The April 1st trial session was a momentous turning point in the “March 1st Seven” case for three reasons. First, the defendants were released of all the charges related to Article 300. Then, the case was “individualized” because due to a decision of the judge, the cases of five of the seven defendants, not including Alexander Arzumanyan and Souren Sirunyan, were sent to other jurisdictional courts.

Third, the case dealing with the ten people who perished during the March 1st events was separated from the “March 1st Seven” case. This means that, in essence, there are no defendants related to this case. The Court of Cassation’s press service rationalized this decision by citing the “extensive scope” of the case and the inappropriate attempts by the defendants and their lawyers to “drag-out” the trial. The defense, in this case the opposition or the HAK, presented the court’s decision in a totally different light. In the statement circulated by HAK it reads, “With the division of the group case and the omission of Article 300, the severest and primary charge related to the usurpation of state power, this pyramid, “epochal” in its absurdity and consisting of over 15,000 pages and 44 volumes of material, collapsed like a deck of cards. With its collapse, the regime’s official version of the events of March 1st fell to pieces as well. As such, they confessed that the opposition hadn’t planned or attempted to carry out any rebellion or the overthrow of constitutional order…” However, can the fact that the case has been redirected in such a way be automatically viewed as a victory for the opposition?

To answer this we must first clarify the reason why the judge made such a decision and what the consequences will be for the “March 1st Seven” case. It is not by chance that the prosecution motioned the court to reassess the charges at the April 1 trial date. During the preceding two days the Pace Monitoring Committee in Valencia, Spain, had been examining the modifications made to Articles 225 and 300 in the RoA Criminal Code as evidence that Armenia had fulfilled the responsibilities it had assumed. Both the prosecution and the court were waiting for the reaction of the monitoring committee before deciding how to proceed with the case, or more correctly, its most crucial aspect – whether to set the defendants free or to keep them in pre-trial detention; whether it was possible to continue the policy of keeping them in custody.

The Council of Europe, by noting positive movement in the implementation of Armenia’s assumed obligations, in essence certified the regime’s adopted policy or reassessing Articles 225 and 300 in terms of the “Case of Seven”. This meant that PACE had given the Armenian authorities time not to free those imprisoned for political motivations but to free themselves of the term “political prisoner” and to eliminate this headache for the CoE as well. In other words, the real aim of the Armenia-PACE game was to criminalize the case in order that the CoE would no longer have the grounds to claim the existence of political prisoners in Armenia, by relying on the only argument available, on the formulations derived from general interpretations of Articles 225 or 300.

The government of the RoA brilliantly carried this off by direct consultation with the CoE Venice committee itself.

Thus, if there were to be any moves at the PACE spring session aimed at restricting the rights of the Armenian delegation, the Armenian regime could argue that its obligations had been carried out and that Armenia had not made a move without the participation and assistance of the appropriate CoE substructures. These developments also freed the hands of the regime; on the one hand, by skirting their problems in the CoE and, on the other, to solve the problem of “shutting down” the seven.

This was conditioned on the aim of keeping the forces of the opposition and their organizational potential paralyzed at all costs so that the opposition would be deprived of its primary “strike force” for the upcoming city council election and the 2011 parliamentary election.

Razmik Zohrabyan, Vice-President of the Republican Party of Armenia, openly declared this position during his last interview; “In their name (prisoners – GD), the opposition declares that it is entering the elections to remove the regime, to reestablish constitutional rule, to carry out regime change, etc.

Should we let them replenish their army so that they oppose us again?” Regarding the splitting up of the case, of course one of the primary aims is to bring it to a swift and speedy conclusion. This is more doable when several courts are brought into the process.

For the Armenian authorities it is vital that the issue of political prisoners and especially the “March 1st Seven” case be removed from the political agenda as soon as possible. The stance taken by the PACE monitoring committee was the best prerequisite for this.

Second. When the case was being tried jointly it was easier for the opposition to monitor it and to translate it into political action. T

he consolidated nature of the case ensured undiminished public interest towards it which made it more difficult for it to be directed along the desired path during the examination phase.

Furthermore, in practice the case was going nowhere and had devolved into a circus in which both sides equally put on a show. Individual trials will make it more difficult for the defense to mount joint action during the actual trials. Second, public interest in the case will wane.

Third, it is easier to “break-down” the “March 1st defendants one by one rather than as a group.

Third, this was an interim step to wreck the case since it was clear that the evidentiary resources of the prosecution were weak and vulnerable. The regime, by reassessing the indictment and by “dismantling” its structure, has adopted the path of gradual and stable retreat, so that the opposition isn’t suddenly given a reason to declare itself victorious. Above all, this would strike a blow to the unity of the regime’s ruling pyramid.

Fourth, and equally important, by removing the Article 300 charges against the defendants and by removing the expression “combined with deaths” from Article 225 dealing with the organization of mass disturbances, it would lead to the detachment of the case of the ten dead victims. With the inclusion of the “seven”, the future examination of the case would have been impossible with the presence of such an indictment since sustaining the responsibility for the ten victims was to have been the primary weapon used against the “seven”. 

The joint court case of the “seven” assumed their actions had been mutually arrived at and premeditated, something that absolutely isn’t articulated or can’t be articulated in the in the reassesses charges. By the way, this process of separating the case didn’t happen all at once. Just about a month ago it went through a “test” phase when Judge Mnatsakan Martirosyan first isolated Shant Harutyunyan from the case by assigning him psychological  testing and by then disallowing five of the defendants from entering the court room for ten days.

For two days straight the trial was in session with only Grigor Voskerchyan present. During those days public support for the defendants appeared to grow a bit more passive and it might have been viewed by the court as a positive signal to direct the process of the case as it eventually wound up. In all of this, what remains a mystery is the future of the case of the ten victims.

By separating this case from that of the “March 1st Seven”, the court has basically accepted the fact that these individuals had no connection with the victims and are in no way responsible for their tragic deaths.

This is exactly what the defendants and their lawyers, as well as the aggrieved, were demanding all along. In essence, the case of the ten victims, the most pivotal and most pressing question linked to the events of March 1st, continues to remain up in the air. What will be the fate of this case? It is difficult to say. Logically, it must be started anew, by opening a new page. This is particularly so given that even the authorities accept the fact that at least three of the ten victims due to the fault of law enforcement.

These actions, however, have yet remained a mystery. This case, in actuality, is entering a completely new “frozen” stage in which the logic of “there is no accused, thus there is no case” seems to dominate.