Hetq's political analyst, Tatul Hakobyan, has written extensively on the Nagorno Karabakh negotiations. He has been working for eighteen months now on a book dedicated to the peace process that is due out by the end of this year. Hakobyan has conducted dozens of interviews with present and former officials, with participants in the negotiating process, present and former co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group, high-ranking military officers, and war veterans, as well as with ordinary citizens who directly suffered from the war and for whom the war in Karabakh and on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border has been not only and not so much a victory, as a tragedy - mothers who lost their sons, orphans, refugees who left behind all their belongings.

In the coming weeks, Hetq will be publishing some of the interviews from this series. These interviews should perhaps be approached with some caution. As an American senator said after World War I, "Truth is the first victim of war." These words can be extended to both the Karabakh war and to the negotiating process and, in general, to everything that is directly or indirectly a consequence of the war.

We open the series with an interview with former Special Envoy of ex-President of Russia Boris Yeltsin and Russia's mediator in the OSCE Minsk Group (1992-1996) Vladimir Kazimirov. We would like to emphasize that the interviews were conducted for the purpose of writing a book, and hence the questions might seem odd from the point of view of a classic newspaper interview.

Vladimir Kazimirov: "It was hard to believe that the bloodshed in Karabakh would finally end."

Mr. Kazimirov, the contradictions between Russia and the OSCE vis-à-vis the Karabakh settlement was a clear reality in the early and mid-1990s. What were the main reasons for those contradictions?

 

The absolute priority for Russia was the cessation of bloodshed and military operations. It is most difficult to conduct negotiations while a war is going on. Our Western partners within the Minsk Group would welcome a cease-fire only if it were established through the Minsk Group and not through separate Russian mediation. This is where the contradictions existed. They became more obvious after the Armenian forces seized Kelbadjar. We would put the question this way: the Armenian forces would withdraw from Kelbadjar in exchange for the overall cessation of military operations and the issues of Lachin and Shushi would remain for later consideration. The main priority for the American mediator, John Maresca, was different - the continuity of the negotiating process, in other words, to make sure that the conflicting parties would not slam the door shut and leave the negotiations. Two such instances had taken place, and the Americans were compelled to save the Minsk Group. The first time, after the fall of Shushi and Lachin, the Azerbaijanis refused to participate in the Minsk Conference scheduled for June 23, 1992. In Helsinki, the head of the Azerbaijani delegation, Mehtiyev, declared that Azerbaijan would not participate in the Minsk Conference unless Armenians withdrew from Lachin and Shushi. The second time, we were meeting in Geneva when Kelbadjar was taken. Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Tofik Kasimov slammed the door shut and cut off the consultations.

What would you say about Kelbajar? To what extent do the rumors that the Armenian side was ready to evacuate this region as early as 1993 correspond to the facts?

Do you remember the "Timetable of Urgent Steps"? It was Russia's invention. The first months of the negotiating process, I mean the first sessions of the Minsk Group, were quite ridiculous. Though the Italians were formally chairing the Minsk Group, it was the American, John Maresca, who played first fiddle. He drew up, for example, a plan for Shushi according to which the Armenians were supposed to withdraw from Shushi, and then the displaced Azerbaijanis would return to the town. I asked Maresca jokingly: "Now what, are we supposed to prepare a plan for Kelbadjar?" The Armenians were ready to withdraw from Kelbadjar, at least Yerevan was. I believe that it wasn't a game on Yerevan's part, because it made sense to return Kelbadjar in exchange for the overall cessation of hostilities. Whereas returning Kelbadjar only for the sake of continuing negotiations was too little for the Armenians.

In your articles, you mentioned that the Americans had used the Swedes, who chaired the Minsk Group in 1994-1995, for their own geopolitical purposes.

Once when we visited Baku with the Swedes, we spent a half of the day arguing over where the agreement on the cessation of armed conflict would be signed. Moscow had already been named in the draft agreement. It had been coordinated with all the conflicting parties. But my Swedish colleague Anders Bjurner did all he could to replace the word Moscow already in the draft with dashes, that is, to leave the question of the agreement-signing venue open. Let me tell you another episode - in May 1994, a few weeks after the cease-fire agreement was signed with Russian mediation, Minsk Group Co-Chairman Mattias Mossberg all of a sudden made a proposal to the conflicting parties to prolong the terms of the cease-fire agreement for thirty days. The futility of the proposal was obvious, since the cease-fire agreement signed in May 1994 with our - Russia's-mediation was not limited in time. At times I had the impression that restraining Russia was a no-less important task for our Western partners than achieving real progress in the settlement process.

On May 4-5, 1994, the Bishkek Protocol, and a few days later, the trilateral agreement signed in Moscow on May 12, initiated the cease-fire regime. How did it come about?

The Speaker of the Parliament of Kyrgyzstan, also acting as the chairman of the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, Meditkhan Sherimkulov, participated in the trilateral meeting of the parties organized in Mariehamn in the Aaland Islands, in December 1993. The so-called Inter-parliamentary Peacemaking Group on Nagorno Karabakh was established. Sherimkulov kindly offered to host the next meeting and to continue the Karabakh dialogue in the capital of Kyrgyzstan. The most senior officials from the parliaments of the conflicting parties gathered in Bishkek, except for Rasul Guliyev, who was replacing Haydar Aliyev while he was in Brussels. That is why Azerbaijan sent Vice Speaker of Parliament Afiaddin Djalilov. In Moscow, before leaving for Bishkek, I had set out in writing the draft Bishkek Protocol. The main point of the Protocol was the call for the cease-fire; it was important that the parliament speakers endorse the cessation of fighting. The night of May 9 th was selected by mutual agreement beforehand since we hoped that it would be associated with the Victory Day for all the peoples of the Soviet Union. We hoped to manifest that in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, common sense prevailed. Every one besides Djalilov signed the Protocol in Bishkek. He explained that he could not sign the Protocol since we didn't enable Nizami Bahmanov, the head of the Azerbaijani community of Karabakh, to sign it. In fact, a few days later, on May 21 st , Haydar Aliyev revealed in Baku why Djalilov didn't sign the Protocol. Aliyev said that he had instructed him not to sign any document without his approval. On May 4-5, 1994, Aliyev was in Brussels and we were in Bishkek. I called Guliyev from Bishkek and tried, in vain, to persuade him to empower his deputy, Djalilov, to sign the document. The others, with the exception of Azerbaijan, signed it. We agreed that if Azerbaijani parliamentarians so decided they could join the Bishkek Protocol later on. That is why after coordinating it with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, I had to rush to Baku to discuss the Bishkek Protocol with Heydar Aliyev and Rasul Guliyev. However, I could not visit Baku immediately since on May 6 th Kozyrev was scheduled to receive in Moscow Swedish diplomat Jan Elliasson. So I went to Azerbaijan after taking part in that meeting and arrived in Baku on May 7 th .

You visited Baku to urge Aliyev to sign the Bishkek text. What would you tell us about your "stormy" meeting with the Azerbaijani leadership?

My meeting with Heydar Aliyev took place on May 8 th . Guliyev, Djalilov, Foreign Minister Hasan Hasanov, Defense Minister Mamedrafi Mamedov, and Azerbaijani Ambassador to Moscow Ramiz Rizayev settled themselves next to him. I was representing the mediators alone. Aliyev immediately rushed to the attack saying that we had again drafted a document disregarding the interests of Azerbaijan. I said that the Armenians didn't like everything in the text either. I said, "Find just one formulation that neglects the interests of the Azerbaijani people." I was alone. The others, naturally, defended their boss. Finally, Rizayev made the first sober comment, that the bloodshed must be stopped. He had close personal relations with Guliyev. So Guliyev supported his friend Rizayev and here came the turning point. I told them that the document was not legal but political.

They added the word "international" before the word "observers" in the text though if they meant the Russians, they too were international. A meaningless amendment. The second amendment was to replace the "held territories" with "occupied territories". And the last, the most comical one - they again began insisting on putting Bahmanov's signature under the document as well. As before, in Bishkek, I asked what institution Bahmanov represented, was it a legislature? We had argued for long time but they insisted on both amendments and added Bahmanov's name under the Protocol. However, we were unable to find Bahmanov in Baku. Heydar Aliyev said, "Affiyaddin, sign it." But Djalilov suddenly replied that he could not sign the document since he had publicly stated his position. And I thought, "Oh, damn! Why do we need Djalilov's signature, when Guliyev is present here?" Perhaps Guliyev-Djalilov relations were not unclouded. Guliyev said that for some people their prestige was more important, but for him it didn't matter much, and what was important was the interests of his people. I'm simplifying it now, but that was the gist. And Heydar Aliyev told Guliyev to sign. I took the paper and called Yerevan and Stepanakert. On May 9 th I had already committed to paper another document on the cease-fire and submitted it for Yerevan's and Stepanakert's approval. On May 9 th in Heydar Aliyev's office Minister of Defense Mamedrafi Mamedov put his signature to the paper. Vafa Guluzade is lying when he claims today that the document was signed by Baku and Yerevan and Kazimirov secretly inserted the Karabakh signature into it. On the contrary, I still have in my archive the very first draft without Yerevan's name; only the names of Mamedov and Babayan are inscribed on it for signature. Later on Aliyev said that it would be better to add Yerevan's signature, which was in line with our intentions. I had been telling Levon Ter-Petrossian and other the Armenians for months that there was no need to hide behind Karabakh's back: "You are a full-fledged party to the conflict and it is necessary to participate in these proceedings directly."

Aliyev agreed and so did Ter-Petrossian. But Baku refused to sign the paper with Nagorno Karabakh. For that reason I didn't want to waste valuable time on organizing a trilateral meeting. And we employed an unusual, semi-diplomatic trick - each one of the parties signed the paper separately, without the presence of the other parties. Since 1993, when short term cease-fire arrangements were signed, we had the experience of "fax diplomacy", where because of the urgency of the matter and the impossibility of gathering the parties around a table, the Russian mediator had no choice but to agree upon matters over the phone and to quickly commit them to paper using fax-machines. The first cease-fire agreement bore only Mamedov's signature, the other signatories' names and positions were inscribed in the document. I took this signature and left for Moscow. I asked Serge Sargisyan to send the agreement with his signature to Moscow via fax. Then Samvel Babayan sent his signature. I had in my hands all three papers and therefore the cease-fire agreement. There are three different papers containing one signature each with two other names and positions inscribed on them without signatures. They didn't want to sign the paper together.

Of course, it was an unusual method. I consistently struggle with the OSCE because they label the agreement "non-official" in their annual reports. I ask: "What is non-official about this?" True, there is no single joint paper but it doesn't mean the agreement is unofficial.

I'll tell you another amusing incident. During the May 17, 1994 meeting in Moscow held at the initiative of Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, the representatives of the Russian Defense Ministry, being used to non-fulfillment of cease-fire arrangements, produced a draft document on the cessation of fighting along the Karabakh frontline effective May 18 th - whereas the cease-fire in Karabakh had already been in force for 5 days. It was hard, indeed, to believe that the bloodshed in Karabakh would finally end.

In your opinion, was it the fatigue of the parties that led to signing the cease-fire, or was it because Azerbaijan was facing the threat of losing other regions?

One didn't contradict the other. One wouldn't have happened without the other. Our efforts would have yielded no results if Aliyev's situation hadn't been critical. Essentially, Aliyev faced losing not only other territories but his power as well. It is often said in Baku that Kazimirov threatened that the Armenians would take Giandja. Why did I threaten? Stubborn fighting was going on in the Terter region. That is, ahead lay Barda, Yevlakh, Mingechaur, and the repetition of the southwest scenario. There [in the southwest] the Armenians reached the Arax River; in this case, relatively speaking, they would have reached the Kura River. Just imagine Aliyev's position if the northwest of Azerbaijan had been "cut off". Accordingly, signing the cease-fire agreement wasn't a matter of goodwill but a struggle for survival. Once Arkady Ghukasyan [the president of Nagorno Karabakh] raised this issue in the Russian Duma during hearings organized by Zatulin. In his statement Ghukasyan said, "What is the significance of the mediators? The parties had just got tired and there was a balance of forces at the moment." Of course, there existed both a balance of forces and fatigue. But there had been fatigue before that as well, and there had been a certain balance of forces after Kelbadjar. After the seizure of Aghdam by the Armenians that balance collapsed.

November 26, 2005