Even international experts engaged in issues related to the “memory of war” continue to stress that hatred of Turks is ingrained in the national psyche of Armenians and that Armenian-Turkish enmity is a textbook example.

While the “right here and now” idea of having contact with Turkey lead to a certain legitimate attitude (without the weighty guarantee of the Turkish state to recognize the Genocide), the line between those totally rejecting or accepting this didn’t directly pass through Armenians of the RoA and those of the diaspora.

There was a widespread opinion that keeping the decades-old characterization of the “enemy Turk” smoldering from generation to generation had much greater consequences on the Armenian mentality than could have been imagined.

To a degree that hatred of the Turk became a primary component of Armenian identity and that the struggle waged against the Turks would become the most organized and influential of motivating factors of existence.

All the while, the “good Armenian” and “bad Armenian” distinguishing badges weren’t the most extreme of expressions stated by the Turks. There is an Armenian diaspora in Turkey that fully supports normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations and those traveling from Armenia to vacation in Turkey aren’t pilloried for doing so at home.

Despite the fact that the formulations “Turks will never change”, “The Turk remains a Turk” and “He behaved worse than a Turk” still today do not “grate’ on the ear of modern-day Armenians, there are perceptions and views alongside these that permit expression, “There are Turks and then, there are other Turks”, to be used in daily verbiage.  In general, the official line of “No preconditions”, that was accepted by a newly independent Armenia under conditions of a totally different intra-national and internal state of affairs and for another objective all together, in and of itself, provided Armenian society certain freedoms for having contact with Turks; without being castigated as a traitor of the homeland or one who tramples on Armenia national pride.

As a result, even though the primary enemy for Armenians remained the Turks and Azerbaijanis, nevertheless, according to widespread public opinion, cooperation with Turkey and even Azerbaijan in the economic and other sectors, even though unresolved internecine problems existed, was regarded as not only possible but beneficial.

Just five years ago, when everything on the Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Azerbaijani front was continuing along according to the “normal rules” of enmity, and there were no signs that anything would change, our research at the “Region” investigation center not only clearly showed the above-mentioned varied mode of thought in Armenian society, but also that between the social perceptions of the three sides there was a difference of principles.

The difference lay in the official “formulations” of Armenia, Turkey and Azerbaijan regarding having contact with representatives from the opposite side. In contrast to the official positions of Armenia and Turkey, Azerbaijan demanded a more resolute stance from its citizens regarding the issue of contact with Armenians; namely, “no cooperation at all since Armenians haven’t returned our lands”.

Those veering either left or right from this formula received their just punishment; some psychological, other criminal. Presently, Baku gives no sign of changing this stance in any way. Last year, a small Armenian-Azerbaijani group of intellectuals, with the participation of the Armenian and Azerbaijani ambassadors in Russia, visited Yerevan, Stepanakert and Baku.

This fact, just by itself, seemed to have an explosive impact in Baku. A headline reading “Shock” appeared the next day in a number of Azeri papers. Later on, when the dust settled, so much reproach and accusations were directed at the Azerbaijani ambassador that he was forced to “introduce some corrections” in his less than aggressive statements made in Yerevan and especially Stepanakert.

In Azerbaijan, they have laid the groundwork for long-term enmity in such a primary manner and they tell the truth about the Armenian “occupiers” to the children, starting from the lower grades. As a reminder, on the last page of primary school history books, it is written, “Remember – January 20 is the national day of mourning; March 31 is Azerbaijani genocide day.

The Armenian aggressors have occupied Khojavend, Khojalu, Shushi, Lachin, Kelbajar, Aghderen, Aghdam, Djabrail, Fizouli, Kubatli and Zangelan”. Without doubt, the basis for the mutual rejection of Armenian-Turkish relations remains not the defense of Azerbaijani interests in the Karabakh conflict but the position of the Turkish government to justify the massacres of 1915 by referring to World War I and the conditions it created.

Over the past 100 years, several generations of Turkish society, have been educated under the influence of this state version of what happened. Thus, it isn’t at all surprising that recent Turkish generations, unfamiliar with the historical facts, regard Armenian demands as either grandiose or unjustified claims on their government or else out and out hostility on the part of Armenians. 

The Turks have a particular loathing of the Armenian diaspora and regard it as a uniform structure wielding considerable influence whose task it is to cause harm to Turkey. But, on the other hand, in Turkey, as opposed to Azerbaijan, they take a much calmer approach to the issue of their citizens having contact with Armenians; and not because there are Armenians also living in Turkey.

Furthermore, during the past two years in Turkey, two mass social revolts took place against this prior treatment of Armenians and, of course, it had a stimulating impact on Armenian society as well. Of course, the personality of Hrant Dink and the fundamental difference of his views regarding the recognition of the Genocide from the approaches of other Armenians struggling for the same cause, had a certain significance when it came to the crowds that filled the streets of Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir in January 2007, chanting slogans like “I am Armenian” and “I am Hrant”. Dink was convinced, just like many other Turkish intellectuals, that what was important was the irreversible democratization of Turkey.

To the astonishment of many Armenians, Dink even believed that the French law prohibiting the denial of the Genocide could not assist in the process of Turkish recognition and that the law was simply a violation of the principle of freedom of speech.

However, the demonstration on the day of the journalist’s burial, on the one hand, attested to the fact that there was a sizeable segment of Turkish society ready to challenge the serious ethno-political restrictions in the country and, on the other hand, that the perceptions of the “I’ and the “Other”, at least for these people, became one and the same. And this is the first step in the transformation of enmity.

During the period of December, 2008, to March, 2009, the fact that so many Turkish intellectuals signed the online petition entitled “Armenians, forgive us”, again pointed out the following important feature. That’s to say, that we are no longer talking about individual Turkish dissidents (historians, writers, publishers) who are questioning the official Turkish line about the Genocide, but of a much larger segment of society, some 340,000, who shape public opinion.

Even if those asking for forgiveness of our “Armenian sisters and brothers” do not call events by their correct names, using such terms as the “Great Calamity” instead, it is still a great leap forward given that the participants and the 200 Turkish intellectual petition organizers were not criminally charged under the infamous Article 301.

This asymmetry of Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Azerbaijani inter-societal contacts is just another factor disallowing that which is demanded in Azerbaijan – if not a joint settlement then at least a paralleling of processes. In passing, On October 22, a meeting of the Armenian and Azerbaijani delegations was organized in the Russian Duma on October 22; again with the intercession of Russia and the participation of the ambassadors of Armenia and Azerbaijan to Russia.

As a result of the meeting, all sides agreed that it was more advantageous to meet than not to, and plans for the next meeting were arranged. In the context of the unexpected quickened pace of the Armenian-Turkish process, today, the Maindorf Treaty signed at the end of 2008 is seen from a totally different angle. It would seem that it was the first step taken to give the appearance of placing   Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations   on a parallel track with the Armenian-Turkish process.