On February 27, before Raffi Hovannisian had announced his hunger strike and was actively organizing regional visits and rallies, the President of the National Assembly and the head of Serzh Sargsyan's election campaign Hovik Abrahamyan said, "Raffi Hovannisian's offers to Serzh Sargsyan regarding a second round or the dissolving of Parliament are not reasonable, but there is one that I consider reasonable. Hovannisian, for example, may suggest to Sargsyan that a Heritage representative could be a head of this or that department. I am sure that Sargsyan would consider such a reasonable suggestion."

It was obvious from the beginning that Hovannisian's offers to Sargsyan were not going to be reasonable. The incumbent president, who was barely able to maintain his power during the elections and actually gained a significant amount of legitimacy from the outside world, would never agree to resign, hold a second round of elections, or dissolve Parliament, which would mean letting the carpet be pulled from under its feet. After the Constitutional Court's ruling on the decision by the Central Electoral Commission to declare him president entered into force, supporting those offers became twice as meaningless. 

Apart from that, Hovannisian's team, together with the parliamentary opposition, in fact offered a new alternative to the parliamentary majority regarding the transition to a parliamentary system of government, the implementation of a constitutional referendum and radical changes in the election code, but the discussions failed. By rejecting those offers and refusing to hold a special session, the Republican party in fact made it clear that offers implying systematic changes are "unreasonable" for them. More precisely, the government, particularly Abrahamyan, made it clear that the only reasonable option was Hovannisian's claims to certain governmental positions. In other words, Hovannisian is being offered to make a deal using the classical scheme of receiving a "position for betraying a movement that started democratically," which this government has applied very skillfully.

Actually, that is not a policy for seeking compromise, but of neutralizing all opportunities for compromise. The government was never guided by the partnership principle. That was proved perfectly in 2009 with inglorious death of the coalition formed in 2008. It was already obvious at that time that its actions and policies were not based on a signed memorandum for a coalition, which was essentially a way to put a freeze on the main social, political and economical challenges, but solely based on the President's ideas and ambitions to obtain monolithic power. It was not accidental that the willful deprivation and marginalization of the Rule of Law party as well as its transformation into the Republican party's attaché qualified as a demonstration of political morality. It was also not accidental that in 2011 the government was forcing the Prosperous Armenia Party to announce its willingness for unconditional support in the upcoming presidential elections.

The government considers any compromise as a defeat; it always wants to deal with capitulating powers. The government sees potential victims in anyone, that it is possible to buy them off with positions and promises, or else be undermined or intimidated.

That is why Abrahamyan perceives the present pre-crisis situation not as an accumulation of problems, but as how to address Hovannisian's expectations for a position. Therefore, he doesn’t talk about suggestions and steps for solutions, but about "reasonable" offers expected from Raffi.

This is an issue of political culture. Since Hovannisian is not the bearer of that culture, the government isn't receiving the signals it is accustomed to from him. It is not possible to bribe, convince or threaten someone like Hovannisian, and there are no leverages that can be used in order to undermine him or initiate a case for money laundering. And, most importantly, it is not possible to peg secret conspiracies on him. Hovannisian tries to shelter himself by being open to the public, no matter how weak he is in terms of developing a strategy and methodology and carrying out the plan of action. 

That is why the government does not know how to deal with the situation. It doesn't know what to expect from a politician who as a messenger for unity versus separation, patience versus attack, peace versus violence, and who cannot be accused of being aided by an external force. But it is not only a question of Hovannisian's persona, but something invisible that became quite visible during the election. It is already hard to say whether the opposition or Raffi really are a minority, when according to official numbers almost half the voters did not choose the ruling party candidate, despite the sophisticated fraud.

That is why Abrahamyan keeps changing his attitude towards the movement. Late in the evening of March 15 when visiting Hovannisian, he talked about the offers again, but in a completely manner.

"The suggestion should be made by our team's leader, by everyone on our team," Abrahamyan said. "Consultations would be made within the team, after which we would definitely try to present a offer."

It is obvious that the government has no hope that Hovannisian will give in, and this forces them to present offers by their own initiative, something it never did before. And those offers will certainly be presented. The problem is that the government, by incessantly putting on a different face, wasted all its resources of trust within the public long ago. Consequently, it is hard to say how people will evaluate these new offers, no matter how hopeful they would be.