Interview with Former Foreign Minister Vahan Papazyan

- At this time fourteen years ago Armenian forces liberated Shushi. You were an advisor to president Levon Ter-Petrossian at the time and were in charge of organizing the president's visit to Tehran, which coincided with the liberation of Shushi. There were articles in the press - by the way, I wrote on the subject myself- saying the first president of Armenia was unaware of the imminent capture of Shushi. What can you tell us about that?

- Even now, 14 years later, there are certain things that I cannot permit myself to tell you. I was aware of the Shushi liberation operation, which had been planned long before. I was not aware of the timing. I was in charge of organizing president Ter-Petrossian's visit to Tehran and I went to Iran a week before the trilateral [Armenia-Azerbaijan-Iran] meeting. Iran was very serious about its mediatory mission. They believed they could gain prestige through such mediation. And it could have been true if they had succeeded. During the visit a draft agreement on a cease-fire was being worked out when the Shushi events unfolded. Of course, we drove the Iranians into an uneasy situation. It looked like, roughly speaking, the Armenians and the Iranians had conspired against the Azerbaijanis. The document was drafted in three languages - Persian, Armenian and Russian; there was no Azerbaijani copy, if I'm not mistaken. Since I knew Persian I compared all three texts - there were some minor differences. The Iranians had apparently noticed them, but pretended that they didn't. The document was signed and the Azerbaijani delegation had left for the airport but they turned back halfway, fearing that something was wrong. They demanded in vain to reconsider the text of the agreement. By and large, the agreement could not play a substantial role for the simple reason that there was complete anarchy in Azerbaijan. Yagub Mamedov, who had signed the agreement, was returning to Azerbaijan, realizing that soon he would not be the Azerbaijani leader anymore. But from the purely propaganda point of view it had some significance.

Our delegation left for Isfahan. During a banquet, Foreign Minister Ali Abkar Velayeti told me that the Iranian side received a report that the Armenian forces were entering Shushi; it was May 8, 1992. I said that I was unaware of that and could not tell him anything certain. He asked me to call Yerevan. I could not avoid doing that and I spoke with Shahen Karamanukyan [the president's chief of staff] over the phone. Karamanukyan told me that everything was all right and that there was nothing to worry about. Then I approached Levon Ter-Petrossian and told him the situation. The president took the news very calmly; he had known that the events might coincide. We told the Iranians that the news had taken us by surprise as well and we would find out the details after returning to Yerevan. Seeing off the Armenian delegation was a chilly procedure. This was natural, since the Iranian side had found itself in rather odd situation. It might even be considered a small diplomatic scandal. To a certain degree Armenian-Iranian relations had suffered a setback. But two or three months later a letter from Levon Ter-Petrossian to Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani was drafted and I went to Tehran with a special mission. I was received by vice-president Hassan Habibi and delivered the president's letter and thus the diplomatic chill was overcome.

- In April 1993, after the capture of Kelbadjar, confidential negotiations took place in Moscow and according to Vladimir Kazimirov the parties were working on a draft cease-fire agreement which would allow the return of Kelbadjar. Were Yerevan and Stepanakert indeed ready to return Kelbadjar in exchange for the cessation of military operations by Azerbaijan?

- Once again, there are things that I cannot permit myself to tell you. The problem is not settled yet, peace has not been achieved and therefore some expressions even by a former foreign minister might not be perceived correctly and might disturb the ongoing processes. I would answer more generally. Was the Armenian side ready to return Kelbadjar in exchange for the cease-fire? The answer is No. Because the issue of Kelbadjar was a matter of security for both Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh. Returning Kelbadjar, then as now, would mean directly jeopardizing the Armenian population in the bordering regions of Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh. At the time the Armenian side never said "No" categorically during the negotiations. In general, the word "No" doesn't belong to diplomacy; rather - perhaps, we'll see, quite possibly, it should not be ruled out. Such was our approach. It is possible that someone who participated in the negotiations would hint that perhaps it should not be ruled out. But it could not lead to practical steps because the capture of Kelbadjar had one principal aim - to silence the weapons positions from were Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia had been fired upon.

- In May 1993, Stepanakert rejected the proposal put forward by the mediators; Robert Kocharyan publicly stated that peace in the region must not be established at the expense of the interests and rights of the people of Nagorno Karabakh. Were the contradictions between Yerevan and Stepanakert serious at the time, or it was just a game for the outside world, a way of maneuvering to sparing Armenia from taking all the blows upon itself?

- Both. Naturally, there were elements of a game since Nagorno Karabakh was not participating directly in negotiations. Nagorno Karabakh was recognized as a direct party to the conflict at the end of 1994. Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh would often agree in advance how to conduct negotiations or that Stepanakert's position would be more rigid than Yerevan's. This is quite natural. But there existed real contradictions between Yerevan and Stepanakert as well; they could not not exist. I'll give you a simple formulation - any government of Armenia is responsible for the security of the Republic of Armenia and its population, for the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh and its population, as well as for the security of Djavakhk and other Armenian communities. The Nagorno Karabakh government feels responsible only for the security of its population; it doesn't have a sense that it is responsible for Armenia as well. It is natural and one should not look for human or qualitative distinctions. There are many examples of that. In his time Slobodan Milosevic was responsible for Serbia-Montenegro, for Serb-populated regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, for the Serbs of Kraina but the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kraina didn't feel themselves responsible for Serbia.

- In other words, those contradictions were merely tactical, but there was one common goal?

- There was one common goal, and there had always been one, but since Armenia was an internationally recognized state and the main, or rather the only, responsible party, it was, naturally, more cautious regarding these issues, was looking farther ahead, approaching the issues more diplomatically. The Nagorno Karabakh leaders didn't feel need for all that because there were no direct political, diplomatic, economic or other pressures on them. In other words, they were more free in their statements and approaches.

- Let's talk about the contradictions between the OSCE Minsk Group and Russia. Vladimir Kazimirov says that at times the members of the Minsk Group were hindering the negotiating process, were quashing Russian initiatives; Heikki Talvitie says that the Russians were working separately; Gerard Libaridian says that in 1993 the Russians arranged for peace, there was a real chance to establish a cease-fire but the Americans were opposed.

- Strange as it may sound, all three are correct. Contradictions between Russia and the West have always existed; Russia has always viewed the Nagorno Karabakh conflict more as its own and still has some grounds to view it as such. There were instances when we acted as intermediaries between the mediators to smooth things over. Yes, there was a moment in 1993 when Russia could have arranged a cease-fire. I would like to emphasize that I'm not talking about peace but about a cease-fire, but this endeavor failed. Why? It's one of the cases when I cannot give an answer today for the reasons I mentioned earlier. However, ultimately the cease-fire was established in 1994 through Russian efforts. It is another matter that all three parties to the conflict wanted the cease-fire, since all three were exhausted. Russia helped in establishing the cease-fire then the OSCE got involved in the process. I remember well Kazimirov's irritation in Budapest. He would say: "We arranged the cease-fire but the OSCE presents it as if they arranged it all." He was right, but there was the other side of the matter. In 1992 the OSCE Minsk Group was established; it had a certain mandate and obligations and was compelled to show some results. The Swedes and the Finns were not as active at the time as the Americans are now. Russia's role was, of cause, much large.

But here I would say one more thing - the Russians are saying that they could have established the cease-fire earlier but the Americans prevented them from doing so. But let me remind you that to a large extent the Russians brought Heydar Aliyev to power with the expectation that Aliyev would bring Azerbaijan into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which he did. And in exchange the Russians helped Aliyev to initiate the large-scale military operations of the winter of 1993-1994. The offensive was organized with direct assistance from the Russians and it failed due to our firmness and correctly calculated policy. Aliyev is considered to be almost the father of the Azerbaijani nation, but it was he who lost the territories, not Abulfaz Elchibey. However Aliyev is regarded as the savior of the Azerbaijani people. Of course, similar nonsense exists in the Armenian reality as well - Nagorno Karabakh was liberated, the security belt around it was created thanks to the former government but we [the former government] are considered to be yielding.

- What can you tell us about the "step-by-step" and "package" variants of the settlement? Diplomats who took part in negotiations maintain that it was because of the wishes and demands of the Karabakh side that the step-by-step proposal was put into circulation, and yet it was the Karabakh side that some time later qualified it as unacceptable.

- The Karabakh side fully participated in the negotiating process from at least the 1994 Budapest Summit of the OSCE. And the formulations that appeared later on - a step-by-step or a package deal - had been discussed repeatedly at our meetings in one way or another. Moreover, some proposals based on the ideas put forth by the Armenian sides were embodied and were committed to paper. At the time, the co-chairs of the Minsk Grope were more listeners than talkers. Of course, they organized the meetings, and mediated when problems or conflict situations emerged, tried to smooth things over. Naturally, they had their approaches and presented them to all the three parties - Yerevan, Stepanakert and Baku. When those formulations - first the package deal then the step-by-step approach - evolved, they had been approbated during the negotiations. They say now that the step-by-step and the package approach were not good, but was the so-called Common State proposal good? The one that has fallen into oblivion by now. The one that was accepted by Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh. Was it good? And what is the difference? The difference is that such formulations and wording are used that provide the opportunity to state that this proposal differs from the previous two. But the fact is that it doesn't. And if it does, it's for the worse. Why didn't Azerbaijan accept it? For a simple reason - they, in Azerbaijan, had come to the conclusion that they could demand more, as they are do today. Today Azerbaijan is demanding more than it did in 1997. Of course, the proposals weren't good. But who has seen a good peace agreement? Has it ever happen that the warring parties sign a peace agreement and all sides are happy? It doesn't happen. The proposals were bad, but those of today might be worse - this is the logic of diplomacy. One must realize that any diplomatic document is either bad or very bad; there is no such thing as good document. The good one is when the opposite side signs capitulation, accepts its defeat and puts its hands up.

See also: Lessons of the War