Hetq talks to France-based journalist and author Tigrane Yégavian. He recently authored Géopolitique de l'Arménie. Yégavian is a member of the independent Centre Français de Recherche sur le Renseignement/CF2R (French Centre for Intelligence Studies) and a member of the review committee of the geopolitical review CONFLITS.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, referring to his recent visit to France and the "Ambitions: Armenia-France" conference in Paris, noted that economic cooperation between France and Armenia needs to be ramped up. How would you assess the so-called special Armenian-French relationship from an economic and political perspective?

What is striking and significant in Armenian-French relations is the deep imbalance between the sentimental dimension, that’s to say friendship, memory, culture, and the structural weakness of bilateral trade. Despite the efforts of both sides, trade between France and Armenia remains below 100 million euros.

France's market share in Armenia is low, about 2%. Armenia is a small market limited by the rules governing the Eurasian Economic Union. France is not in the top ten of Armenia's export partners. The number of French companies established in Armenia can be counted on one’s fingers. While Armenia has hosted high-ranking French politicians for years, French investors are absent from the Armenian market, except for a few, such as Veolia, Crédit Agricole, Carrefour, Pernod Ricard.

In comparison, bilateral trade between France and Azerbaijan in 2019 amounted to 749 million euros. The sharp yearly fluctuations result from the bulk of Azerbaijani exports being hydrocarbons.

At the political level, the tradition has been to praise the excellent level of relations between the two countries, but we often forget that friendship, feelings and culture have no effect on international relations. France and Armenia belong to rival geopolitical alliances in an undeclared state of war. The 2016 Four-Day War and the 2020 44-Day War showed that Paris will not fly to Armenia to help. As a rule, there is currently no strategic component to this relationship. France does not sell arms to Armenia. There is no significant cooperation, such as in the field of nuclear energy.

Mr. Macron, however, announced that the French government would set up a special fund to provide large-scale assistance to Armenia. He urged French regions and charities to contribute to the fund. The two governments have developed a ‘Franco-Armenian economic roadmap’ for the next five years, as well as more joint programs that, according to Macron, will benefit Armenia's public infrastructure, healthcare system and cultural and historical heritage.

During his meeting with Pashinyan, Macron said that the war in Ukraine will have consequences for Armenia and the region. He added that in the current situation he hasn’t forgotten the unresolved issues from the autumn of 2020.  Was Macron hinting that Turkey and Azerbaijan can take advantage of the conflict in Ukraine, as they did in the fall of 2020, when the ‘big players’ were busy with other things.

It should be noted that President Macron's speech targeted the Armenian community of France given the upcoming elections. For reasons beyond his control, he was unable to attend the annual dinner of the CCAF (Coordinating Council of Armenian Organizations in France), which marked the end of his campaign in the middle of his re-election campaign. The fact that the Karabakh issue isn’t resolved does not concern him. We know he’s doing a lot to get closer to Azerbaijan.

Pashinyan and Macron highlighted the settlement of the Karabakh issue within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group. In essence, France, one of OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs, again noted that the conflict is not resolved, and the only format for a solution is the Minsk Group format. Can the statements of Macron and the other co-chairs on the issue have any serious impact on the dictatorial regime of Aliyev? The Azerbaijani government says the 2020 war resolved the issue.

Macron also mentioned the Minsk Group and the forthcoming visit of the French Co-Chair to Stepanakert, but such a scenario is very unlikely, especially since the Ukrainian war has probably signed the death order of this unique diplomatic mechanism.

By the way, the speech of the French president was interpreted as an invitation for Armenia to finally join the European Union. The problem is that neither France nor the European Union can provide even a minimum guarantee of Armenia's security. Paris did not even mention the role that Armenia can play as a mediator between Moscow and Brussels. Therefore, we must understand that this long-planned forum was compensation for Armenia abandoned by the Wes. Armenia, apart from the promise of $2.6 billion in conditional economic aid, has nothing to expect from its European friends.

This forum, although somewhat disorganized, was rewarding because it brought together the economic players in French-Armenian relations. There are four points worth mentioning. 1) Quality education offered by the French University in Armenia and TUMO within the framework of Francophonie 2) Taxation issues 3) Armenia's assets. The country despite its geographical isolation, wants to become a gateway to Eurasia 4) Potential to develop critical infrastructure (roads, irrigation systems) due to the French Development Agency development opportunity (for example, the Syunik roadway and Vedi reservoir).  

What’s your assessment of Armenia's foreign policy?  What problems can you single out and what steps to address them must be taken?

Unfortunately, Armenia’s diplomacy has significantly weakened after the so-called Velvet Revolution.  It is obvious that the current administration preferred to employ people in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who were obedient and who praised Pashinyan. It is really a painful phenomenon. Armenian diplomacy is not very practical and must show more flexibility, although Armenia's current position is very weak.

This issue must be addressed from the point of view that Armenia's human resources now lie outside the country. This, however, doesn’t mean that the more Armenia exhausts itself the diaspora will grow stronger. But there are professional journalists, political scientists, university students, even diplomats in the diaspora who can serve the interests of Armenian statehood.

Recently, in France, we saw how President of Georgia Salome Zourabichvili, a brilliant native French-speaker and former French diplomat, used these skills to Georgia’s advantage. Even in this weak state, Armenia has the leverage of the diaspora, but does not use it for the benefit of its diplomacy, foreign policy and strengthening its position.

Therefore, I want to note that we are now facing two challenges. Either we will strengthen this state with elements of the diaspora, or we will continue the process of Russification of Armenia and become a Russian region, as Robert Kocharyan mentioned. 

Concluding on an upbeat note, we must realize that Armenia has the diaspora factor as leverage. We must understand this.