nterview with Former Head of the State Department on Special Programs, First Deputy Minister of Defense Vahan Shirkhanyan

Arkady Ter-Tatevosyan says that Armenia was, of course, aware of the preparation for the liberation of Shushi but he insists that Yerevan didn't believe that it was possible. He maintains that even Vazgen Sargsyan [minister of defense of Armenia] didn't believe in it.

On the contrary. Of course, Arkady's service in Shushi, and not only in Shushi, was excellent. The task was to win the war and that's what all of us, Vazgen Sargsyan first of all, believed in and strove to do. And winning the war without liberating Shushi was impossible. The best Armenian officers took part in planning and carrying out the operation. It is also true that the Army of Nagorno Karabakh liberated Shushi. In those days I spent the nights in my office, the situation was tense. I remember that Vazgen Sargsyan called me early in the morning and said, "Congratulations, Shushi has been liberated." Artsakh could not have been liberated if Shushi had not been liberated. Artsakh could not have been liberated if Lachin had not been liberated. These are axiomatic truths, and no Armenian at war would have sacrificed his or her life without believing in victory. There exists another axiomatic truth today - preserving Artsakh, for the loss of Artsakh will be the beginning of the loss of Armenia.

Is it true that during closed hearings in the National Assembly after the liberation of Shushi some members of parliament condemned the operation? It is said sometimes that the liberation of Shushi came as a surprise to the first president of Armenia.

When Vazgen Sargsyan mounted the rostrum and announced that Shushi had been liberated, the entire auditorium got on their feet and applauded loud and long, everyone was filled with enthusiasm - communists, ANM members - all of them. Nobody condemned the operation- nothing like that ever happened. Perhaps, behind the scenes, within a certain group some discussions from the standpoint of political consequences might have taken place. As far as Levon Ter-Petrossian is concerned, I can confirm that he was the president of a warring state in the broadest sense of the word. I was the head of the State Department on Special Programs at the time and I was in charge of Armenia-Nagorno Karabakh integration. I was keenly aware of the development of Armenia-Artsakh relations during those seven months I headed the department from January through July 1992 - the liberation of Shushi, the opening of the Lachin Corridor, the creation of the common border between Armenia and Karabakh.

In 1992 Nagorno Karabakh forces liberated Shushi and opened the Lachin humanitarian corridor, but soon afterwards a period of failures began - almost the half of the territory of Nagorno Karabakh fell under Azerbaijani control. What were the reasons for the losses?

There were two main reasons for them. First, as much as we tried not to fall into euphoria after the Shushi operation, there was a short period of complacency. We almost lost the Lachin Corridor and that would have endangered the existence of Karabakh as such. And only the most serious work in September-October 1992 saved the Lachin Corridor. Second, the Azerbaijanis succeeded in creating the necessary conditions, reached an agreement with the Fourth Russian Army located there, and the Russian Army began actively and effectively helping them. Thus, in Lachin we were fighting against the Fourth Army. The USSR collapsed, there was anarchy everywhere, the Army commanders decided to make some money and they got paid to fight against us. So, there were two reasons for the defeats - the feeling of euphoria and Soviet Army's involvement on Azerbaijan's side.

Are the assertions made by the Azerbaijani side, and from times to time by some Armenian circles, that we won the war with Russian weapons, a myth?

As Hitler said, if a lie is repeated enough times it starts to look like the truth. The attacks on Armenia and Artsakh in 1989-1993 were carried out with the serious involvement of the Soviet Army. We succeeded in securing at least the essential weapons from abroad. And only beginning in June 1992 did the Armenian Army receive - without robbing or stealing - the share of armaments due to us from the USSR. Furthermore, Armenia, on the direct order of Levon Ter-Petrossian, initiated the creation of its own military-industrial establishment and in 1992 we were already manufacturing certain types of arms.

What were the reasons for our failure in Kelbajar at the end of 1993?

That was connected to the active involvement of the Russians in Kelbajar, in Martuni, and in Fizuli. The remnants of the Fourth Army still quartered in Gyanja were hired as mercenaries. In 1992 the Afghan Mujahedin were called to help Azerbaijan; Turkey helped with weapons and training. At the end of 1992 the first hundred Turkish military instructors were sent to Azerbaijan. All of this had an impact. One of the negative aspects of this period in Armenia was that people of draft age were subjected to forced recruitment for three-month service; they were rounded up from the streets. These round-ups were necessary-the situation stabilized, but the people's trust was, to some extent, shattered. We should have done it differently. The cases of desertion in the Army - that had begun in the end of 1992 - rose during 1993-1994. When we tried to catch the deserters and bring them back with the help of police it had the opposite effect - they escaped farther, hid deeper.

The president signed a decree creating a commission on deserters. Vazgen Sargsyan was the head of the commission and I was his deputy. We were quartered in the Officers' House. We made an announcement that those deserters who return to their military units voluntarily would be exempt from liability. 2,700 deserters returned over two or three months. Working in an atmosphere of mutual trust with people yielded results.

The war gives rise to legends.

I have never gone to extremes and I've tried to prevent others from doing so. The only legend for me is the legend of the Armenian people. That was the reason we won the war. Of course, Monte [Melkonyan], for example, did a huge job, but he couldn't have done it if it hadn't been for those boys who went voluntarily to give their lives, who were sent by their families to win; they didn't run off from their families, their families sent them, well aware that their sons, husbands, and fathers could get killed. I went with Vazgen to pay our condolences to parents who had lost their sons. When Vazgen tried to fulfill this hardest mission, a mother standing at the head of her son's coffin said, 'Vazgen, you don't have to console me, my heart is bursting from the pain but my soul is proud. My son was killed for our homeland and our nation. Go and finish the job.' No one can take away what the people, what the nation, achieved. When I was working at the Artsakh Committee an old man came and said he wanted to help the Army. He brought the pension he had just received - 27 rubles. What can I say, if it hadn't been for these people what would our lion-hearted commanders have accomplished? Nothing. This is the nation's victory. Not that of Robert Kocharyan, Serge Sargsyan, Samvel Babayan, or even my beloved and revered friend Vazgen Sargsyan.

Can it also be said that the real heroes were killed in the war?

No doubt about it. The best, most devoted, most honest guys were in the vanguard and they got killed. At any rate, most of them were killed. In many cases, unworthy guys took their places. It was impossible for unworthy men to take their place in 1991-1993, but later on, unfortunately, it became a phenomenon.

April 15, 2006