At a Crossroads: No Peace, No War
April 4, 2005. Theme: No peace, no war
Rasim Musabekov. No peace, no war.
In practice, the ceasefire regime itself is not fixed from the legal standpoint (the declarative Bishkek agreement signed by the speakers of the parliaments is not legally valid) and is based on the protocol signed by the defense ministers. Therefore, on the one hand, the fact that the cease-fire regime with all its violations has been maintained until now is, undoubtedly, a significant achievement. But, on the other hand, the absence of progress in the process of peaceful settlement of the conflict makes the situation rather shaky and unstable. The probability of the resumption of military operations if no way out of the impasse is found is quite high and this upholds and even intensifies from time to time the trend of mobilizing public opinion toward the "image of the enemy" and greatly limits the space for efforts aimed at achieving a historic reconciliation of the conflicting parties.
Yelena Kurdyan. No war, no peace.
I fully agree with Mr. Musabekov with regard to the shakiness of the ceasefire regime. By and large, the armistice is maintained because the parties understand the hopelessness of attempting to solve the conflict by force, but one should not disregard the fact that common sense may disappear. The Armenian side has repeatedly stated at the highest level that a military resolution is unacceptable. The formulation sounded something like "Whoever starts the war will lose it." This understanding is also strong within Armenian society. But over the last several months we have had many occasions to hear diametrically opposed opinions from the Azerbaijani side. I would like to know what the distinguished participants of the discussion think about the acceptability of militaristic rhetoric under the conditions of such a fragile peace. My opinion is that it is irresponsible playing with fire.
Laura Baghdasaryan. The unique nature of the truce.
No doubt, the fact that the ceasefire regime has held without "outside" intervention is an achievement. It is usually said that this is the only achievement in the eleven years since the Bishkek agreement was signed. Because the dead-ends that the parties constantly face keep the process going in circles. They even say that the ceasefire regime has held all this time not so much because of the understanding that war is not a solution but because of the balance of power in the region. Not our power but outside power. For the last four years, the talk about a military resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict has gotten louder and louder in Azerbaijan . In the beginning it was clear and obvious that this was for the sake of being heard by those outside actors who were supposed to satisfy Azerbaijan 's demands or else they would have to abandon their geopolitical and economic plans regarding the region as a whole because of the military operations on the frontline. And also for solving a strategic problem for Azerbaijan - keeping the younger generation "warmed up". Because time has gone by. And now, according to the results of research on stereotypes of the image of the enemy propagandized in the Azerbaijani media and public-opinion polls it is quite clear, at least to me, that we are dealing with serious intentions at the state level to resume the war. On the one hand, the Armenian is portrayed as the unconditional enemy, and his behavior and characteristics no longer require explanation; the fact that Armenians are enemies is understood by the Azerbaijani as axiomatic. On the other hand, peace is the third most important thing for the people of Azerbaijan , after health and family. I think this is because Azerbaijani society feels that the possibility of the resumption of the war is real and, therefore, peace becomes clearly desired.
After all, psychologically you start paying attention to what you may lose. I would like to ask you and other representatives from Azerbaijan a question - Is there an understanding in Azerbaijan that war is a chain reaction, a domino effect which will inevitably echo if not in a year, then certainly in 15-20 years? If so, how dominant can this understanding become? If not, then what is the perception of the essence of a long-term settlement? Or, is such a settlement, where there are no winners and no losers just theoretical, with no connection to real politics?
Alexander Iskandaryan. This is simply the kind of peace that we have here.
It seems to me that the current situation is fairly durable. After all, it is in fact due not to some external factors (peace-keeping forces, papers signed, promises by politicians, and so forth) but to the balance of power within the conflict. I mean, of course, not only the military balance, but an entire complex of factors (military, political-economic, external and internal), that work in favor of preserving the situation. For instance, the Karabakh lobby in Yerevan can counterbalance a certain oil contract in Baku , and the construction of the Astrakhan-Olia railway in Russia can counterbalance one of the heights occupied by Armenians in 1993. This balance is complex and multifaceted and has been maintained for eleven years. I don't believe that politicians (present or future) in Armenia or Azerbaijan will start a war without changing this balance. I don't believe in anything so irrational. Well, let's assume the war turns positional. Or Azerbaijan seizes half of Karabakh and can't take the other half, and the war goes on but money and ammunition run out: Are they going to introduce rationing? Or what if Armenians divides Azerbaijan in half? Or what if there is a missile attack? Any of these possibilities will lead to the break-up of the regime (the one that unleashed the war). Therefore it will not start this war. Kocharyan and Aliev may be considered weak politicians but they shouldn't be considered feeble-minded. The question arises: can the balance change after all?
My answer is: ? ) I do not believe that it can change soon in such a way that one of the parties becomes 99% sure that it will win the war in the course of three weeks; b) if it does change, we will talk. Why then is such hatred being inflamed? First, the parameters of the inflaming of hatred differs among those who "won" and those who were "defeated", and second, do you, ladies and gentlemen, really believe that this is related to foreign rather than domestic policy?
Laura Baghdasaryan. We have forgotten about compromise.
I would even put it differently: it is not the parameters that are different but the necessities. In fact everyone understands that sooner or later it will be necessary "to rehabilitate" Armenians or Azerbaijanis in their respective societies since at some point an agreement will be reached. A change of several generations growing up under more tolerant conditions will be required in order to start talking about building confidence. From my point of view, the situation of "no war, no peace" implies a discussion about both peace and war. The last several years have shown that although there were different interpretations of the understanding of compromise by the parties to the conflict, nevertheless, the understanding existed, and this word was present in the discourse. Today it has to be stated almost nobody is speaking about compromise. That is why I asked the question: Is a settlement in which no one has lost and no one has won just theoretical, having nothing to do with real politics?
Arif Yunusov. Everything is much more complicated.
I look at this problem as a military historian. That is why I don't see anything unusual in that fact that less than the most friendly thoughts about the other party to the conflict dominate in both societies. The fact that the level of hatred among Azerbaijanis is higher is completely natural. Azerbaijan has lost the war but doesn't agree at all to accept the results and, therefore, as other peoples and states have done throughout history, is preparing for war. However, it doesn't always follow from this that a war will start. We can rephrase the question: will there be military operations? The war (cold, informational) will keep going on for a long time, like the one bet ween the USSR and the USA did in its time. If Armenia had lost, everything would have been exactly the reverse. In accordance with the laws of war, the situation in Azerbaijan is not so simple. It is wrong to surmise that it's only the government that's boosting the militaristic rhetoric, and that the majority of the people are allegedly for peace. That's not true. Ask yourselves a question: What is peace according to Azerbaijan and what is peace according to Armenia ? And see what the answers are. Is Azerbaijan afraid of losing if there is a resumption of war? I personally have the impression that no one in Azerbaijan is giving this serious thought. I don't really believe they are giving the conflict serious thought in Armenia , either. We have witnessed irrationality and emotionality so often during the 1980s and1990s that it is rather difficult to look for logic. Aren't the same people playing the leading roles in our political life? There is simply no confidence in Azerbaijan yet that the present level of the army makes it possible to hope for victory. Add to this the deep depression following recent events and the 2003 presidential election in the first place. That is why I don't believe that in the next one or two years the resumption of military operations can be spoken about with any certainty. And not because of the existing balance of power.
Arif Yunusov. There is no such thing as a just peace.
Laura has asked whether a settlement when no one has won and no one has lost is just theoretical or if such thing is possible? The answer: It is theoretical. At least, in military history, in the history of conflicts, especially ethnic ones, there have been no such examples yet. Of course, it would have been great if our peoples had been the first, but... And this is the main difficulty of the present situation. Both parties talk about the necessity of peace and a just peace. Some people talk about the necessity of a compromise peace, such that no one is offended. Thus, it is considered that our peoples have a choice between a just (good) and an unjust (bad, humiliating) peace. And each party talking about peace and justice assumes that all this will be in its own favor. A just peace according to Armenians means that Karabakh should be either independent or part of Armenia . And a just peace according to Azerbaijanis envisages that Karabakh should be part of Azerbaijan , and that everything else is nothing. In fact our peoples are facing a different choice - between a bad peace and a worse peace. In any case a signed peace agreement will cause a lot of discontent on each side, and it is still unclear what such a peace can bring about if it is not signed in time. I mean the following: if both societies are extremely intolerant toward each other (and this is the case) and are hoping for their own "just" peace, then such a settlement my cause internal political explosions. Thus unless the level of conflict within our countries decreases, unless we become more tolerant toward each other, no peace treaty can serve as a basis for development. Once again I call to your attention that we will be compelled to choose between a bad and a worse variation of the settlement of the conflict.
Laura Baghdasaryan. To Arif Yunusov.
Judging from the previous message, you adhere to the formula "confidence building - peace agreement". There is also another variation of the formula - "peace agreement - then confidence building". Now we are in a situation when there is no movement toward the first formula or toward the second. Instead, such a sharp escalation of tension and inflaming of hatred can be observed that even resolutions by international organizations address the issue of mutual hatred. Of course, on the one hand, one can take an unyielding position and declare, Who cares about those international organizations, what is important is we and our interests! But one can also give some thought to why the Karabakh conflict began to be called the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. I understand; the question is not to you personally and perhaps not even to the other participants of the conference personally. One question is whether we-political scientists, experts, journalists-can have an impact on the processes in our countries?
Yelena Kurdyan
When we entered this conflict we lived in one world; now we live in a completely different world, but we still are trying to resolve the conflict, proceeding from the realities of a world that no loner exists, that is obsolete. The new world is moving toward integration. We too declare that we are ready for integration in every way, except for the Karabakh problem. What will become of us in some fifteen years? We speak about integration into the European structures, about possible membership in the European Union (at least this is our direction). And what? Will it be then important what Arif Yunusov calls "a just peace according to .."? We see our future within one block and perhaps we should try to simulate existing within one block and, proceeding from that, see what will be then important for each of the parties.
Alexander Iskandaryan. On dancers and choreographers.
The world and the northern coast of the Atlantic Ocean are different things. Integration is the prerogative of a rather small part of the world. Globalization is a phenomenon that is not so global. Most of the world is at the stage of building national states. So are we. And citing the EU as an example is not correct. It is unique and very small (approximately one fifteenth of the world).
Yelena Kurdyan. On builders. To Alexander Iskandaryan.
I fully agree with you - "Most of the world is at the stage of building national states. So are we." But here are the questions that I have in this regard: Is that good? Since historically we have achieved statehood only recently, is it inevitable that we pass through all the stages of building a state in the same sequence that it happened in other states? Isn't it more reasonable to try to cut historical corners and enter into modern processes, instead of being at the tail end of the advanced world? I think the only way to avoid being left behind is to rise level with the world, and this is possible. As regards the EU - I have cited it not as an example but only because both our states consider membership in this organization as a future goal; thus it is not important whether the EU is big or not, what is important is that our countries may appear there.
Arif Yunusov. We are children of the past, but we want to have a present.
Yes, indeed, most of the world, including us, is at the stage of building national states. By the way, for this very reason our conflict should be called Armenian-Azerbaijani, instead of the Karabakh conflict. If there were no Karabakh we would have invented it or we would have named it the Nakhichevan conflict. It is indeed a conflict of two young - from the point of view of building national states - ethnoses. At the same time, looking at Azerbaijan today, I can see clear changes in the mentality of our elite, at least. Yes, a lot still remains from the past and that is why I personally do not believe in the quick resolution of the conflict. But I see the future settlement only within the context of integration into Western structures. There is no other way.
Alexander Iskandaryan. Swans and the integration.
We will be admitted to the EU, if necessary. They have admitted Cyprus with its conflict and have not choked. Romania too, and Bulgaria will soon be admitted. Recently Romanian "tourists" (to put it as politely as possible) in Vienna ate black swans out of a pond in a public park. Very expensive.But no problem - they will be admitted to the EU since they (as Arif Yunusov has put it quite fairly) are not in the center of Africa . They will admit us as well if geography requires. We, however, do not eat swans, even when we're hungry. And if geography doesn't require it, we will not be admitted no matter what lengths we go to...
Arif Yunusov. To Alexander Iskandaryan.
Is this about certain individuals? It is about a system of values. Certainly, modern Bulgaria and Romania are not England or France . But now these countries will have to behave differently in many respects, especially in crisis and conflict situations both with their neighbors and within their countries. They will have to make changes in the human rights situation, and the judicial system has to change, and a lot of other things as well. The Karabakh Armenians do not trust Azerbaijanis, and in many respects they are right. How can they, if the government of Azerbaijan violates the rights of its own citizens of Azerbaijani nationality? How can they, if the Azerbaijani government does not fulfill a number of obligations before the international organizations and sometimes behaves like a common card sharp? Naturally, the Armenian authorities do not behave like Europeans either.
Rauf Mirkadirov. The parties are playing into each other's hands.
The cease-fire regime has, in fact, been effectively kept for more than ten years. But this is hardly an indicator of the peace-loving nature of the parties. Many factors - both internal and external - have their impact on the preservation of the cease-fire regime at this stage. I shall start with the first factor. Neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan is confident of victory if there is a resumption of military operations. And any defeat will lead to the overthrow of the regime both in Armenia and in Azerbaijan . It is no secret that both Robert Kocharyan and Ilham Aliev are in very shaky positions politically. Thus, the existing status quo accompanied by military bravado on both sides suits the ruling elites in Baku and Yerevan in a way. There are also external factors preventing the parties from resuming military operations. The West (first of all the USA ) openly declares that the party that renews military operations will face strict sanctions by the international community. Both Yerevan and Baku are compelled to take this into account. Moreover, in the absence of peacekeeping forces or even permanent monitoring in the conflict zone it will be virtually impossible after the resumption of military operations to determine who was in fact was the "initiator". Thus the West - in the person the USA - will decide who the guilty party was at random, depending on its own geopolitical interests. Some people may object that for Yerevan , which is oriented toward Russia in foreign policy, this factor is less urgent. By no means. As the recent events show, the Kremlin surrenders its allies in the post-Soviet space, even strategic ones, without any remorse if circumstances demand. Therefore, it sometimes seems to me that through the military rhetoric (I mean the threats to resume military operations on the part of Baku, as well as the uncompromising position of Yerevan vis-à-vis the future status of Nagorno Karabakh), the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia are to some extent play into each other's hands, while preserving the "no war, no peace" situation.
Azad Isazade. "The military operations" have never stopped.
In my opinion, the "no war, no peace" regime exists in the press and among political scientists, apart from real life. Real military operations are still going on, "operations" in the information field have not stopped and, what is most alarming, they are still going on in the hearts of both the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians. I don't think, however, that everything is so terrible. As long as the average Azerbaijani, in addition to hatred toward Armenia and all "Armenian occupiers", still has warm memories of an Armenian schoolmate, a neighbor from home, or a roommate in a Moscow hostel, and the average Armenian has perhaps the same memories, things may still be put right.
Rasim Musabekov
As my colleague Arif Yunusov has correctly noted, the party which has lost is compelled by virtue of its position to demonstrate readiness for military revenge, whereas the winner of the last round is more interested in diplomatically fixing of the results of the military campaign that has been to its advantage and in outward manifestations of peacefulness. But I also agree with my colleague Iskandaryan that one should not exaggerate the significance of menacing gestures, as they do not indicate at all the direct readiness to proceed from words to deeds. Thank God. In any case the parties will have to negotiate, and it will be better not to get involved in one more round of bloody collision. In order for the Azerbaijani side to stop thinking about military revenge, it is necessary that the Armenian side abandon the attempt to impose a peace based on the results of the victory. Though as a realistic politician I understand that it is impossible to take these results out of brackets and to pretend they don't exist. But everything has its limits.
As for the name of the conflict, the use of both the "Karabakh" conflict and the "Armenian-Azerbaijani" conflict are right. The first term defines the cause and the subject of the conflict and the second defines the parties: the participants and the victims of the conflict.
Karine Nalchadjyan. A psychological look at the history of war.
A psychological look at the history of war and interstate conflict shows that war becomes a psychological reality when politicians succeed in stereotyping their people. In this respect, based on the research data, the Azerbaijani people are ready for war. But are they really? A people that puts health, family and peace on the top of the list of values cannot humanly, sincerely wish for a war. One doesn't unleash a war in that psychic condition.
Today the stereotypes held by Azerbaijanis are in internal contradiction with their basic goals, and thus the Azerbaijanis do not want war, and if it is resumed it will simply be imposed on them by their leaders. Besides, the impressions from the Karabakh war are still fresh in the minds and hearts of the Azerbaijani people and deep in their hearts they understand and know that it will not be easy to bear the war. The prospect of victory is vague, and great human losses are inevitable. All the more so because if war is forthcoming, Azerbaijan will be on the offensive (we all understand very well that Armenia will not begin the war in this case, there is no need). Wars of offense are the most awful ones in terms of losses and deprivations. As for the Armenian society, as the results of surveys show, it is not predisposed toward Azerbajanis with such hostility. Nevertheless, it can't be said that there is a complete absence of animosity-it has simply become subconscious, and the reason for that is the military success. All of us should keep in mind that if there is a military clash, hostile feelings and directives may easily materialize. War has no prospects: we too place a very high value on health, family, and peace, and our peoples should not be pushed into something that they don't like. We should also not forget that the most peaceful borders are ethnic borders. We can peacefully coexist, but only when state frontiers coincide with ethnic borders. With the current type of ethnic contact between Armenians and Azerbaijanis it is naïve to think that they can live peacefully within the framework of one state. That is why, psychologically, Karabakh's being part of Azerbaijan is a permanent conflict and not its resolution.
Arif Yunusov. To Karine Nalchadjyan.
Karine, do you at least realize that your words have a lot in common with Robert Kocharyan's statements, with which, by the way, our radical patriots, too, identify themselves? You talk about peace, about the necessity of peaceful co-existence and at the same time, as a matter of fact, you propagandize ethnic cleansing! Let's speak openly. In Armenia it has already been carried out, there are only 2 % of non-Armenians. What are Georgia and Azerbaijan supposed to do now?
What should they do to make state borders coincide with ethnic ones? Should they, for example, expel Armenians from Djavakheti? Or, on the contrary, they should let it secede for the benefit of Armenians? Should they expel Azerbaijanis from ? vemo Kartli or, on the contrary, should they give this region to Azerbaijan ? And what should Azerbaijan do with Iran and Russia ? Should the southern regions where the Talish reside compactly be given to Iran ? Or, on the contrary, should the territory where Azerbaijanis live be taken away from Iran ? Should southern Dagestan with Derbent where Azerbaijanis live be taken away from Russia ? Or should a state of Lezgistan be created? The list goes on. And above all, why do you think that Karabakh is not important to Azerbaijan ? That it will agree to coexist peacefully with Armenians if it loses Karabakh? Where does such confidence come from?
Laura Baghdasaryan. The features of "no war, no peace".
The problem is not that the authorities of Azerbaijan are so bad that they do not wish to have any contacts with the inhabitants of Karabakh at all. The problem is that the principle of inviolability of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity - on which the entire logic of Azerbaijan's arguments are based - is a struggle for the territories of Karabakh, not for the people who live there and for the right of Azerbaijanis to return there to live. This is the key. And I am sure that as long as Azerbaijanis have no contact with Armenians from Karabakh there will be no confidence.
Mr. Musabekov has written that the Bishkek cease-fire agreement was signed only by the speakers of the parliaments, i.e. was not endorsed at the highest state level. Hence, the war may resume at any moment and no one can be reproached for not observing an agreement. Thus, here too we are in an obscure situation.
And Mr. Isazade has presented, I think, an interesting aspect of our situation. That "no war, no peace" is when the military clashes occur constantly in the form of exchanges of fire on the front line and there are advances of several meters of by one party or another, but so far, peace has been kept on the whole. Whereas the other war - informational-goes on constantly and is as great a threat to the idea of settlement. Please don't consider my formulation to be blasphemy, since human life is incomparably more valuable. That is true, but playing on people's feelings and distorting the consciousnesses of an entire generation cannot be taken as harmless hooliganism.
Arif Yunusof. Laura is my friend but truth is a better friend!
The subject Laura Baghdasaryan touches upon is very urgent and in fact is of the utmost importance. I have taken part in many discussions on Karabakh in Azerbaijan and once at such an event (organized, by the way, by the leader of the movement for liberation of Karabakh, Akif Nagi) I asked, What is going on with Armenians in general? With whom are we at war? With Armenia or Armenians, with all the Armenians or some of the Armenians? Who are Karabakh Armenians for us now? Our fellow citizens? Then why are we afraid of contact with them? Or are they not citizens? Karabakh has become a virtual country over which the war is going on everywhere - on the battlefield and on the Internet. What should we call the relationship between Azerbaijan and Armenia from the legal point of view? Formally there is no war between us. And I could not understand why our authorities proudly announced last year that they would not issue visas for the Armenian officers to come to Baku to participate in a NATO meeting. And is there a visa system between our states? Or any system at all?
Unfortunately, these questions hung in mid-air, as does everything related to Armenians in Azerbaijan. Therefore, I have to say "No" to the question of whether there is an open discussion on Karabakh in Azerbaijan . Even in parliament they are afraid to discuss this subject openly, stating that all such issues are decided by our president. In turn, I would like to know whether the question about the possibility of the Karabakh Armenians residing together with the Azerbaijanis within a single state is being discussed within the Armenian society? That is, how open is the discussion within Armenian society? And also, is there a difference between discussions inside Armenia and inside Karabakh?
Today, as before, I don't adhere to the view that Karabakh originated from the struggle of Armenians for self-determination. It is the same propaganda myth as the Azerbaijanis' point about the aggression that the Armenians have systematically carried out against poor Azerbaijanis since the 19 th century. Laura's desire to conduct the discussion from the point of view of experts is great. But if we ask a Spanish expert about Basques or a French expert about Corsican separatists (I've personally had the opportunity) I assure you that the ethnic factor will immediately emerge. And there is nothing terrible in this; it is natural for ethnic conflicts. An expert evaluation is something else, I believe-it s to determine the degree of conflict between peoples and possibilities for exiting the situation as painlessly as possible. In any case one should not be afraid of open discussions. Both parties suffer pain. And as much as it hurts Armenians to hear from Azerbaijanis that Sumgait was organized by Armenians themselves, it hurts Azerbaijanis to hear that no ethnic cleansing has been carried out in Armenia , and that what happened was a result of economic crisis and migration and so forth. And that Khodjali was done by Azerbaijanis themselves. Hrant Matevosyan observed very correctly in 1992 that unless the Armenians have felt the pain of the Azerbaijanis and the latter, in turn, have felt the pain of the Armenians there can be no possibility of talking about any confidence and, accordingly, peace between our peoples.
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