Two weeks ago RoA Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan again made a call to the radical opposition for cooperation. “We wish to cooperate with the opposition and have proposed a serious cooperation method; the implementation of joint monitoring of the anti-corruption program’s activities,” the PM noted. He made a similar proposal in the middle of last year but the opposition didn’t react back then or now. Is it the case that Tigran Sargsyan isn’t taken all that seriously within opposition circles?

In July of last year, when the prime minister and opposition leader Levon Ter-Petrosyan met along the sidelines of the Heritage Party congress, the latter gave some words of ‘friendly advice” to Tigran Sargsyan. He stressed the opposition’s loyal attitude towards the prime minister.

Even though this was more of a personalized nature than a political attitude, however, in this manner the opposition leader presented a possible conduit by which the regime could hope for building bridges of dialogue with the opposition.

There were two essential beneficial factors for this. The first was Tigran Sargsyan’s intellectual image against the backdrop of those in the higher echelons of the regime, his comprehensive world view and most importantly, his liberal socio-political positions, that created serious conceptual commonalities with the locomotive force of the opposition, with the Ter-Petrosyan affiliated and Armenian National Congress (HAK) circles. Secondly, given the apoliticization of Sargsyan, the fact that he is a technocrat, diminishes the field of possible conflict.

Despite these factors, however, Tigran Sargsyan is seen by the opposition as “the only declawed wolf” within the regime who, not having sufficient political experience and leverage upon on-going processes, cannot impact on the essential political decision-making process and thus, involuntarily or voluntarily, not only becomes one who carries out those essential decisions but one who directly assumes the responsibility of their outcomes.

As a result, the statements and activities of Tigran Sargsyan start to leave a populist taste in ones mouth, gradually grinding down their authority. This doesn’t permit the opposition to believe that the prime minister, even in the best case scenario, is capable of taking bold steps to display political will.

The latest example, linked to the legislative packages regarding changes and additions to the judicial and criminal trial codes presented to the national assembly by the government, create serious prerequisites for growing distrust in the case of Tigran Sargsyan himself.

The problem is that this package, which defines the legality of removing from the courtroom those accused who display a disrespectful attitude towards the court and continuing the trial in their absence, which was immediately perceived as a spasmodic step to get out from under the “March 1st Seven” affair and critically interpreted by Human Rights Defender Armen Harutyunyan and several international organizations, was hurriedly pushed through the parliament without being subjected to examination by way of public discussion.

All the while, just one year ago, almost immediately after having been selected as prime minister, Tigran Sargsyan declared, at the first session in April of the newly formed government, that, “The decisions adopted by us must become topics of public debate.

This assumes that members of the society must first have the possibility of participating in the processes of drafting legislation; secondly, in the debate process and thirdly, that we must enter into reciprocal links with the public regarding draft bills that have been adopted. These three principles that I have underlined must be applied not only by the government but by the ministries as well.”

This obvious contradiction between word and deed cannot but raise serious questions on the part of the opposition as to whether the prime minister, in general, is capable of at least having an influence on those initiatives regarding which he expressed a principled position in the past.

The prime minister, who called on the opposition to cooperate, couldn’t have overlooked the fact when presenting that package to the parliament that the issue of those incarcerated for political motives was the most principled of issues for that very same opposition and is regarded as a precondition before the start of any dialogue with the regime. Such issues immediately clarify the true motivations of the calls for cooperation on the part of Tigran Sargsyan and the regime. In the first place, the problem lies within Tigran Sargsyan, or more correctly, within the context of his political career.

Presently, the prime minister well understands   that he is the weakest link in the regime in the context of the existing political situation because he doesn’t represent any of the forces in the governing coalition and in reality he serves as a convenient scapegoat for all of them.

Today, it is the “Bargavach Hayastan” (Prosperous Armenia) political party and to a certain degree the “Dashnaktsutyun” (ARF) that have openly expressed their displeasure over the government led by the prime minister. It is clear that he will be the first to be hit by any change in the balance of power with the regime.

Against the backdrop of all this, the talk of the return of Robert Kocharyan and the obvious internal tension within the regime it has created, is forcing Tigran Sargsyan to take all possible steps to safeguard his position. However, not possessing adequate political resources for this, he is forced to rely on such factors that will increase his worth in the eyes of the regime.

From this perspective, the maintenance of relative political neutrality, dialogue with the opposition and, when necessary, the knack for mutual compromise, all become remarkable tools in his arsenal. But if this was the only motivation, the proposal directed to the opposition to carry out monitoring of the anti-corruption program should have been merely an individual initiative on Sargsyan’s part, to the consternation of the regime’s adopted political course.

However, the allegiance shown by the president and the coalition regarding the prime minister’s proposal reminds us that it is the result of a common political decision or in any case that it corresponds to the disposition of the regime.

The regime, by granting Sargsyan certain liberties to interact with the opposition, purely for propaganda consideration, simply wishes to once again prove its readiness for dialogue. However, there might be another reason for presenting this proposal.

By doing so the regime might be attempting to gauge the disposition dominating in the opposition camp, particularly after the hopes it had pinned on the European Council were dashed. If the response by the Armenian National Congress to this proposal were relatively mild then it would be understood that, regardless of holding a public rally on March 1st, the opposition found itself in a situation of tactical uncertainty and that, in the short-term at least, it didn’t present any real threat.

However, the Armenian National Congress has shown striking indifference regarding Tigran Sargsyan’s proposal.