Rasim Musabekov, an Azerbaijani political scientist, comments on the Moscow Declaration at the Hetq’s request

According to concrete and announced results, this meeting could hardly be considered a turning point. The declaration passed has very poor content and goes round the main disaccording issues, these being the withdrawal of the Armenian troops from the occupied territories, the status of Lachin and Nagonro Karabakh and the mechanisms of its resolution, the opening of communication routes, the resumption of economic cooperation and so on.The Declaration does not stipulate obligations for the signing parties and does not generate legal consequences. The only noteworthy point is the one on the international guarantees for the implementation of the parties’ obligations around each stage of the future agreement.

The above-mentioned point restates the fact that the agreement under discussion envisages a stage plan for the resolution process, and that first and foremost it envisages the liberation of the occupied Azerbaijani territories.

The international guarantees are required by the Armenian party, as it states that the withdrawal of the troops is an irreversible action, and Azerbaijan may later use this to apply military pressure on Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh or to stop any transportation communication in case there is aggravation of relations. The Armenian anxiety can be understood, but the international guarantees cannot infringe on the sovereign rights of Azerbaijan and exclude the Russian guarantees under pretence of the realization of international guarantees requested by Armenians.

As to the rest, the important part here are not the negotiations between Sargsyan and Aliev (as far as I know, they lasted a bit longer than 60 minutes). The important point here is what Medvedev offered to the parties or who he pressed. From this perspective the situation is not very bright for Armenia. Armenia has already given all it could to Russia, and its degree of dependence on Moscow is extremely high. Whereas Azerbaijan’s degree of dependence on Russia is minimal, and the interests Russia holds in us are great and are even increasing.

As a growing and solvent market, Azerbaijan is a draw not only for the Russian business but also the Russian military industry. The Russian Federation needs our energy resources, but it more needs to coordinate its energy policies in the third markets.

The North – South and West – East transportation and energy corridors also pass through Azerbaijan, and they are impossible to implement without our participation (they can go and have so far gone round Armenia). Besides, Moscow (just like Armenia) needs to open the communication routes passing through Azerbaijan, for after the August war waged with Georgia these routes are difficult, if not impossible, to access from the military perspective.

All this creates objective premises for shifting the emphasis of the Russian policy in the South Caucasus. It seems to me that the calculations of those who consider that Russia will sacrifice its actual interests for the sake of Armenians’ exaggerated expectations are unjustified.

Besides, Moscow needs to push forward the resolution process also to stop the slow but sure movement of Azerbaijan to NATO and the West (as was the case with Georgia). To sum up, I should say that if my observations reflect the reality, Moscow will keep on working towards reaching a resolution, and if its offers find support on the side of Turkey, France or the USA, the necessary break-through may happen in the course of a peaceful resolution and the threat of the situation to grow into a new military conflict will be taken off the agenda.