President tows a tough line before Astana meeting The recent military exercises conducted by the Artsakh Defense Forces, the largest and closest to the frontlines since the ceasefire, primarily served as a very important military review. The geography, technical equipment and manpower that went into the exercises definitely raised the fighting preparedness of the army to a new level. However, apart from its military significance, these operations had a political backdrop as well, that was all the more visible and tangible due to the informational and diplomatic efforts made by Armenian. One can say, from the 1994 ceasefire to date, this was the first time that the Armenian side played according to the rules of “real politik”, Conducting military exercises on such a level aimed at striking at two targets simultaneously; internal and external. First, they were aimed at smashing the ever-consolidating stereotypes of the Armenian army’s military preparedness and moral underpinnings. The problem at hand was to restore, with one blow, the damaged confidence of the populace regarding the army. The opinions since expressed about the exercises show that the authorities were successful in this to a certain degree. Naturally, the primary target wasn’t the society at large. The exercises took place on territories in the NKR security zone, right under the nose of Azerbaijan. The tacit message was clear and was immediately understood in Baku – do not adopt an adventurist military approach to settling the conflict, because the Armenian side is not only ready to resist such steps but it will counter-attack and resolve the matter once and for all. This latter implication was much more essential from a diplomatic perspective. In this light, the last two speeches of the RA President (on November 13 in the NKR right after the exercises and on November 16 in Moscow, at the dinner gala of the All Armenia Fund) contained a developing targeted logic. In the NKR, President Sargsyan said, “I am confident, that if the hour suddenly comes, we will not only be able to repeat that which happened in 1991-1994, but also that we will resolve the problem once and for all…If the time comes, if they force us, hen this time our blow must be devastating and final.” These statements weren’t simply a response to the warmongering statements of Azerbaijani President Aliyev, nor simply being seduced into the whirlwind of mutual boasting. Developing his line of thought, President Sargsyan stated in Moscow that, “The sooner Azerbaijan realizes that it has no other alternative but to accept self-determination for Karabakh, the sooner the negotiations will end.” In other words, Serzh Sargsyan indirectly made it understood that one shouldn’t expect anything more from Armenia; that there would be no further compromises. Either Azerbaijan accepts the right of Karabakh to self-determination or else Armenia would be ready to accept any challenge thrown down by Baku. In addition, Armenia is doing this directly and publicly, without any subtleties. It is not hard to imagine what Azerbaijani officials felt when watching footage of Artsakh Defense Army units welcoming Serzh Sargsyan, and not Bako Sahakyan, with cheers of “Mr. President”. It’s hard to believe that at that moment the RA President, or the Armenian diplomatic corps in general, weren’t aware that in Baku, the fact that the Armenian president accepted the greetings of the Karabakh army, would again be interpreted as clear proof that Armenia has territorial ambitions regarding Azerbaijan. It’s hard to believe that Serzh Sargsyan didn’t ponder how that step of his would be regarded by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-chairs. And since such things are not the result of random carelessness or inconsistency, it becomes clear that, at least externally, Armenia has shown its resolve to fight to the end when it comes to Karabakh. From this perspective, it’s absolutely not accidental, that Serzh Sargsyan raises the precondition of recognizing the right of Karabakh’s self-determination to end the negotiations exactly in Moscow. By doing so, Yerevan makes it clear that for a settlement of the Karabakh conflict it accepts, de jure, the Minsk Group formulation, and de facto, that formula/reality, in the context of Russian unilateral mediation, that Moscow has achieved during the past three years. On the other hand, the military exercises conducted by the Artsakh Defense Forces, their approval by the RA President, as well as the aggressive statements made by him, all come just one week before the OSCE Summit scheduled to take place in Astana. It appears that this fact would have had to constrain the Armenia side, so as not to allow tactical mistakes or gaffes on the eve of the summit and not to weaken is position during this most important forum. However, externally at least, just the opposite has occurred. One can conclude, that the Armenian side has gone the route of all these provocative operations and declarations exactly to harden its position on the eve of the summit and thus with the aim of defending itself against all possible pressures. And this signifies that the Armenian side has certain concerns regarding Astana and that these recent actions are aimed at neutralizing them. A week ago, the presidents of Armenia and Russia met in Moscow. Most probably, Serzh Sargsyan attempted to obtain additional guarantees from Moscow before the OSCE Summit; i.e. that the latter would not retreat from the positions it seized from the ruins of the Minsk Group and which are indirectly supported by Yerevan. Perhaps, the entire game was built by relying on the very assistance of Moscow? Photo: Ashot Yeramishyan