Former NKR Deputy Foreign Minister Masis Mayilyan spoke with "Hetq" regarding the recent joint statement of the Presidents of the United States, Russia and France at the close of the G-8 Summit regarding a settlement to the Karabakh conflict. Mr. Mayilyan, who now heads the "Public Institute of Foreign Policy and Security", commented that the statement differs little from previous statements made by the OSCE Minsk Group and other international organizations regarding principles to be adhered to in the settlement process. He noted however, that the three presidents have called for a speedy end to the conflict based on these principles. (See: http://www.osce.org/item/38731.html). Mr. Mayilyan touched on several of these. 1. The return of territories to Azerbaijan The return of territories under the control of the NKR to Azerbaijan would mean a violation of the NKR's primary law, the constitution, in which these territories are given official recognition. Second, a return of even a portion of the liberated territories would seriously damage the military and economic security of the NKR. The principles thus published include nothing about the more than 1,000 square kilometers of NKR territory now under Azerbaijani occupation or their return. The negotiations must not revolve around territories but rather about the border between the NKR and Azerbaijan. Only after Azerbaijan recognizes the state of the NKR can the two sides set up a committee to deal with the future state border. This has been the experience of international negotiations. 2. Temporary status for Karabakh and security assurances This principle, in essence, places the independence of the NKR into doubt and restricts the NKR authorities and signifies an attempt to deprive the state from conducting an independent security policy. The only real security assurance would be the recognition of NKR independence since it would provide the government with new opportunities to safeguard its security, including political and diplomatic approaches. 3. Land corridor between Armenia and Karabakh The land link between Armenia and Karabakh was created in 1992 and expanded in 1993 as a result of military operations. It would be utterly naive to limit the current fully fledged land link to a vulnerable tiny land corridor. Interestingly enough, this principle is presented as a "concession" to the Armenian side. 4. Putting off the final legal status of Karabakh The legal status of the NKR has already been decided based on the free will of the people on December 10, 1991 and was again recognized by the December 10, 2006 referendum regarding the adoption of a new NKR Constitution. In addition, the NKR populace has on eight occasions indirectly expressed its support of an independent state through presidential, parliamentary and other republic elections and by voting for candidates and platforms who stress the need for the international recognition of the NKR. Thus, during the past 18 years the citizens of the NKR have come out in favor of independence on ten occasions. 5. The return of all refugees and displaced persons The issue can be discussed by the three sides after Azerbaijan recognizes the independence of the NKR. Hopefully, the term "all" doesn't merely refer to Azeri refugees. It remains unclear, however, who or how will the safety and security of thousands of individuals who might wind up on the territory of the opposing side. 6. International security guarantees and peacekeepers Essentially, what is being proposed is that we give up our own security measures and replace them with the failed "blue helmet" mechanism. The possible deployment of foreign armed troops on NKR territory, even under the auspices of authoritative international organizations, will immediately restrict the self-authority of the state.