Two days before Russian President Dimitry Medvedev was scheduled to travel to Azerbaijan, there was a major skirmish on the Karabakh frontline in the vicinity of the Verin Chailou village. Azerbaijani forces attempted to advance on Armenian positions, but were repelled. In a striking coincidence, Azerbaijani forces attempted a similar move two months ago when President Ilham Aliyev was on his way back from a tripartite meeting in Saint Petersburg organized by Medvedev himself, attended by the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia. The topic of discussion was the Karabakh conflict. In essence, such incidents on the Karabakh-Azerbaijan frontline are not directed against the Armenian side, but rather Russia. Baku wants to send a message directly to Moscow, not Yerevan or Stepanakert. On August 27, on the eve of Medvedev’s visit to Baku, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, in an interview to several Azerbaijani news outlets, clearly stated that the St. Petersburg proposals were still on the negotiating table and that they had been favorably received by the other co-chair nations – France and the United States. Furthermore, by stating that the negotiations were continuing behind closed doors, in secret, Lavrov made it understood that Baku, despite making attempts to the contrary, had no room at present to avoid the St. Petersburg proposals and that it had no choice but to accept the fact that the other intermediary countries had given their tacit approval to Russia taking the lead in the conflict settlement process. Having no political resource at hand to oppose the situation created, Baku has become emboldened to express its disagreement by inciting such incidents on the frontline. Moscow has really caught Baku in a pincer move. The last blow came two weeks ago in Yerevan, with the visit of Medvedev and the signing of the agreement prolonging the contract of the Russian military base in Gyumri. What really irritated Baku wasn’t the lengthening of the contract but the stipulation that Russia assumed regarding the safeguarding of Armenia’s security and the fact that for the first time Russia assumed such a role in writing. This gives a strategic carte-blanche to Russia, for at least the next 50 years, and a tactical advantage to Armenia, not to wind up in the Turkish-Azerbaijani diplomatic pincers and to keep hold of the upper hand in the Karabakh negotiations. Such a situation allows Medvedev to travel to Baku as a leader of a nation that has restored its regional leadership status. Medvedev’s visit has no real fundamental significance. It is just a formal measure aimed at ensuring Russia’s balanced approach to the two south Caucasian nations. The real matter to be discussed by Medvedev in Baku is the final delineation of the border between the two states and an agreement regarding water rights of the Samur River. While the two leaders have played an active role in the settlement of these matters, it is clear that they are issues that could have been resolved at a lower official level as well. The impression has been created that these issues were included so that at least there was some formal agenda at hand. In fact, Medvedev is travelling to Baku to familiarize himself with the proposals to be made by Aliyev to crack open the closed situation and to gauge sentiments after his visit to Yerevan. Moreover, Moscow is noting such expectations without mincing words. In particular, in his interview Sergey Lavrov made it clearly understood that Moscow expects an understanding on the part of Baku regarding the division of the bed of the Caspian Sea. This is a matter that the five nations abutting the Caspian Sea have failed to reach agreement on in the last twenty years. There is another intractable issue between the two nations that appears to have had serious significance for Russia, at least in terms of its acceptance of an apparent pro-Armenian stance. We are referring to the agreement reached one year ago between Russian Gazprom and the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), during Medvedev’s trip to Baku, according to which Azerbaijan was supposed to sell 500 million cubic meters of gas to Gazprom yearly as of January 1, 2010. The outcome of this agreement still isn’t clear. It seems that the agreement only exists on paper since there are no energy issues on the agenda of Medvedev’s upcoming visit to Baku. This project was necessary so that Russia could undermine the Nabucco pipeline program. In essence, Russia attempted to force Azerbaijan to divert most of its energy exports to Russia. Furthermore, Russia was ready to obtain these resources at a substantial financial loss; a factor that only reinforces the political nature of the project. One can expect that Medvedev will raise this matter while in Baku. In any event, Medvedev’s visit to Azerbaijan is particularly significant for Armenia. The outcome of the Medvedev-Aliyev meeting will prove just how serious Russia is in regards to its assumed obligations. It is evident that for Moscow they are mere tools to be used to fulfill its regional pretensions. It is not mere happenstance  that Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov , in an attempt to play down the significance of the agreement reached in Armenia, noted in his interviews to the Azerbaijani press that, “The main aim of the Russian base is to fulfill the interests of the Russian Federation. Within the framework of those interests, ensuring the stability of the south Caucasus and the Caspian region is a natural component.”