On December 10 during the Ministerial Council of the Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) meeting in Dublin US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that Russian policy and integration processes, which repress opposition in Europe and Central Asia, resemble sovietization by being called a "customsunion" or "Eurasian Union."

"But let's make no mistake about it. We know what the goal is and we are trying to figure out effective ways to slow down or prevent it," Clintonsaid. This statement by theSecretary of State at least proves that the US became serious aboutPutin's idea of establishing a Eurasian economic union. And it is not just a groundless concern. 

On November 8, 2011 the presidents of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan adopted the agreement on Eurasian economic integration. The parties agreed to establish the Eurasian Economic Space. A year later "EurAzEs" members Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan officially confirmed their desire to join this initiative. 

Last week during a summit of CIS countries in Ashgabat Russian President Vladimir Putin invited his partners to use the GLONASS GPS system, which is designed to provide operative navigation and informational services for land, sea and air freight transportation. 

Besides the economic component, the integration processes includes cultural and political areas as well. Gazprom's CEO Aleksey Miller's idea for organizing a CIS Football League, which was quickly approved by soccer clubs in Russia and CIS countries, was not accidental. 

This year's victories of the pro-Russian Ukrainian leader Viktor Yanukovich and Bidzina Ivanishvili in Georgia as well as the political and legal persecutions againstpro-west Yulia Timoshenko and Mikheil Sahakashvili prove that Russia is somehow restoring its lost footing in these countries. Moscow doesn’t hide its ambition to see CSTO member countries acting as an engine for the "Eurasian Union," using its hegemonic status in the establishment of a common security system.

The fact that the US is openly talking about its determination to "prevent" this integration process of "sovietization" is becoming a new, more serious challenge for countries like Armenia, as it will have an impact on foreign and domestic political realities.

In order to prevent Russian imperialistic projects, the US will surely try to protect the authorities of all countries that more or less have a balanced policy of resistanceagainst the "Russian Bear." Simultaneously, the West will tend to activate relatively freesocial-political circles funded by western donors that try to create domestic social alliances in order to resist the trends imposed by the Kremlin.

In that sense, the direction towards EU integration adopted bythe Armenian government and the successful negotiationswiththe EU in the framework of the Eastern Partnership Program regardingComprehensive Free Trade and Association and Visa Regime Mitigation,provide a means for the US and the West to create those barricades here.It assumes that there will be an attempt to protect Serzh Sargsyan's policy of European integration, understanding its formality.

That can explain the cold reception of the Prosperous Armenia Party's delegation in Brussels last week. A clear message was sent to Gagik Tsarukyan as well as Sargsyan that the Prosperous Armenia Party and its leader are distinctively seen in the domain of Russian interests and values. Thus, they cannot get the support from European structures.

However, the West will tend to minimize Sargsyan's maneuvering opportunities between Brussels, Washington and Moscow. The West has leverage to do that. First, the single ratification left for Armenia to establish trade, economic and energy partnerships with Iran could be withdrawnat any moment. Second, it promises to provide a part of the necessary investments for constructing a new Armenian nuclear power plant and agreed to extending the operations of the Metsamor plant until 2026.

The main thing is that the Armenian economy vitally needs promises for financial investments, which the EU gave to Sargsyan in the context of aso-called "more for more" principle. If we consider the fact that Sargsyan is trying to get the support of his legitimacy from the West, the picture will be complete.  

Yet, Russia more than ever also needs trustworthy governmental and political support in Armenia, even if we disregard its obvious tendencies to push its idea of a Eurasian Union in Armenia and create its political and social demands.On December 10 the Russian Foreign Ministry officially announced that Russia finally terminated its operation of theGabala radar stationdue to a disagreement with the Azerbaijani government regarding the terms of the lease.

That means Russia is withdrawing its small military contingent from Azerbaijan. Armenia now remains the only country in the South Caucasus where Russia has a military presence. If we consider Moscow's concerns about NATO's decision to deploy Patriot missile batteries in Turkey, we can understand how significant it is for Moscow and Armenia to keep its military base in Gyumrias a platform.

Two months ago Armenia ratified the protocol on banning the placement of military units of any foreign country or organization in the territories of CSTO memberstates, whichsimply means it is putting all its hopes on Russia's security system.So Armenia and Sargsyan have no place to run from Moscow. There is also nowhere to run due to an overdependence on energy and, most importantly, a huge flow of transfers from Moscow, which have become cudgels swaying over Armenia's head.

Despite that, Russia needs to have a political system in Armenia that will allow it to enact a necessary "rotation" at any moment without seriously shaking the country, because it is difficult to foresee to what extent its interests would be damaged if these cudgels were to hit Armenia's "head."

In this sense, the Prosperous Armenia Party and the creation of a so-called alternative political pole around it can become a powerful tool with more subtle effects for Moscow. It can't be ruled out that Moscow itself has a certain role in creating that pole, although the demonstrated cautiousness shows that the Kremlin tends to find common ground with Armenia's ruling authority.

Two important circumstances can be considered. First, although Sargsyan still didn’t say "yes" to a Eurasian Union, he also didn’t say "no." And because Moscow is only establishing a background for that union, and there is no significant basis for negotiations, it doesn’t try to intensely suppress Yerevan. Taking into consideration the extremely delicate situation in the Middle East, Moscow doesn’t create additional tensions. Secondly, Russia's projects with the Armenian authorities could be connected with the 2018 presidential elections and a preferred successor to Sargsyan. 

In other words, Armenia is gradually appearing in the focus of geopolitical interests, where each of the three centers will try to decrease Armenia's political resources to maneuver and request specifying foreign political directions with all the negative consequences.

At the same time, the imperative to counterbalance each other will result in the efforts to create mutually excluding levers in Armenia,which will lead to the growth of internal political and socialinstability.And it is possible that the present uncertainty concerningthe presidential elections is determined by these external factors.