, but Kocharyan. These divisions even surfaced during the events of March 1, 2008. Most interestingly, if we look at the instruments of power that the government has, that any state has, they no longer have a monopoly on that power. In other words, there were divisions within the police, security service, that revealed and reflected divisions within society and that scared the former president much more than the people camped out in Opera Square. Now there’s mistrust and a lack of reliance, even on the instruments of power. And I think that’s a good thing for democracy and the ordinary Armenian citizen.

On a personal note, you have been living and working in Armenia for three years. What positives and negatives, in terms of progress and development have you observed; especially in the public sector?

To me the most obvious positive development is ironically a result of the worst experience I have observed – March 1st - because, in my opinion, March 1, 2008, changed Armenia in two ways. The Armenian people changed because of March 1st. They are no longer as apathetic, no longer content with complete political disengagement; they are reaching a tipping point. And there is no possibility of returning to the pre-March 1st status quo, in my opinion. The second interesting development coming out of March 1st is that, if the Armenian people have changed, the Armenian government has changed demonstrably. It enjoys much less legitimacy and is more unpopular than any preceding Armenian government. It is much weaker as a result. And I believe that this combination is a good development for instituting real change in Armenia, in a positive way. In terms of civil society, we have a dynamic civic society. We also have in general a lack of momentum, if you will. We see the same faces, the same people, who are faced with brick wall imposed against civic society activity by the state, by various official and oligarchs, who are getting tired of smashing their head against a brick wall. The negative development in civil society is that we see a new Russian style, pro-government, NGO camp emerging; cheerleaders for the government within civil society. At the same time, I also retain a sense of hope and optimism in the next generation, which has now come of age, mot within the Soviet system, but within the independent Armenian system. They are much less likely to be bought off or co-opted and are much more frustrated by the status-quo and much more pissed-off at the lack of opportunity. You know, most of those who left Armenia were the ones who could. Many who are here now, in the younger generation, have decided to stick it out and have not yet given up. And I really think that the future of the country rests in the hands of that generation, not mine and not the older one. This is the optimism that keeps me going.