“I do not rule out the possibility that in the future the ruling clique will find itself in such a sorry state of affairs that it will be forced to totally resign. I also do not rule out that they propose a national consensus to us or, more correctly, to form a government of national salvation. If such a proposal is made, the question of whether to accept or not of course will have to be decided by the people and not the Congress,” proclaimed Armenian National Congress (HAK) leader Levon Ter-Petrosyan on March 1st.

After the “Black Tuesday” of March 3, this supposition/prediction led to the formulation of two questions. First, wasn’t this a possible reference or proposal of cooperation directed to the regime? What issue was the leader of the pan-national movement trying to resolve by placing this notion into the public arena? Second, just how realistic was the possibility that the regime would resign or that it would form a “salvation” government with the opposition? This statement was immediately followed by the response of the press secretary of the ruling Republican Party of Armenia (HHK), MP Edward Sharmazanov, who declared on March 2 that, “Contrary to Levon Ter-Petrosyan and his team, who avoided political responsibility at one time, Serzh Sargsyan and his team haven’t shunned political responsibility, because for us, responsibility is a political definition.” As regards to the formation of a joint government, according to Sharmazanov, “nothing can be ruled out in politics but at this moment such an issue isn’t on the HHK’s agenda.” Sharmazanov was making these statements on March 2, just a day before “Black Tuesday, when everything appeared to be more than foreseeable and controllable after the “culminating” rally of March 1. However, after the Central Bank freed-up the dram exchange rate it only took a few hours to be convinced that the self-assurance of the government and its assertions that it was in control of the situation were mere fiction and that the possibility that the government headed by Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan would resign under the influence of a deepening crisis was totally realistic. The demand that the PM Tigran Sargsyan led government resign was put on the table up until March 3, more correctly, until the last congress of the Prosperous Party of Armenia. Such demands, however, came from within the ruling coalition. The hints made by the PAP and, to a certain extent by the ARF, with that aim in mind, and the news/PR pressures regarding the president, were exclusively political in nature. These forces viewed the change in the government make-up as a method to bring the portfolios into alignment with the existing balance of political forces. Even though the PAP claimed that these allusions stemmed from the government’s incorrect tax policy, however the effect of the economic crisis was never perceived by the coalition forces as a reason to express skepticism of the government. Thus, there was no objective political demand for Tigran Sargsyan’s resignation. The regime was looking for a way out of the socio-economic situation not through a change in the government make-up but by bringing in foreign financial resources. In essence, the issue of the government’s resignation can be placed on the political agenda only after it becomes clear that the executive isn’t capable of governing that process and when the clear preconditions of a social revolt are created. In other words, the authorities will only revert to the step of expressing a vote of no-confidence in the government at the very last moment. Moreover, this will not be done to fix the domestic situation, to build a more professional and robust government, since today’s regime simply doesn’t have a much stronger resource of personnel, but rather to let off the steam of growing public protest and to mollify the masses to a certain extent. The government of Tigran Sargsyan will be used as a scapegoat. It is another question, whether the regime will subsequently manifest the political will to propose the formulation of a “salvation” government to the opposition. If this were to happen then it would be possible to prove that the regime is not only taking the path of rallying together the pan-national forces to escape the present situation, but that it had also set about to resolve the pressing issue of neutralizing the internal social and political polarization. However, at this moment, no actual prerequisites for this exist. And let’s look at why this is so. The regime doesn’t have the capacity to manifest such political will, due to both subjective and objective reasons. The subjective reason is connected to the stereotypes and behavioral patterns adhered to by the authorities. Even the thought of proposing the formulation of a “pan-national” government to the opposition would be construed as a sign of weakness, recognition of defeat. If the radical opposition, or more correctly its leader Levon Ter-Petrosyan, having accurately assessed the unfavorable internal and external factors it faces, is skillfully employing the tactics of retreat, of temporary passivity, the regime, on the other hand, is exclusively being led by the psychology of the victor. This subjective factor wouldn’t be all that important if it wasn’t accompanied by objective realities playing a much more serious role. The formulation of a “salvation” government assumes that one portion of the regime’s administrative-enforcement levers would be transferred over to the opposition. And the regime could never be sure that these levers wouldn’t be employed as tools to strengthen the opposition. Furthermore, given the conditions of the bureaucratic rank and file, relatively insecure in a social sense and finding itself in a state of political uncertainty for over a year could gradually tend to the opposition ranks and unintentionally assist the opposition in obtaining total state power. This process can be accompanied by the traditional rat race in the political field. The regime, which holds on to the control of the state-administrative apparatus only through “power tactics” and by creating the impression that it has curried the confidence of foreign power centers, can find itself facing the very real possibility of losing that important resource. One shouldn’t consider such a scenario to be pure fantasy if we remember how smoothly the Pan-National Movement (HHSh) took over the reins of power from the communists back in the day. Then too, directed by the idea of resolving issue of pan-national import through a unity of forces and by reaching an agreement with the communist regime of Soviet Armenia, the HHSh, by capturing a majority in the 1990 Supreme Council elections, was able to quickly to take control of all state levers. It can’t be ruled out that Levon Ter-Petrosyan is once again trying to implement that political tactic and that he is using the imperative of jointly overcoming the unprecedented economic crisis as a matter of similar pan-national import. This is clearly a trap for the current regime and in all probability they won’t take the bait. However, besides this, there is yet one more objective reason. Even if one accepts Ter-Petrosyan’s proposal at face value, without any hidden agenda, then the formulation of a “salvation” government signifies that an agreement has been reached regarding a number of problems and steps to be taken. In his speech, Levon Ter-Petrosyan clearly noted the errors being made by the regime and which are preventing it from effectively confronting the economic crisis and its consequences. One can single out the most crucial of these errors, “the toleration of the unbridled dominance of monopolies in the import sector, the tax burden being heaped on small and medium size business”, etc. This signifies that as a precondition to participate in a joint government to overcome the state of affairs, the opposition will demand sincerity and the display of political will from the regime when it comes to correcting these mistakes. It is obvious that the authorities cannot agree to these conditions because it would mean to strike a blow to the interests of the oligarchy on whose shoulders the entire pyramid of the regime rests. In other words, by moving against their interests, the regime would be underling its own positions, would be losing their financial support and would be stripped of a revenue stream. This can be regarded as nothing other than suicide and naturally the regime will not go down this road. Consequently, it is possible to conclude that Ter-Petrosyan’s proposal-hint at formulating a “salvation” government is a trap seen from this angle as well. Of course, it can never be ruled out that the regime can fall into this trap. However, this will be a calculated step that will only be taken when the regime, no longer able to withstand the deepening crisis, will elect to withdraw with minimal losses and leave the reins of power to the opposition, while it slips smoothly and effortlessly into the background. It is completely another question whether or not the opposition will want to assume the reins of power given this extremely problematic state of affairs. To what extent does the opposition regard such a development as necessary? Based on Ter-Petrosyan’s speech of March 1st, one gets the impression that the Armenian National Congress is still not ready for any such thing.