The main aim of the March 1st public rally was to gauge the level of trust that the Armenian National Congress (HAK) enjoyed within the society. The number of those who attended once and for all verified the hegemony held by the Congress over the political opposition and its status as the main molder of the political agenda.

For the most part this proved a success as a result of the information campaign carried out by the HAK regarding the organization of the rally. All information regarding the rally was accompanied with assurances of decisive activities. It was not by accident that one of the slogans chosen was, “The running of special elections”. This was viewed by the people as a maintained stance to continue the activities started one year ago and to bring them to their logical conclusion. This was guaranteed by the large numbers who showed up at the rally. Large sections of society were waiting for the resumption of decisive and drastic activities on the part of HAK and the rally was seen as the start for this. The regime also perhaps fell under the influence of the HAK’s publicity campaign leading up to the rally. The regime expected that HAK, seeking to incite the public’s rage regarding the events of March 1, 2008, would enter the final principled battle. This expectation/concern forced the regime to put the entire “preventative” administrative and enforcement system into action. The severe nervous state of the RoA Police Chief during a pre-rally new conference and his nearly threatening warnings showed that an atmosphere bordering on panic had overshadowed the law enforcement sector in particular. From the start, the police intended to foil the success of the rally by preventing people from ascending to the plazas around the Matenadaran. However, as in previous rallies and again now, the large throngs of people forced the police to make concessions, to avert more serious clashes and conflicts. Given the existing situation, the decisions taken by the police both before and after the rally, regarding the march, were probably the most pragmatic solutions available. However, the speech by HAK leader Levon Ter-Petrosyan showed that the rally above all was called to create a new reality in Armenia’s political arena. This proved to be a surprise not only for the thousands who participated but for the regime as well. In his speech Levon Ter-Petrosyan finally confirmed that HAK had chosen the tactic of long-term struggle, which in the first place assumes a rejection of intentions seeking quick regime change and the adoption of tactics designed to realize the primary objective through consecutive elections. “Under the term “decisive activities” one pictures round the clock rallies, non-stop marches and pickets, assaults on the presidential palace, in a word, immediate regime change, rebellion or revolution. I consider it vital to declare that the concepts of assault, rebellion and revolution will be stricken and will no longer appear in the vocabulary of the pan-national movement and of the Armenian National Congress…Any regime change must occur solely via the constitutional route, that is to say through legitimate elections, the sole guarantor in the establishment of a legal and democratic government. It is our firm belief that in politics resoluteness is expressed through a single maddening outburst but is the ability to wage an intractable, enduring and long-term struggle.” However, it wasn’t all that easy for Ter-Petrosyan to decide to change the entire tactics of the pan-national movement in such a drastic about-face fashion. This step can lead to two serious problems. First, a new wave of disillusionment can crop up in the ranks of those who support “instant regime change”, both in the public and within the HAK itself. Second, this decision will call into question the meaning of the Congress itself, since it had been seen by most all as a project for the realization of short-term problems. From this point of view large numbers of people at the rally were vital to Ter-Petrosyan. Using this fact, he will try to convince the political forces included in the HAK that these masses of people are not following individual opposition forces but that they are following the banner of HAK and thus it has no other alternative as the most effective method and format for action. No wonder that Ter-Petrosyan gave a special stress to this issue in this speech. “Opinions are being expressed that if the Congress slows its actions a bit more its place will be taken over by the radicals. There is no basis for this concern at the moment. The Congress has halted mass actions for four months. Where were those radicals? They should have come forth and filled that vacuum. Where were those who faulted us for being irresolute? They should have undertaken decisive action,” declared Ter-Petrosyan and added as a second argument that, “The pan-national movement or the Armenian National Congress, even for objective reasons, could not even contemplate the alternative of shutting down or weakening, since the regime, by its failed and ineffective actions, always provides fodder for it and society energizes it again and again. What is the reason for this about-face? There are objective as well as subjective factors at play here. One of the main objective factors is that HAK has finally lost all hope of receiving foreign assistance. First, the passage of Resolution 1943 by PACE clearly showed that Europe doesn’t wish to upset the status-quo in the region at the present time. Second, the intensive contacts between HAK organizers and representatives of international organizations and the ambassadors of the United States, Great Britain and Poland to Armenia, showed that the latter are attempting to pressure the opposition to make certain concessions regarding the regime. The direct result of this was that HAK essentially withdrew one of its two preconditions for entering into dialogue with the regime – dialogue with the regime solely regarding the implementation of special republic wide elections. The visit of HAK organizer Levon Zurabyan to Moscow in mid-February perhaps proved fruitless as well. The other objective reason was the international financial crisis that developed. By refusing to intensify anti-regime actions in this crisis situation and to utilize the possibilities it brought forth in the social sector, the opposition essentially refrained from assuming the responsibility of catapulting the country into even further dire straits through irresponsible actions. This, of course, was presented to the society as a great sacrifice that derived not from narrow or party interests but from state and pan-national ones. In reality, however, these were only a veil to hide the newly adopted tactics of HAK that were also the subjective motivations to reject the prior political course. The opposition, in the context of the given long-term plans, isn’t turning down the chance to make use of a convenient opportunity and, in this way, has placed its hop on the inability of the regime to withstand the international crisis. “Is it really difficult to understand that in a few months hence the regime will reveal its nakedness? The authorities will destroy themselves as a result of problems beyond their powers and internal bickering. And the more we remain calm and the more we contain our nerves, the quicker the regime will collapse. The moment is not far off when the rating of the authorities, if they ever had one, is equal zero,” says Ter-Petrosyan and foresees, as a result, “I do not rule out the possibility that in the future the ruling clique will find itself in such a sorry state of affairs that it will be forced to totally resign. I also do not rule out that they propose a national consensus to us or, more correctly, to form a government of national salvation. If such a proposal is made, the question of whether to accept or not of course will have to be decided by the people and not the Congress.” Also noteworthy is the fact that contrary to all previous speeches, this time Ter-Petrosyan uttered not a word regarding the settlement of the Karabakh question. It can’t be ruled out that by doing so he is attempting to give carte blanche to the regime, in the name of the opposition, to carry out the scenario as prescribed to the Armenian side at Moscow and Helsinki. The date of the next meeting wasn’t chosen by happenstance as well – May 1st. If the extremely gloomy predictions of Ter-Petrosyan regarding the Armenian economy come true, it can’t be ruled out that by mid-April the public will tangibly feel the consequences of the economic crisis. On the other hand, we must not forget that as of May the average consumer citizen will tangibly feel the results of the rates hikes of Russian gas and the price increases of basic necessities. Nothing more will be left for the opposition to do other than to kindle that potential critical mass. If we also add to this the fact that during this interval the HAK will attempt to straighten out the political processes towards the formation of a civil society, then one can consider its gradual rise in power to be secured.