The political opposition began to formulate all its actions exclusively during the period when the regime was supposed to implement the demands required of it by Resolution 1609 of the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly (PACE). The activists and leaders of the Popular Movement no longer conceal the fact that the obligatory implementation of these demands is a precondition for the start of negotiations or the already completely devalued dialog designed to overcome the situation that has been created.

Both the regime and the opposition view the implementation of those demands or even the possibility of their implementation as an unreserved capitulation on the part of the authorities. For this very reason the former are doing every thing it can to drag out the implementation of the PACE demands, while the latter is hardening its position and demanding the immediate fulfillment of these requirements.

There are still no victors in this psychologically waged silent struggle that reminds one of the cold war era. This balance isn’t being preserved by countering a small victory by one side with an equivalent one from the other, but rather as a result of a competitive race replete with reciprocal defeats and errors. The problem for the regime when it concerns going down the road of reforms is one of coming up with different maneuvers that exclusively communicate a sense of imitation to the actions of the authorities. The problem with the opposition is the uncertainty of its future measures and the inconsistency of its activities and these are gradually depriving the opposition of imparting an impression of being both sincere and above any narrow self-interest.

This existing situation in the opposition camp is very close to resembling an internal crisis. This was clearly underlined subsequent to the speech given by Levon Ter-Petrossian during the Second Congress organized by the Popular Movement on May 2nd when it became apparent that his thoughts, that up till then had sounded like imperatives at any given situation, had started to become suspect in terms of their certainty and effectiveness. Ter-Petrossian suggested that the content of the movement be altered and that it correspond to the new realities created in the post-election period. In other words, to move the struggle from the front line to smaller, partisan actions in order to solve long-term tactical problems and with this objective in mind to change the organizational/structural content of the movement. The proposed models to replace the movement with the Congress, to continue the struggle in the guise of a shadow government, even up till the point of forming a unified party, did not meet with any serious response from within the ranks of the opposition. Moreover, one of the closest allies of Ter-Petrossian, Stepan Demirchyan, President of the People’s Party of Armenia, clearly declared that it was still too early to discuss the solutions proposed by the Movement’s leader.

What is the reason why this new situation has come about within the ranks of the opposition? Ter-Petrossian came out with these proposals of his at the right time since it was clear that after the elections the Movement lacked any long-term strategy to expand upon. These were proposals with one specific aim in mind - to transfer the Movement from the confines of Freedom Square to the wider political platform. This would really have been the best of solutions given that it would have freed the society from being a political tool/pawn, a status that it freely assumed. Two very important factors prevented this from happening. First, the Movement itself was essentially apolitical given that in the one camp was an assembly of forces with drastically different principles and viewpoints. The only reason or factor that united them all was the joint aim to get rid of the regime at all costs; something that was presented in an ideological and ontological context. It would be difficult to picture any type of cooperative effort on the part of such forces absent this joint aim because it is hard to believe, for example, that the Yerkrabah organization or the People’s Party of Armenia would be in favor of the political positions propounded by the Armenian National Movement regarding the settlement of the Karabakh conflict or the total liberalization of the economy. The Congress on the other hand, especially if it transformed into an umbrella party consisting of the various political forces of the Movement, would have been obliged to confront these realities. The unblemished opposition of today wasn’t ready to go down this road and Ter-Petrossian clearly understood this even while declaring his proposals.

Secondly, the response of the authorities and the mistakes allowed, in themselves, force the opposition to remain in its previous position and continue to believe in the future of the Movement. Today, the opposition is utilizing all its resources to prove that the regime is simply putting forth initiatives to save its own skin rather than basing its actions on objective circumstances. The Movement remains vibrant given that the regime is still blowing smoke in the eye of the entire society. The opposition really has the evidence to justify such an approach. First, rather than satisfying the demand of PACE to release the ‘political prisoners’, there are new people being rounded up by the police with every passing day. A working group attached to the ROA President has been created to draft a set of proposals regarding the implementation of the PACE demands, but in practice there are no opposition elements included in it. The regime hasn’t taken into account the alternative set of proposals made by the 7 members of the Heritage Faction seated in the National Assembly. Furthermore, the issue of expanding the role of the opposition in the political process is being addressed by the creation of senseless, permanent Parliamentary subcommittees. The authorities are really pushing the opposition to remain as a Movement tactically and thus are not coming absolutely any closer to resolving the issue of the split within the society.

In any case the atmosphere of uncertainty within the opposition camp is already apparent. The fact that the Movement has announced that it will stage a rally on June 20th in no way signifies that the opposition is operating in a planned way, as had been the case both before and during the elections. On the contrary, if we closely note the time for the announced rally every thing becomes clear. The fact remains that the announced rally is to take place on the eve of the PACE summer assembly session, when a monitoring group will be in Armenia ostensibly with the aim of reviewing the level of compliance with the post-election requirements assumed by Armenia. By staging this rally the opposition will attempt to prove that the regime has in effect done nothing to fulfill these demands. If we take into account the fact that what the Europeans expect to see is not the complete fulfillment of these demands but rather the start of a series of processes leading to their eventual implementation, then it’s plain to see that the opposition has little chance of obtaining any results from the rally.

Such a point of view is substantiated by another fact as well. In essence, the same PACE Resolution 1609 directly obligates the opposition to reconcile itself with the registered election results, calling on it to recognize the decision of the Constitutional Court to that effect or else to appeal the decision at the European Court. It is not by accident that the opposition isn’t in any hurry to carry out such a demand/proposal, either to recognize the decision of the Constitutional Court or to take the matter to the European Court. The problem is that in both cases it could emerge as the loser. Accepting the Constitutional Court’s decision directly signifies the legitimization of Serzh Sargsyan’s election. If it applies to the European Court, the opposition isn’t certain, more correctly put, it is convinced that the Court will hand down a sentence more political in nature than anything merely to save the European monitors which is the same thing, the face of European politics concerning Armenia. One cannot rule out the possibility that based on tactical considerations the supporters of Ter-Petrossian would never apply to the European Court.

However, this doesn’t hinder the opposition in gradually turning its resources of social trust into dust. Levon Ter-Petrossian declared that the only way out of the current state of affairs would be to call snap parliamentary and presidential elections. Based on this thesis this is exactly what the opposition is demanding of the regime today, all the while understanding that this is totally unacceptable to the authorities. This is unrealistic also because that staging two nation-wide elections in the current situation could prove a paralyzing blow to the entire government and social system. This is an eventuality that neither the regime, the political system nor the society at large is ready for.

However this didn’t prevent one focusing attention on the elections of local self-governing bodies already underway. Elections for local district leaders took place in several Yerevan communities, right under the nose of the opposition and with clear indifference on its part. Only one candidate was entered in these races, mostly representatives of the ruling Republican Party of Armenia. Due to the opposition's apparent indifference to these races, the elections were conducted in such a transparent and democratic manner that one would have thought we were back the in the good old days of stagnation during the 1970's. That was the result of the so-called politics of “the big bite” that the current opposition or the Armenian National Movement, which serves as its driving force, started in 2007 by refusing to participate in the parliamentary elections at mid-point. This was really a major blunder. Not only did the opposition loose the vigilance of the society, the good chance that the society would follow behind it, but also the opportunity to obtain sources of influence on political processes through victories on the local level.

Parenthetically, the issue of expanding the role of the opposition in the political process as envisaged by resolution 1609 isn't a problem only for the authorities, given that the opposition itself must be primarily interested in participating in such an endeavor. Elections of local governing bodies were the ideal arena in which the long awaited dialogue between the regime and the opposition could have taken place. Furthermore, that perhaps would have been the most correct and effective format for such dialog because negotiations between the authorities and the opposition can only be directed by obtaining agreement to create equal conditions for all and not merely by surrendering individual positions of power of the regime to the opposition or by taking steps to deprive the opposition of authority. In passing, a vacuum came into being in the opposition camp as a result of the two-way incorrect perception of this exact issue which prepared the ground for the return of Levon Ter-Petrossian to high stakes politics and the division of the playing field into two poles.