Interview with Heikki Talvitie, former EU special representative in the South Caucasus (2003-2006), Finnish former co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group (1995-1996)

Mr. Talvitie, what were, in general, the positions of the parties during your co-chairmanship of the OSCE Minsk Group? In other words, were the three conflicting parties ready to make daring compromises for the sake of establishing peace in the region?

In those days when Finland was in the co-chairmanship, the system was a little bit different from the present one. Russia and Finland were co-chairs, and the Finnish co-chair was supported by the EU, the US and Turkey within the Minsk Group. In the negotiations the parties were Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh. Then Nizami Bahmanov [representative of the Azerbaijani minority of Nagorno Karabakh] was a silent partner in the Azeri delegation. So, this was the set-up. We really had negotiations; we had a kind of basic document which was finalized between the Russian and Finnish co-chairs and then discussed in the Minsk Group. Basically, the dilemma was that, O. K. the parties could not really agree, there was a general feeling that outside powers were trying to impose a solution on Armenia, Azerbaijan and NK. So, you had two difficulties. The parties could not get an agreement; secondly, the parties together felt that outside powers had agreed on something to impose on them. In that way we could not proceed very much.

You mean that the big powers were trying to impose some kind of a solution?

Not big powers but co-chairmen and the Minsk Group, because we were in agreement, we had one text agreed upon, a kind of a basic document. At that time, because the parties could not agree, they felt that somebody was imposing a ready-made blend on them. Even though we continued to have these negotiations all the time Finland was co-chair, basically these efforts failed.

Former Russian mediator Vladimir Kazimirov confirms that then there were contradictions between the co-chairs. In particular, the US was using "neutral" Sweden to keep Russia from its aspirations to be the only mediator. Do you remember contradictions between Russia on one hand and the Minsk Group on the other?

When Finland was in the co-chair, then we agreed that once Kazimirov came to the South Caucasus and was one of the co-chairmen then he had to consult the Finnish co-chairmanship; that was the policy. But Kazimirov had another hat; he was representing the President of Russia, and there we agreed that if he acted in that capacity, that was the business of Russia, but that he was the co-chair in consultations with the others.

As I understand, there were two Russias in the negotiation process.

Basically, yes.

In those days, what was the general formula for the solution of the conflict? Was the maintenance of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity a priority?

You have always had this situation where you have two very strong principles- the territorial integrity of a state and the self-determination of the people. At that time we used both terms, we used the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and we used the term of self-determination of the people, because at that time there was no real understanding of what would be the status of NK. So, we used both terms.

Was there a point in 1995-1996 when the parties were extremely close to the resolution of the conflict?

No, no, even not near a solution. Later you had a situation in Key West where, very many people believed that the solution was very near, but I don't think that Heidar Aliyev ever, let us say, accepted that. Basically, I think that when returning home he understood that it would be hard there. So, it was near, but basically it was not near. Now there is a situation where you have momentum, let's say a creative Prague process, but there are outstanding questions which are not solved and it is very hard to say whether you are near or whether you are not near, because you are near when you can solve it, but up to now nobody can say that.

Many countries recognize the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, but on the other hand, for example, the United States does not prejudge the results of the negotiations. In the mid-1990's did you discuss a kind of solution whereby NK was not under Azerbaijani control?

No we did not discuss this because we never arrived at a situation where there should be a clear picture of what kind of status NK should get. That is why we used the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and at the same time the self-determination of NK, because nobody knew whether it was autonomy, independence, or together with Armenia, whether it was in the framework of Azerbaijan. All these possibilities were open. There should be a balance between those two basic principals, so that both principles will be valued.

Do you see any connection between the solution of the NK conflict and regulation of Armenian-Turkish relations? Do you believe this two principal issues in some way are connected?

There is a certain solidarity between Turkey and Azerbaijan. In that way the NK conflict is connected with Turkish-Armenian relations, but this is not the whole picture, because then you have Turkish-Armenian bilateral relations and also you have some problems. Turkey has been in the Minsk Group and involved in that way in conflict resolution and Armenia and Turkey have conducted some bilateral discussions. In that way they are separate but belong together.

You were at the Lisbon summit in 1996. In Armenia some people believe that Lisbon happened because of fraud in the 1996 presidential elections in Armenia. What is your assessment; do you believe that because of rigged elections we got Lisbon?

The Lisbon document afterwards was considered a victory for Azerbaijan and a defeat for Armenia. And Armenia had domestic reasons why it was difficult to arrive at a better document. That might be so, but in this conflict resolution there are no victories and defeats when there is no solution. The situation in Lisbon, in Key West-I mean you can always say the other side was gaining and the other side was losing, but basically I don't really buy this theory because if one side loses a lot, that is very bad for the other side. It means you are not close to the solution, because there is discrepancy of the interest and in that way I remember Finns tried to calm down the situation in Lisbon. Basically, in Lisbon, Armenia was isolated.

You are a former co-chair, now acting EU representative in the South Caucasus. You knew the situation in the mid-1990s and you are aware of what is going on now in the negotiation process. You met the former president of Armenia, now you meet the acting president. What is your assessment-Who is more flexible? There are lot of speculations that the first president, Levon Ter-Petrossian, was much more flexible than Robert Kocharyan.

I don't see it this way. I met Ter-Petrossian when I was a co-chair, I met him the time when I was here; I know what Ter-Petrossian wanted to do. At that time it was really difficult to do that, also because of domestic reasons in Armenia. Now when President Kocharyan is trying to solve this problem, time is very different, very different. You cannot compare with flexible and with not flexible if the time is different, if the political situation is different. Basically, both presidents tried their best for Armenia and NK to achieve a kind of solution that it could last. As you see, so far there is no breakthrough in any negotiations because it is very difficult. I confess it.

How did the format of the negotiations under the framework of the Minsk Group change after Lisbon?

Everybody thought, because earlier on the Russians had told us also that they were ready to accept the US as a co-chair. Everybody thought that the US was a candidate. In the final moment of the Lisbon conference the US said that they were not ready, and just to save the situation France said OK, we will take it. So France saved the situation. After a few weeks the Americans said that then they were ready. But France said they were co-chairman. That is why we have three co-chairman.

Do you think that the co-chairs work in full harmony? Do you believe that a Russian peace will be acceptable to the Americans or an American peace will be acceptable to the Russians?

If you take Russia, the US and France, most probably those countries have different ideas how the conflict should be solved. But if you take the co-chairs, they have worked together, so they have to find solutions which are attractive to the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Basically, the co-chairs work in a way that they ask Armenia and Azerbaijan what might be possible and they draft something and see whether it is possible. If Armenia and Azerbaijan find a solution, then everybody will accept it. The international community will accept it.

Can you recall any curious moments during your co-chairmanship?

The main curious situation came when the co-chairmen and the Minsk Group had this joint position. When we came to Baku, Yerevan and Stepanakert, we found out that all three were against us. They joined forces against us. The real decision belongs to Armenia and Azerbaijan. Mediators can only assist.

February 21, 2006