Gor Abrahamyan

The radical opposition is in a state of indecision. Ever since the arrests of Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s supporters after March 1st and the investigations of his ideological partisans the opposition has been deprived of a serious resource for organizing.

This fact has forced the opposition to focus attention on defending the rights of the detained, to see that they are fairly treated while in custody, and not on directing the popular movement or guiding public sentiment.

The second reason is that the opposition isn’t certain when it comes to what future actions would prove to be the most effective and hasn’t decided what specific steps it can take given the current situation. World public opinion has basically remained unresponsive to the specific demands made by the opposition regarding the proper evaluation of the current situation. Despite the serious pressure brought to bear on the Armenian authorities by the Council of Europe, it is clearly stated that these measures are directed not to remove the causes leading to the present situation but rather to remove the consequences. In an interview granted to the Russian  “Novaya Izvestiya” newspaper, Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s general observations lead one to conclude that perhaps one of the decisive factors in the failure of the opposition to achieve its aims was exactly the inadequate response of the West both during the election and the pre and post elections processes. This stance on the part of the West regarding the opposition proves that during the February 19th to March 2nd time period what took place in Armenia had no similarity at all with the Color Revolution phenomenon.

In any event, to understand the reasons and factors that led the West to be so precautious and to be so allegiant regarding the actions of the authorities, a serious analysis must be conducted. This is not only a matter for the opposition to take up since it is has a most direct bearing on Armenia’s entire political system and culture, in general. The problem is that world public opinion has created a certain stereotype regarding the opposition in Armenia according to which the opposition is not able to become a political player and have any influence on the political decision-making process and cannot evolve into an instrument of change. As such, world public opinion cannot rally around it.

This is conditioned based on two essential factors. Firstly, the great influence that the Russian factor has on the Armenian political landscape and which necessitates that any change be made solely with the approval gained from the authorities in Moscow and secondly, until September 2007, the time of Ter-Petrosyan’s return to the political arena, the barren state of the oppositional field, a result of the virtual inaction of the forces existing therein.

Perhaps such an external stance wouldn’t have been so important, and could even have been considered positive in terms of having an independent opposition, if it weren’t for the threat that the social movement could be removed from its political course that has resulted from the present indecision of the opposition and its wait and see approach. In his latest public statement Ter-Petrosyan promised to shortly declare a new conception and approach regarding actions to be taken in the future. However, his interview to “Novaya Izvestiya” leads one to conclude that the only definite thing that the opposition can propose for the moment is to mold public opinion around the idea of not accepting this regime. And the fact that Hovhannes Igityan, a representative of Ter-Petrosyan’s team, is presently in Strasbourg attending the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in an attempt to lobby the Europeans and make known to them the opposition’s approaches and demands regarding the present situation in Armenia, is evidence that the opposition is attempting to bring the game to the field of external pressures.

At the same time, the social movement that was sparked in the corridors leading to Freedom Square has essentially been left to fend on its own or to rely on the organizational potential of a few social organizations. Given that it has been deprived of its political base, the movement can wind up being deeply disenchanted with the opposition. This signifies that the society will gradually be deprived of the ability to raise the social-psychological and objective dissatisfaction and issues it has internally accumulated to the political level. This, in all cases, can lead to two possible conclusions. Either the scope of that accumulated dissatisfaction will reach such a critical level that a social-civil eruption will take place, leading to more confrontation, loss of life and other unpredictable consequences, or despair will give way to a deep-rooted nihilism that will strip society of the essential components vital for its healthy functioning, such as the incentives to struggle and strive in the name of justice. In any event, as a result of either scenario we will be left with an unhealthy and afflicted society and political system and consequently an enfeebled government.

On the other hand, the authorities will loose that only effective conduit by which it could tap into and take the pulse of the society’s real discontent and get a grasp of reality’s objective stimuli, in a word a true basis upon which to make decisions regarding the situation that confronts us. In the event that the mechanisms of this reciprocal link are violated not only will the issue of the government’s legitimacy not be resolved but it will also grow thornier, regardless of the type of staff politics that Serzh Sargsyan conducts. Thus, if he expresses the political will to implement radical reforms the first and most important step to take along that road must not be to strangle this unprecedented wave of social discontent, to persecute those in political departments by handcuffing them, but rather to place this wave in its correct course and to assist in activating a true opposition to lead it. Only in this way will it be possible to essentially decrease the extremist emotions in the society.

In this context any manifestation of contact between the authorities and the opposition can be of benefit in changing the current state of affairs. In other words, by complying with the social demands the authorities will have to go the route of serious reform (and not a temporary imitation), otherwise the beaten down radical oppositionists on Northern Avenue will take concrete steps to assume the role of a strong opposition in order to safeguard the application of the measures initiated by the regime. It is not possible to imagine any type of dialogue between the regime and the opposition occurring any other way. Moreover, any other type of relationship outside this scenario could be even worse. The problem is that presently the base for discussion between the regime and the opposition doesn’t generally exist because the two sides are mostly being lead according to the principles of mutual denial and intolerance. If anyone from either side showed signs of compromise he or she would be seen as a loser in the eyes of the people. This perhaps wouldn’t be viewed as so shameful or dishonorable if the events and victims of March 1st weren’t looming in the background and the shadow of those responsible.

The regime, in the event that it manifests such will, need not demand that the opposition unreservedly accept the official election results or the legitimacy of the Constitutional Court’s final decision. This would even be senseless and a step that Ter-Petrosyan would never take given that he has never signed off on his official defeat. This needs to be perceived as a principled departure point for the opposition, whose constant broaching, furter hardens the latter’s stance.

Those steps that the opposition and world public opinion are demanding the regime to implement shouldn’t absolutely be directed at Ter-Petrosyan despite the fact that currently their possibility is so viewed. They must be directed to that society for whom Serzh Sargsyan declared the willingness to be the president of all members during his inauguration. This assumes much deeper solutions than new parliamentary elections or the release of those in custody. As to what concrete steps and solutions these might be is a theme for another discussion all together.