Samvel Martirosyan

Is the CIS a dynamic organism or is it a mechanical association of incongruent parts faced with a constant threat of disintegration into several smaller elements? It is difficult to answer this question definitively, since the CIS appears at times to be one, at times the other, and at times something transitory. 

The Psychological Core of Cooperation

During the Belovezh accords, there was a struggle between diametrically opposed undercurrents on the territory of the USSR. Some of these bore a strongly anti-centrist character; the others, on the contrary, were trying to out the body of the country back together, when it was, in fact, already disintegrating into history. Everything was clear with the Baltic States: psychologically those three republics had never been part of the USSR, and a little jolt to the foundations of the totalitarian regime was enough for de-centrist powers to take them out of the system. As to the remaining republics, the situation has always been ambivalent. Georgia has perpetually been drawn away from and then back again to the cooperation: Azerbaijan has also wavered at a steady tempo: Armenia--on the contrary - is trying to squeeze itself into all possible structures of cooperation.

What are the social and psychological factors cementing the CIS together? The element of nostalgia must be considered, for it has a powerful effect on public opinion. Millions of people living in the countries of the former Soviet Union were deprived of the lifestyle they knew in the blink of an eye and found themselves in an unfamiliar social environment of developing capitalism, which in many ways, if not completely, was the opposite of their lifestyle in the country of the Soviets. One of the main reasons for unemployment in the CIS countries is not so much the economic situation as the inability of many people, used to state planning, to adapt to the new environment, which shuts them off and depriving them of the chance to find comparable jobs. In about 20 years there will be no one left to remember with longing the “hothouse” lifestyle, where most human activity, including job placement, mandatory recreation on trade union permits, stable wages and guardianship for the bright future, was managed by the government.

Cultural affinity presents another factor. But let’s bear in mind that the basis for common values was anchored in the Russian language, which formed the foundation of the mental and cultural affinity of the Soviet people. At present the number of Russian speakers in CIS countries is decreasing exponentially, and at the same time English is increasingly becoming the language of international communication. Russia is doing very little in this area to uphold the status of Russian as a tool of international communication, yielding before the advance of English, which creates further strongholds for Anglo-American influence. 

Unanswered questions

The term cooperation itself presumes friendship--not just historic or theoretical, but factual, palpable, existing here and now. In this sense it remains unclear how countries like Armenia and Azerbaijan, at war with each other, can be members of the cooperation, or whether Abkhazia, Mountainous Karabagh, South Ossetia and Pridnestrovie are considered constituents of the CIS.

In a word, many existential issues in this cooperation remain unanswered. And if the European Union tries to provide scientifically deterministic answers to such issues as say, the standards for the length of cucumbers or the diameter of watermelons, the state of affairs in the CIS is the opposite: here, questions are piling up, but nobody is looking for the answers. And too many questions are being hushed up, which is extremely destructive for integration.

The economic component

In an economic sense the CIS is like theatre of the absurd. At a time when Russia and Belarus seem inclined to introduce a common currency, Armenia and Azerbaijan are discussing the volume of illegal trade between their countries: In Baku they are calling for sanctions against businessmen who trade with Armenia, and in Yerevan they offer the justification that Azerbaijani flour will not stay in Armenian markets for long, and it has appeared only as a result of disruptions in wheat supplies. Meanwhile, it is specifically the economic factor that might become the cementing force for cooperation in the CIS, for in all other spheres the gap in their vision of the future both among the elite and among the general public in the two countries is steadily growing. However, common economic grounds could consolidate not only the elite but also society as a whole, bypassing all ethno-religious conflicts. But even if the countries of the cooperation strike some mutually favorable trade deals on a small scale, the CIS in general does not represent a serious economic structure.

In turn, Russia wants to make use of the CIS for its own economic expansion. The examples of Georgia and Armenia show clearly enough how divergent bureaucratic conversations about a common economic field for the CIS countries are from Moscow’s real geo-political plans. Moscow has succeeded in getting concessions from Tbilisi to open the Abkhazian segment of the railway - extremely important for Russia - in an attempt to gain economic access to Armenia and further to Iran. For a while, Georgia’s intractability, with its openly anti-Russian rhetoric, was an obstruction, but suddenly Georgia started dancing to Moscow’s tune. And Moscow has achieved unprecedented success in getting Georgian consent to keep its peacemaking forces there forever. The US has failed to neutralize Gazprom’s influence in the South Caucasus as well. Despite the fact that Steven Mann, an advisor to the US on energy, and Richard Miles, US Ambassador to Georgia, have in turn warned the Georgian leadership that their cooperation with Gazprom would undermine the economic viability of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum pipeline, and asked that they coordinate their actions with the American leadership, official Georgia has behaved uncharacteristically. Georgian President Edward Shevarnadze responded by declaring, “Georgia’s cooperation with Russia in energy will not only continue but will also get much deeper.” He said that in the next two or three Georgia cannot go without Russian gas, and the issue of cooperation with Gazprom is for Georgia, not US advisors, to resolve.

In its turn, Armenia has signed an agreement with Gazprom on supplying the country with natural gas. In fact, the government has already made it clear that Gazprom will soon get exclusive rights to provide Armenia’s gas. Previously, Russia succeeded in getting serious concessions from Armenia in energy. The unexpected but very successful explosion of the gas pipeline on Russia’s border with Georgia in mysterious circumstances in December 2002 and the disruption of the gas flow to Georgia and Armenia during the coldest season triggered a serious energy crisis in both countries. Prior to the explosion Russia had stopped supplying nuclear fuel to the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant (using Armenian debt as a pretext), as a result of which the plant shut down. Armenia found itself in a most precarious situation, with its energy system on the verge of collapse. Giving in to pressure from Russia, Robert Kocharian initiated the near-total transfer of Armenia’s energy complex to the Russian Federation on a visit to Moscow in January of this year. In return he receive Russian support in the March presidential election.

Thus, it is clear that Russia is not interested in serous economic cooperation throughout the CIS as a whole, but is using all possible means to get favorable concessions from each of the member countries. The seemingly unmotivated pro-Russian behavior of the Georgian leadership and the forced actions of official Yerevan speak for themselves and prove that Russia is carrying out a backstage policy of “economic integration” into the CIS, which will hardly have a positive influence on improving relations among the member states.

The political component

From a political perspective, the CIS is becoming increasingly irrational. On the one hand, the CIS is the bodily extension of Russian imperial ambitions. On the other hand, countries have joined the CIS with often contrasting motivations. For example, both Armenia and Azerbaijan hope to solve the Karabakh issue in the CIS. It is clear that the epicenter of cooperation is Russia. Russia is the mediator for the processes unraveling in the CIS countries. Should Russia step aside from any of those issues, all ties will be severed--or parallel alliances will emerge which are as strange structures as the CIS itself. For instance, the emergence of GUUAM would have been unnecessary if there had been natural and logical growth in the CIS. The existence of GUUAM is already an indication of unhealthy processes inside the cooperation, creating foreign bodies --or so they are perceived in Russia.

What about the South Caucasus?

On the other hand, the growing American influence since the anti-terrorist campaign was unfurled all across the world has resulted in the gradual alienation of most Central Asian republics from Russian influence. Following the war in Iraq, the US has far-reaching plans in relation to the South Caucasus, in the context of a general intensification of its influence broad areas of Asia. Russian zeal about the CIS in combination with American aggressive imperialism is capable of triggering serious convulsions in the South Caucasus. The Russian political elite and military leadership, using doctrinaire historic arguments on the one hand, and security considerations on the other, insist that the region should be under the constant and undivided control of Russia, with further access to the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. For the US, with its pragmatic approach to geo-politics, the South Caucasus represents an invaluable base for the proliferation of American influence in Western and Central Asia region and the deterioration of Russian imperial ambitions. Were Washington able to tear this region away to realize its plans, the historical balance of powers would change drastically across vast areas of Eurasia. The US has been trying to undermine the Turkish and Israeli influence for some time now. As a result of forcing the USSR out of the whole Near East and the weakness of modern Russia, Washington is no longer in need of such strong allies as Ankara and Tel-Aviv, which are increasingly trying to assume the role of individual players, to Washington’s displeasure. Therefore, the South Caucasus can be expected to become an arena for a grave and tense struggle between the superpowers, with the consequent serious exacerbation of existing ethnic and religious conflicts in the region. And when this happens both CIS and Collective Security Treaty issues might arise with unpredictable consequences.

What are the prospects?

The cooperation consists of countries that find themselves in increasingly diverse geo-political situations. The political connection between the Central Asian republics and the European sector of the CIS is very weak. Perhaps the only thing unifying the countries of the cooperation politically is the struggle against the chimera of international terrorism--all the rest is demagogic prattle. Cooperation presupposes a common political will that is absent here. The policies of the Eastern wing of the CIS countries have nothing in common with the pro-European tendencies of the Western wing. The Cooperation incorporates too many diverse cultures, no longer united by the cementing ideas of victorious Communism. In general, the CIS cannot be fed by common ideas like the European Union can. Here, two areas are gradually gaining momentum -economic growth and security. Therefore, the real integration of the CIS can be realized only on the basis of counteractions against non-fictitious threats and an improvement in common prosperity. In this sense, the Union of Member States to the Collective Security Agreement seems to be more viable. Another tangible possibility for fostering the CIS could be the creation of common economic cooperation.