The atmosphere resulting from the intolerant remarks uttered by Amin Gemayel, Lebanon's former president, on August 5 th regarding Armenians was somewhat mitigated when he stated on August 12 th that he respected the Armenian community and when he likened his controversy with the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) as merely a “passing cloud”.

Let us remember that Gemayel lost the recent parliamentary by-election in Lebanon's Metn district. Gemayel credited his defeat to the political stance taken by the ARF and Armenians in general. He also cast doubts regarding the civil rights of the Lebanese-Armenians when he noted that, “Armenians should not dictate the wishes of Metn”.

The former president had also declared that it was unacceptable that, “The ARF had stolen the votes of true Christians”, implying that he considered Armenians as second-class Christians. He had also accused the ARF of engaging in widespread electoral fraud in the neighborhood of Bourj Hammoud. Lebanese-Armenians and a number of Lebanese political figures roundly condemned these statements soon afterwards.

Lebanon once again finds itself in the throes of an extreme political crisis and given the absence of any visible solutions the country's future remains uncertain. Despite the fact that the political atmosphere resulting from Gemayel's statements has been eased, the overall situation under which this event took place sheds light on the conditions in which the Armenian community in Lebanon lives.

What is the prevailing state of affairs in Lebanon today and where does the Lebanese-Armenian community fit in?

The Lebanese Conundrum

While Lebanon is a mere 10,452 square kilometers in size, due to a series of historical, geographical, multi-cultural and other factors, its internal political life has always been complex and irregular. Without going into details, suffice it to say that in this tiny nation of less than 4 million inhabitants reside 18 separate denominational communities belonging to both the Christian and Muslim faiths, most of which are Arabic-speaking. No one community constitutes a plurality in numbers. Despite the linguistic and other commonalities that unite them, these communities also possess distinct cultural and lifestyle values and characteristics that also set them apart. Often, adherence to ones own community takes precedence over the realization that one is a member of an overall Lebanese citizenry.

The nation's political system is founded upon a shaky balance of power sharing between the three main communities: Maronite Christians (Eastern Rite Catholics) and Sunni and Shia Muslims. In its internal dynamics, the modern history of Lebanon has been, to a large degree, the result of the struggle between the dominant Christian and Muslim communities and their respective political and economic elites to control the nation's political helm and economic resources.

But due to the country's small size and vulnerability, as well as to its internal contradictions and other factors, Lebanon has continually been subjected to foreign interference. Moreover, the elites of certain communities themselves often request the assistance of outside forces either because they fear loosing the dominant positions they enjoy or because they feel threatened by other communities and their foreign backers.

In addition to being the result of internal factors and circumstances, therefore, the crisis in Lebanon, which goes on for decades on end manifesting itself in a number of different ways, is also the result of the struggle amongst regional and international forces.

Up till 1975, the Christians, especially the Maronite community, held a privileged position in the country. They lost that dominance as a result of the 1975 – 1990 civil war. The numeric growth of the Muslims also aided growing Muslim political power. The “Taef agreement” of 1989, which put an end to the civil war, gave additional powers to the prime minister, which is always a sunni. The dominant position enjoyed by the Sunnis in the 1990's and up to 2005 was also partially due to the fact that billionaire and powerful Rafik Hariri was the nation's prime minister. The murder of Hariri in February 2005 helped on the one hand to the withdrawal of the Syrian forces (which were in Lebanon since 1976), but plunged on the other the country into a desperate crisis situation wherein the Sunni and Shia communities have become the main protagonists. The weakened and fragmented Christians were divided between these two dominant blocs. Outside intervention further complicated the situation.

The United States, France, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Syria and Iran today influence developments in Lebanon, to a greater or lesser degree. the two main movements of The ever-influential Shia community, Hezbollah, the organization dealt Israel a serious setback last summer for the first time in modern Arab history, and the Amal movement headed by parliament speaker Nabih Berri , enjoy the patronage of Iran and Syria. The Sunni community led by Saad Hariri, the son of slain Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, and his loyal ally, the current Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, enjoy the backing of the United States, France and Saudi Arabia.

A portion of the Maronites, headed by Samir Geagea's Lebanese Forces Party and Amin Gemayel's Phalange Party, are allied with the Sunnis and lean towards the West. The others, led by General Michel Aoun, are allied with Hezbollah.

Those with a western tilt constitute a parliamentary majority and are known as the “March 14” movement. In Lebanon it is the Parliament which selects the nation's president, which has to be a maronite. In the presidential elections to be held after September 25 th , the “March 14” movement seeks to replace current President Emil Lahoud, who has Syrian leanings, with one of their own. The “March 14” movement holds Syria responsible for the murder of Rafik Hariri and demands the intervention of an international tribunal.

The Hezbollah – Aoun alliance considers the present government to be one-sided in that it doesn't represent the interests of all communities and that it doesn't equitably reflect the dominant power blocs in the nation. This alliance demands the formation of a “National Unity” government before the upcoming elections take place and that one-third plus one of the seats in the government are allocated to opposition forces. The opposition would thus have a decisive say during deliberations of key issues as delineated by the constitution. The “March 14” movement has declared this demand to be unacceptable.

The election of a new president requires the turnout of two thirds of the members of parliament. Though they constitute the parliamentary majority, the “March 14” forces do not represent that proportion. If the demands of the opposition are not dealt with until the elections session, its MPs might choose not to attend that session, thus making impossible or illegitimate the holding of such a session.

The positions adopted by each political camp within Lebanon are firmly backed by their respective foreign sponsors. Thus, the successes registered by any one Lebanese faction serves to strengthen their regional and international sponsors' standing in the Middle East.

If the Lebanese aren't able to come to a meeting of the minds by the presidential election deadline, both Lebanon and its citizens are threatened with an uncertain future that in any case will be a desperate one.

Lebanese-Armenian Political Parties and the Politics of Lebanon

Up till the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975 the Phalange Party and the ARF were both electoral and political allies. Besides, when it came to practical political work in Lebanon, the ARF displayed a pro-government stance. Due to this political positioning and also due to the irrefutable dominant following it enjoyed within the Armenian community, the ARF's selected candidates almost always won the 5-6 parliamentary seats reserved for Armenians. Thus, an “Armenian Deputies Bloc” under ARF's patronage used to exist in the lebanese parliament.

After the outbreak of civil war in April 1975 the three Armenian parties in Lebanon: The Armenian Revolutionary Federation, The Armenian Democratic-Liberal Party (Ramgavar Azadagan) and the Social Democrat Hnchak Party, mutually agreed to keep the Armenian community as far removed from the war as possible. They adopted the politics of “Positive Neutrality”. Despite a few deviations this political position was maintained throughout the entire fifteen-year civil war.

For understandable reasons parliamentary elections didn't take place during this period. In the elections of 1992 and 1996 the candidates of the ARF were once again able to win the Armenian seats in the parliament. The ARF continued to maintain its pro-government stance.

All that changes with the 2000 elections. As a precondition for pre-election cooperation in Beirut's 2 nd electoral district, where 4 out of the 6 armenian MPs are elected, Rafik Hariri, the influential billionaire Prime Minister demanded from the ARF that Armenian deputies not work as a separate ‘bloc' in the future parliament but rather as a part of the parliamentary grouping headed by himself. Another condition Hariri set was that he select some of the Armenian candidates. The ARF refused to comply and thus for the first time stood in opposition to the ruling government, namely Hariri. The ARF candidates were defeated in that district and it was Hariri's chosen Armenian candidates, including members of the Hnchak and Ramgavar parties that went to parliament. The ARF put its defeat down to the intentional redrawing of that district's boundaries. The ARF argued that those Armenians who won were actually voted into office by non-Armenians since the district was redrawn in such a way that Hariri supporters now constituted a majority there. It claimed that the majority of Armenians, whose proportion relative to the total number of that district's voters had decreased because of the redrawing, had in fact voted for the ARF candidates.

The same scenario repeated itself in 2005. Four of the six Armenian MPs in parliament belonged to the Hariri faction. The ARF had only one deputy. In 2000 the ARF stopped being pro-government and since the 2005 parliamentary elections it has sided with the opposition and has demanded changes in the electoral law and alterations to the boundaries of Beirut's 2 nd electoral district.

At the core of the opposition is the Shia “Hezbollah” organization and the “Free Patriotic Movement” of Michel Aoun, a Maronite Christian. The ARF closely cooperates with Aoun and its one parliamentary delegate belongs to the Aoun bloc.

Both the Hnchaks and Ramgavars have pro-government leanings. As noted, their deputies are part of the mainly Sunni grouping loyal to the Hariri family.

A newly found “Movement of Free Armenians”, formed of ex-members of the ARF and headed by a former high ranking officer of the lebanese army, Gen. Nareg Aprahamian, also positions itself clearly alongside the pro-western “March 14” forces.

Thus, the Armenian parties are to be found on both sides of the polarized Lebanese political landscape. Fortunately, despite this situation, the tense atmosphere that pervades relations between other forces in this polarized setting is to a large degree absent when it comes to the Armenian parties and Armenians in general. It has to be mentionned, though, that the attitude of ARF members towards their ex-comrades who have formed the above mentionned new movement is extremely negative.

Where Does The Lebanese-Armenian Community Go From Here?

If the Lebanese are unable to fashion a new design for coexistence, and if in the short-term, say in the next few weeks, they cannot come up with a presidential candidate acceptable to both opposing camps, an uncertain and dark future awaits the nation. In that case, the future of Lebanon's Armenian community, just like the others, will be uncertain and unenviable.

Sadly, even in the case of a relatively positive outcome, one would be hard-pressed to envisage a bright future for the Armenian communities in Lebanon and in other Near and Middle East countries in the medium to long haul. Fifteen years of internal warfare, continual economic crisis and the present exacerbated and cloudy political state of affairs have all taken a heavy toll on this once vibrant Armenian community, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Out of a community numbering some 250,000 in 1975 only 90-100,000 remains today according to the most generous of estimates and not more than 60,000 according to others.

The wave of emigration to the West continues and even if an internal political compromise were reached in Lebanon, this exodus would be difficult to stop. The phenomenon of assimilation characteristic to western and Soviet/CIS countries was, with minor exceptions, unheard of in Lebanon in the past. But since two decades assimilation is steadily becoming an ordinary phenomenon also in Lebanon and will surely continue to gather momentum. In the next 20-30 years precious little will remain of the Armenian communities in Lebanon and other Middle East countries. Repatriation is the only remaining rational solution. The question remains...Is Armenia ready to receive its children, and does it want to?

Aram Tovmasyan