An interview with Mr. Vartan Oskanian, the former Foreign Minister of Armenia and founder of the Civilitas Foundation

Q - What is the main distinctive trait of the processes unfolding in our region today and how does Armenia fit into this scenario?

A - The state of affairs in the region has fundamentally changed. For us, I would single out two security issues. One is the tension between the US and Russia or, between the West and Russia, as a result of which the contradiction between Georgia and Russia have deepened.

 

This situation will surely have consequences for Armenia. If, in the past, we rejected having to choose between the US and Russia, due to our policy of complementarity, today, the urgency of making such a choice is at our doorstep. The problem we face isn’t just one of choosing sides simply between two neighbors, but rather between Russia, our strategic partner, and Georgia, our natural partner. Both countries have existential value for us. For this reason, it is vital that we implement an enhanced policy of complementarity.  

Q - What is ‘enhanced complementarity’?

A - It means we should have been and we should be more active. Complementarity doesn’t work in silence. One of the guarantees of its efficacy is that it is visible publicly - in words and deeds.

Q - Is there something that we could have, should have done in this period, and we didn’t?

A - We should have been able to make our unwillingness to take sides more public and to be more actively involved in the on-going processes. For example, the President of Armenia, immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities, should have left Beijing, traveled first to Moscow, then Tbilisi and finally returned to Armenia. This way, we would have more clearly demonstrated our active impartiality. We would have made it clear that, whatever the course of future developments, Armenia would not be taking sides between the two countries. I believe that had we taken this step, it would have been viewed as both quite correct and quite normal. I do not mean to imply that I believe that such steps on our part would have had any serious impact on the developments themselves. However, the fact that we undertook such a mission would have great significance. This is the first issue that I’d like to underline. The second, which is much more worrisome, concerns Nagorno-Karabakh. This is because processes are taking place in which Karabakh is simply not present. Russian President Medvedyev noted in one of his interviews that the West claims that Kosovo is a unique case, sui generis. Medvedyev went on to say, fine, we accept this, but then the West should also accept that South Ossetia and Abkhazia are also special cases. Now, I’d like to pose a very natural question - and what about Karabakh? Who is going to declare that Karabakh is also a special case? If only Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia are to be officially considered as special cases it will be harder for us to achieve self-determination in the future. During this time, two issues came to the fore. The first is the renewed focus on non-use of force in the resolution of conflicts, something that we should turn into our banner in future diplomatic activity. Secondly, there’s a toughening on the part of international community regarding issues of self-determination. I am not suggesting that changes be made to our negotiating position, but here, too, a more public approach is important. At this stage, Armenia needs to more clearly articulate its position and stress the fact that the right of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh to self-determination is based not only on historical and legal grounds but also on the fact that Azerbaijan has, on numerous occasions, resorted to the use of force, to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh issue in its favor.

Q - When hostilities broke out between the armed forces of Georgia and Russia, the Karabakh government did made a public statement. What did you think of that statement?

A - It is good that the Karabakh came out with such a statement but Armenia, too, should have made an official statement. Our silence today can have serious negative repercussions in the future. Regarding the question of Karabakh, there can be new emphasis on the fact that Armenia does not recognize the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh because at the base of today’s negotiation process lies the principle of the right of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh to self-determination. We want to achieve that objective through negotiations. However, at such time when Azerbaijan refuses to recognize this principle and withdraws from the negotiations, Armenia must reserve the right to recognize the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Q - Without going into details as to who actually started the war between Georgia and South Ossetia (and on this point news sources differ), let’s look at the fact that a conflict’s “frozen” status changed drastically. What might this mean for Armenian-Azeri negotiations in the future?

A - That depends on what lessons the various sides will cull from what has taken place. And by sides I refer not only Armenia, Azerbaijan and Karabakh, but the mediators as well. Azerbaijan will extract that which it finds of benefit.

Q - Surely, we’ll be doing the exact same thing.

A - Yes, but I’m concerned that cracks might appear in the ranks of the mediators. After all, they all have confirmed that Karabakh is one of those rare issues on which all three countries share a similar approach. Today, however, I don’t know whether the recent disagreements that have surfaced between Russia, the US and France might also lead to cracks surrounding the Karabakh issue? I hope not. However, I also know that these disagreements will impact the process. Thus, what is important is that we keep our options open and be more active.

Q - What do you think about Turkey’s stance in this process, especially the absence of unequivocal support for Georgia?

A - Turkey attempted to take advantage of the political opportunity. It proposed a Caucasus security pact. Here, of course, there’s the problem of trusting Turkey. We’ve gone down this road before. Turkey can appear impartial, reinforce its political positions, then turn around and demonstrate its biases. This is what happened in the case of the Black Sea cooperation effort. Thus, while we can react somewhat positively to the Turkish proposal, we must also be weary and clearly state our terms - that if we go down this road and accept the idea of a Caucasus pact, then in the future, Armenia will not be excluded from these processes. All must participate on an equal footing. The formula I propose is that we all take advantage of this opportunity to positively disentangle this critical situation, to actually bring about the creation of a non-aligned Caucasus with its own distinct security system based on the principle of the non-use of force. If this principle is acknowledged, then in the future, it will be possible to reach mutually acceptable solutions in the resolution of conflicts.

Q - Weren’t you surprised that Azerbaijan didn’t reject Turkey’s proposal outright, given the possible participation of Armenia? After all, isn’t it because of Armenia’s presence in the Collective Security Treaty Organization that Azerbaijan doesn’t participate?

A - But what alternative does Azerbaijan have? We’re not discussing economic cooperation. If, in fact, the Karabakh conflict is one of the more dangerous conflicts, then such a security pact becomes meaningless without Armenia.

Q - Generally speaking, has anything actually changed when it comes to Armenian-Turkish relations? Armenia has invited the President of Turkey to Yerevan while Turkey has suggested to Armenia that it participate in a Caucasus Pact.

A - I don’t believe that it has changed. If the recent Georgian-Russian events hadn’t taken place, I would have had a different opinion regarding the invitation to President Gul. Now, however, there is a golden opportunity for Turkey’s President to accept that invitation and discuss security issues with the Armenian President in Yerevan.

Q - Do you believe that Turkey has a role to play in the normalization of Armenian-Azeri relations?

A - No, not under these conditions.

Q - What conditions are you referring to?

A - Closed borders, unequivocal partiality, assistance to Azerbaijan. Given all this, how can Turkey be of any assistance to Armenia on any issue?