Can Yerevan Play the “Iran Card” to its Advantage?

Yerevan’s official “shift” to Tehran clearly signified that Armenia has decided to put Plan-B into action. Given the unlikelihood of ratification in the current Armenian-Turkish deadlock, many in the Armenian government are mulling over the possibility of putting various back-up plans into effect.

At the end of January, former RoA President Robert Kocharyan visited Tehran at the invitation of Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki Mr. Kocharyan was received by Mottaki and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. According to Iranian press reports, Mr. Kocharyan discussed regional issues with his Iranian hosts.

The Iranian press especially picked up on Mr. Kocharyan’s comment that the presence of foreign military forces in the region disrupted the peace and security of regional nations. After Kocharyan’s visit, it was the turn of Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki to make an official visit to Yerevan. During his visit, bilateral cooperation was discussed, including economic and energy related projects. At the same time, there was a meeting in Yerevan of the trilateral (Armenian, Iranian and Russian) working group dealing with the construction of the Iran-Armenia railway. At the meeting, Sergei Tugarinov, Deputy Director of Russian Transport Ministry's Department for Railway Transportation, said that Russia considers the possibility of including the Iran-Armenia railway within the existing international transport corridors, particularly the North-South corridor.

Moscow’s stake in the Iran-Armenia railway

While true that the Russians will announce it final decision only after completion of technical and economic feasibility studies, we must remember that until recently it was the Iran-Azerbaijan-Russia railway project that had greater potential to be included in the North-South transport corridor. At the same meeting, it was also announced that

The Asian Development Bank had allocated $1 million for technical and economic studies regarding the Iranian-Armenian railway. In addition to its economic significance, this railway project has important political significance as well. When we take into account regional developments, this significance grows even larger. Due to the Armenian-Turkish deadlock, the north-south (Moscow, Yerevan, Tehran) axis is again being set in motion.

Economic and energy projects constitute its external base. Each of the three nations involved in the reactivation of the Iran-Armenia-Russia axis has its reasons for this to happen. Moscow, for example, despite encouraging Armenian-Turkish rapprochement, is set on being included in any and all alternative regional projects. Russia can only benefit from cooperation between Armenia and Iran. The developing Russo-Turkish partnership (against the backdrop of sharpening Turkish-U.S. relations), as well as Russian-Iranian cooperation and greater participation in Armenia-Iranian projects, only serves to strengthen Moscow’s position in the region while at the same time squeezing the West out.

Iran seeks status as regional player; once again

However, this new “move” between Yerevan and Tehran isn’t merely confined to economic projects having political significance. Recently, Iran has proposed its mediation of the Karabakh conflict with more frequency. And, despite the fact that all concerned realize how unrealistic such mediation is, by getting more active in the issue, Iran resolves some of its own problems and those of Armenia. First, Iran is attempting to get back into the “regional game” from which it was involuntarily forced out as a result of the 2008 Russian-Georgian war and subsequent developments.

At the same time, by taking this step, Tehran again enters into competition with Ankara, which also is daily making greater demands to be included in the Karabakh conflict settlement process. Thus, Iran is declaring that it too is a regional superpower, just as Turkey.

Iran’s posturing to play a mediating role also works to the benefit of Armenia, since it evidently cancels out any Turkish ambitions to do the same regarding Karabakh. What results is the conclusion that Turkey has the same potential for influencing a settlement to the Karabakh issue as does Iran.

Reemergence of Tehran-Yerevan-Moscow Axis

The setting into motion of the Tehran-Yerevan-Moscow axis also affords another dividend to Armenia vis-a-vis the West – presumably it coaxes the West to exert pressure on Ankara designed to ensure the logical outcome of the Armenia-Turkish reconciliation process. It is clear that the future development of this axis will inexorably lead to the regional status-quo that existed before the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, but with the difference that this time around the traditional bloc in opposition (the Baku, Tbilisi, Ankara alliance) will be all the more weaker.

The reason is that Tbilisi can no longer be considered a reliable ally and due to the cracks in the Baku-Ankara alliance. All this is unacceptable to the West which daily become more convinced that Armenian-Turkish rapprochement is the only possible way to avert such developments. The other important aim of Armenia is to divert attention away from the Karabakh conflict settlement process and to thus prevent pressure being exerted on the negotiating parties to make concessions and register progress.

Thus, it becomes evident, that official Yerevan is putting Plan-B into action given the impasse in Armenian-Turkish rapprochement and the Karabakh conflict negotiations. Plan-B involves deepening cooperation with Iran and to thus make it clear which way Armenia will turn if Turkish preconditions and pressure regarding Karabakh continue.

The question remains just how successful Yerevan will be with activating Plan-B. Nevertheless, given the launch of the process, it’s an opportune opportunity to reassess Armenian-Iranian relations; to convert them from a replacement strategy into a strategic partnership.