Hardly anyone would seriously ask today, “Is Armenia a part of Europe or not?”  This was a question around which there was a lot of debate in the early years after independence, but which has since lost its urgency.  Another formulation - “Armenia on the road to Europe” - is a lot fresher.  This was the title of an international conference (and later the published conference report) organized by the Armenian Center for Humanitarian Research a few years ago.

In contrast to the question - which is loaded towards a positive answer, based on various historical, cultural and other facts - the second formulation has no bias, but also implicitly assumes that Armenia has certain potential for entry into Europe.

Naturally, this change of direction openly suggests modernization and development in society, and suggests something more characteristic of the modern age than our current situation.  I would like to believe that Armenia is on the road to Europe, that our country is set firmly on a tangible road, that there are people who know the direction in which we are heading…  But I think it would be better if the issue regarding Armenia’s prospects (because no matter how you formulate it, this is a question of the country’s future) were placed in a wider context, one taking into account the manifestation and influence of globalization in the region.  Without pretending to undertake a comprehensive and profound analysis, I will try to add a few details from this position to the formulation, or to put it more correctly, to the descriptive definition.  This will involve changing the idea from “Armenia on the road to Europe” to “Armenia on the European Margin” where “margin” as a metaphor has both geographical and socio-cultural meaning, but is not necessarily negative in its implication.  It does not smack of “marginalization” in the traditional sense of that word, but is rather larger in its meaning, which I will go into later.  In any case, this expression takes into consideration both the fact that Armenia has been a member of the Council of Europe for several years and been a part of changes within the European Union as well as the fact that at the same time EU-Armenia relations remain largely formal and Armenia’s prospects of entering the European family seem tenuous at best.

Many people think that the formation and enlargement of the European family is the answer to the challenge of globalization.  A transnational union of this sort allows new solutions for problems (political, economic, environmental and so on) in the present and, most importantly, in the future.  Solutions which would otherwise be beyond the capabilities of national governments.  We know that the expansion of the European Union, which gained pace after the socialist bloc collapsed, has now slowed down, and many are questioning how far Europe can spread.  This question is of great interest to the Europeans themselves, but there is no consensus within the continent.  This is especially so in the case of Turkey’s perspectives of joining the Union.  And this seems more complicated than ever, after a victory in Turkey’s presidential elections of a candidate with strong Islamist roots.

One of the counterinfluences of globalization is the rebirth of local identities and cultural traditions - the strengthening and spread of national, ethnic or cultural ideas.  The activation of Islamic groups, and especially the uprising of radical Islam, is an example.  This radicalism has a different history and varying manifestation in Armenia’s two neighbors, Iran and Turkey, but the current situation suggests that it is impossible to ignore the influence of Islam on the European perspectives of the South Caucasus in particular.

Three influential countries in the region - Russia, Turkey and Iran - who have all dealt with the idea of European expansion in one way or another, have very different standpoints on the issue.  Not only is Iran the least linked to the future destiny of the European family, but it is also in a clear standoff with the West.  The position of the current President of Iran is rooted in a more radical Islam.  Nevertheless, there is a marked movement within society there (which leads to open conflict with the authorities from time to time) towards secularization and values which would bring them closer to the West.  This includes not only ideas such as freedom of expression, human rights and so on, but also the long-term plans for information technology, an internationally acclaimed film industry and so on.

It is pointless to speak of a possible Russian entry into the European Union, at least as far as Russia’s current territory, ambitions and developments are concerned.  The current situation in Russia (the question of Chechnya, widespread suppression of democratic freedom and so on), where differences which exist with the West are being emphasized and becoming clearer on a daily basis, all suggest a stage of complicated Russia-Europe ties, the estrangement of Russia from the West, and many analysts consider these changes irreversible. It is also very clear that Russia does not conceal the jealousy with which it views the improving relations between the West and former Soviet republics.

Most people thought that the possibility of including Turkey into the European Union increased the chances that the South Caucasus republics would gain membership as well.  On the other hand, less attention was being paid in that country to the awakening of Islam, its historical implications and the changes that it had brought into society.

Details about the changes that have occurred in Turkey over the past few decades can be found in a series of studies conducted in different countries in the early 1990s under the supervision of renowned Western authors Peter Berger and Samuel Huntington, published under the title Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World (2002). The project covers a number of countries including Turkey.  The Turkish researchers saw the main change in the 1990s to be the rise of Islam, which generated debates, clashes and different approaches to various issues.  Islam started to play an important role in the political, economic and cultural life of Turkey.  According to the researchers, “the Islamic worldview was politicized and ‘political Islam’ became a critical political element and influential force.”

The results of the study show that, since the 1980s, the plan for Turkey’s modernization has very characteristically seen the coexistence of economic liberalization with traditionalism, where traditionalism has been seen with the tendency to return to a unique identity.  This does not reject, but rather redefines the course of social modernization, “changes perceptions of development and identity as well as casts doubt on secular rational thinking as the only source of modernization.”  This simultaneously means the strengthening of Islam as a political power, which heralds the end of the supremacy of secular culture and could lead to serious modifications in the Western model of democracy.

The researchers stress that none of this was about radical Islam, but rather about a movement which seeks ways to reconcile Eastern and Western values.  Of course, one should remember that the research was led by certain theoretical principles and a vision for perspective (particularly from the standpoint of Berger’s Theory of Globalization), using corresponding concepts and language.  But even with this in mind, the conclusions of the study seem interesting and credible.  Therefore, there is no doubt that there really have been serious transformations in Turkish society over the past two decades and some of it is still in progress.  These transformations have been tangibly changing Turkey, both as a secular society as well as our perceptions of its European future.

Thus, if we look at the South Caucasus in a broader regional context and consider the changes that have been occurring in our more influential neighboring countries, then there is reason to believe that the current situation does not speak in favor of European prospects for society in the South Caucasus at all.