“In conditions rife with the looming critical developments regarding the Karabakh conflict settlement process and especially the threat   posed by the deepening economic crisis and the social reverberations it will create, it would be sheer madness to stoke the flames of instability even further.” This is what Levon Ter-Petrosyan stated during his speech at this year’s March 1st public rally.

Just fifteen days later the HAK (Armenian National Congress) declared that Ter-Petrosyan had decided to head the HAK ticket in the upcoming Yerevan City Council elections. The next day, HAK coordinator Levon Zourabyan commented that, “This will be the second round in the presidential election contest.” Thus, HAK infused the battle for Yerevan mayor, a post assumed to possess mere administrative leverage, with political content, and by doing so proved that this decision by Ter-Petrosyan contradicted all his previous declared policy statements and approaches. Is it possible to believe that Ter-Petrosyan has actually chosen to take this step of “sheer madness”? When we lay certain facts out on the table, side by side, it becomes clear that this decision by Ter-Petrosyan was a mandatory move, on the one hand, and a result of certain calculations, on the other. Ter-Petrosyan didn’t decide to head the HAK ticket all at once. At the outset, his participation on the elections wasn’t even a topic of debate. At a specific stage in the HAK internal deliberations it was announced that the first president agreed to the idea for the sake of a HAK victory, and that he would even agree to have his name show up at the bottom of the HAK ticket. This showed that Ter-Petrosyan had no real desire to become mayor and that his appearing at the bottom of the ticket was purely a symbolic gesture to raise the level of public interest regarding HAK. In essence, he made the sensational decision to head the ticket only when it became clear that HAK not only wasn’t able to arrive at a consensus in terms of picking a suitable candidate but was also mulling over the thought of not participating in the elections at all. As an astute and far-sighted politician, Ter-Petrosyan saw the destructive consequences this would have. This is true especially against the backdrop of his March 1st speech in which he called for a more passive approach. In this context, the development of such issues within the ranks of HAK would mean that internal cracks were beginning to develop within the heretofore unified opposition. On the one hand, narrow partisan interests were being raised, while on the other, signs to avert assuming responsibility that bore evidence of a lack of internal confidence. And the only factor that could even out these contradictions developing in HAK, that could return a sense of direction and confidence, was the decisiveness that Ter-Petrosyan possessed. He was the only leader that could take the reins of control in his hands. In other words, the move by Ter-Petrosyan to head the HAK ticket firstly stemmed from the need to avert the collapse of the oppositional pole that he himself had created. This was all the more urgent a necessity now, when Ter-Petrosyan was attempting to direct the potential of the opposition along the path of long-term struggle. On the other hand, even if HAK was able to nominate an alternative candidate without the intervention of Ter-Petrosyan, it still wouldn’t be able to ward off the prospect of the disintegration of the opposition after the elections. At issue is the fact that any other candidate, in comparison to Ter-Petrosyan, wouldn’t be able to come across with the necessary charisma, widespread influence and world view to insure a decisive victory for HAK in the elections or at least to inconvenience the regime to the extent that it would be forced to resort to extremist and illegal steps and thus serve to spur the ranks of the opposition even further. The ruling regime was directed by such a long-term prospect; by confidently proposing the candidacy of someone like Gagik Beglaryan for the post of mayor, a bureaucratic hack lacking one iota of social comprehension. HAK was confronted with such a problem in the not too distant past. In last year’s elections for the “Kentron” district in Yerevan, HAL suffered a defeat by backing the candidacy of Ararat Zourabyan. This was the concern that didn’t permit Stepan Demirchyan to agree to the proposal that he head the ticket. A defeat would once and for all turn him into a politician with no more resources at hand and one whose time had come and passed. A defeat would also threaten the gravitas of the Heritage Party in general terms, suffering a defeat without much fanfare and without notice could decimate the standing of HAK. Given such conditions HAK wouldn’t have been able to enter fray of long-term and exhaustive struggle. There was another reason in addition to this. Yerevan has always been known for its opposition-leaning electorate that is comprised of the most active and politicized sector of society. It is due to the active participation of this sector that the opposition, despite the repressive measures of the regime, has always been successful in drawing large crowds to its public rallies. And this electorate would never understand HAK if it displayed an attitude of indifference to the upcoming mayoral elections. There was a real danger that these electoral voices would be lost and this was something that HAK couldn’t afford to let happen given that this was a huge chunk of political capital that HAK needed to hold on to in term of planning for future political action. Anchoring himself on this electoral bloc, Ter-Petrosyan can goad the regime into taking extremist measures, to contest the election results afterwards and by doing so open a new front against the authorities?

The threat of out and out confrontation is real

Despite these facts, it must be stressed that by making such a decision Ter-Petrosyan is taking a huge gamble. In essence, he has paced the fate of his future plans and that of HAK on the card table, not to mention his personal standing. In the case of a defeat, the losses incurred may be irretrievable. In order to prevent such a process from occurring, there are two avenues left to Ter-Petrosyan – either to score a victory, whatever the cost, or what is more likely, to lay the total responsibility of a defeat on the shoulders of the regime, to direct public opinion against them, relying on the tactical mistakes and lapses, taking refuge in the tactical lapses and mistakes afforded the regime. By winning the mayor’s seat the opposition will be afforded the perfect opportunity to stage unrestricted street rallies in the capital. They will no longer face the problem of having the mayor’s office refusing them permission to stage marches or rallies. In addition, an unprecedented and, in a sense, undefined legal-political situation will be created. A legitimately elected mayor of Yerevan will serve as a counterweight to a president and parliament whose legitimacy is suspect. An opposition victory would remove the republic’s capital from the oversight of the regime and this would be the first serious step leading to a crisis of governance. Of course, Ter-Petrosyan will have calculated that a regime that has gone through the events of “March 1st” would never tolerate such a situation and would do all in its power to prevent it from occurring. Ter-Petrosyan’s primary challenge, in essence, is to put the regime in such a situation that it would be obliged to make certain concessions, to execute the demands of the opposition, and to go even as far as formulating a unity government. These were the issues Ter-Petrosyan touched on in his March 1st speech and he is attempting to make the mayoral elections serve these aims. In this context, Ter-Petrosyan’s decision can’t be considered a stroke of “sheer madness”. However, the fact that the forces within the ruling coalition didn’t change their tactics after this decision by Ter-Petrosyan and will be contesting the election with separate tickets, shows that the authorities have chosen the route of crude confrontation. Put another way, they have picked up the gauntlet thrown down by Ter-Petrosyan. At the beginning of the elections at least, we will be confronted with a very dangerous situation leading to a new social polarization. Opposition split or jockeying for position? As to how developments will unfold will be mostly dependent on the stances adopted by the other political forces in the contest. In this context, the position taken by the Heritage Party, which couldn’t make up its mind and partially due to the fault of HAK stayed out of the Yerevan city council marathon, will be very important for HAK. HAK, or more correctly its leader Ter-Petrosyan, didn’t make any principled concessions to Heritage in order to come up with a united ticket. Ter-Petrosyan did everything so that such a compromise wouldn’t take place by attempting to force Heritage, which represents the parliamentary opposition, to totally accept his decisions on an equal level with the other tiny and mid-sized and semi-alive parties in the HAK alliance. Not only did HAK create such a situation, but it started a real propaganda-psychological campaign against Heritage and equated the party’s failure to agree to HAK’s conditions to fulfilling the order of the regime. This prompted Heritage to manifest a more cautious stance. For Heritage, at stake was its separate identity and standing as an independent political force. What Heritage did was little more than just force HAK to take this reality into account. However, clashing with the very extreme principled position of HAK, Heritage was forced to find ways out of a very inconvenient situation. What HAK was attempting to do was to force Heritage into a corner by stating that it was Heritage, before Ter-Petrosyan had declared he would head the ticket, which had been insisting that the two oppositional forces participate in the elections jointly. First and foremost, Heritage was faced with the problem of justifying its actions in light of its previous statements on joint participation. The party had to prove that the failure to cooperate wasn’t because it had reneged on its previous statements but because they couldn’t agree to the conditions and demands of HAK. This was the reason why Heritage Party representatives were expecting an answer from HAK right up until the last moment regarding the second, and all together unrealistic, proposal that it put forth. It contained the threat of dividing the oppositional field. Heritage, however, while refusing to participate in the mayoral elections, called on voters to cast their ballots for the opposition. What actually had taken place was a jockeying for position and the two forces on the battlefield refined their principled stances. Practically the same scenario was created in the opposition camp that was formulated at the time of the 2008 presidential elections. What’s at issue is the fact that these two forces are trying to come forth as independent and equally powerful players. Even though Heritage can no longer participate in the mayoral elections directly, its role remains very important, especially for HAK. As a parliamentary force, Heritage possesses quotas within the Central Electorate Commission and thus it controls vital oversight levers, from within, regarding the electoral process. These levers are quite vital to HAK. One can assume that HAK will try not to burn its bridges with Heritage, in order to utilize those very same levers. Such is the case since it was Heritage who made such an offer in the first place.