Richard Giragosian, a freelance political/security analyst, responds to questions posed by “Hetq” regarding recent events in the south Caucasus and Turkish-Armenian relations

Q - Russia has recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  Naturally, this will lead to a large-scale campaign against Russia by the United States and Europe. Russia, however, no longer wishes to go down the concession road. A new state of affairs has seemingly come into existence.  In this context do you think that the Karabakh issue will be resolved? Is it possible to speak of the independence of Karabakh at this time? Can Russia possibly instigate the Karabakh authorities to do the same as what the authorities in South Ossetia and Abkhazia did?

A - The recent Russian decision to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia should be understood as a decision related to Russian policy regarding Georgia and the United States, and Russian recognition is not simply a decision concerning an affirmation of the right to self-determination.  In fact, Russia has already privately assured Azerbaijan that despite the decision, Moscow continues to recognize Azerbaijan’s “territorial integrity” and stressed that Nagorno-Karabakh is a unique case, with important differences from the models of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  The Russian ambassador to Azerbaijan has even publicly confirmed that the “agreement” reached in July between the Russian and Azerbaijani presidents (during Medvedev’s visit to Baku) in which Russia pledged to uphold Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity still remains in force.

Thus, in terms of the broader perspective, despite the apparent link to the Karabakh issue, whereby the decision seems to strengthen the case for Karabakh’s right of self-determination over Azerbaijani territorial integrity, the significance of the Russian decision is limited.  Russia has also made it clear that its decision does not mean that Moscow will also recognize the independence of Karabakh.  And I feel that it is still too dangerous and premature for Armenia to be the first state to recognize Karabakh’s independence, at least until another country recognizes it first.

Moreover, the decision is rooted in the broader issue of US-Russian competition, and the West in general is now struggling to respond to the Russian move, which was unexpected by many Western leaders.  U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has already criticized the decision and has warned that the move will not be accepted by the United Nations, adding that Washington will use its position as a UN Security Council member to try to block UN affirmation of the recognition. 

The issue has also only increased the tension in US-Russian relations, as demonstrated by the reaction of US President George W. Bush, who called on Moscow to reconsider what he characterized as its “irresponsible decision,” adding that it “only exacerbates tensions and complicates diplomatic negotiations.”  For its part, the European Union has also said it will examine the “consequences” of the Russian decision and the EU plans to convene an emergency summit on the issue on Monday, 1 September, echoing the criticism of NATO and the OSCE.

But Russia strongly defended its decision, and Russian Ambassador to the UN Vitaly Churkin argued that Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia earlier this month created a “completely new reality” that justifies the Russian decision.  Further, in an article in the London-based “Financial Times” newspaper, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev added that he had no other choice but to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia after Western countries earlier this year recognized Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia, despite Russia\'s objections.  And to be honest, the US handling of the Kosovo issue opened the door for this move and establishing a precedent whether the US likes it or not.  US-backed independence for Kosovo raised expectations and altered the geopolitical reality. 

But most importantly, there is one aspect of this issue that has not been fully considered.  Specifically, I would argue that the decision is not complete, as Moscow does not seem likely to stop with recognition and is more likely to incorporate South Ossetia within the Russian Federation itself, joining it to North Ossetia.  And such a possible move is also bolstered by the Russian citizenship of the majority of the Ossetian population.  Abkhazia is different from South Ossetia, however, and is more viable as an independent state, with much less in common with Russia proper and much more determined to attain independent statehood, making it a more difficult problem for Russia to solve.

Q - Do you think that the upcoming football match can serve as the first step towards establishing relations between Turkey and Armenia? Will Presidents Gul and Sargsyan take advantage of the situation to do so?

A - Despite the opportunity for a breakthrough in Armenian-Turkish relations from such “football diplomacy,” I am very doubtful that the Turkish president will accept the invitation to come to Yerevan.  Moreover, even the symbolic value of the invitation is not enough to overcome the three fundamental obstacles: Turkey’s refusal to extend normal diplomatic relations, open the closed border with Armenia, and Ankara’s stubborn and short-sighted approach to the Armenian Genocide issue.

Although there have been some recent signs of optimism from both sides, demonstrated by both Turkey\'s relaxation of its air space quota for Armenia in order to ease access for humanitarian aid flows into Georgia via Armenia, and President Abdullah Gul’s 16 August reconciliatory message to Armenia, which noted that Turkey is “no enemy” and pointed out that the recent conflict between Georgia and Russia affirms the need for “early measures to resolve frozen problems in the region and ... prevent instability in the future.”  The Turkish president went on to state, “This is our understanding on all problems. We are no enemy to anyone in the region,” before reiterating the Turkish proposal to set up a regional forum for stability in the Caucasus. 
 
In addition, after a round of secret talks in Switzerland, there is ample room and even greater necessity for a historic breakthrough in relations between Turkey and Armenia.  But Gul’s conciliatory remarks were not part of an attempt to restore bilateral ties, but were in response to a question on whether he would accept the invitation by Armenian President Serge Sarkisian to go to Yerevan in September.  And as he replied that he was still “evaluating the invitation,” it is more likely that this will be yet another example of a “missed opportunity.”

Q - Do you think that reconciliation between Armenia and Turkey will obligate Azerbaijan to make concessions? (For ex. - for Azerbaijan to view Armenia as a possible alternate route for the exportation of oil, given the unstable situation in Georgia)
 
A - For too long, Turkey has actually been “hostage” to Azerbaijan, with Turkish foreign policy seriously limited in its options for dealing with Armenia.  Ankara has for too long been forced to follow Baku’s lead in determining what Turkey could or could not offer Armenia.  Many Turkish officials are now very unhappy with their dependence and weakness in this regard and are trying to balance their desire for closer relations with Azerbaijan while recognizing the need to open the borders and engage Armenia.  But even the most basic issue-opening the closed borders- has been too difficult for Turkey to date and I see no signs of hope or opportunity for a breakthrough.  And if the border issue can not be resolved, it seems even more impossible for any new role for Armenia as a transit route for Azerbaijani-Turkish energy plans. 

Q - Is there anything, in your estimation, that would lead Azerbaijan to totally resign itself to the permanent loss of Karabakh?

A - There are already many inside the Azerbaijani government and even the military that see no real value in retaking Nagorno-Karabakh.  And many in Baku see the value of Karabakh for their national interests as limited.  In other words, Karabakh has no economic value or even military significance for Azerbaijan.  But what they want are two essential things: first, they want to be seen to gain something in return for losing Karabakh and, second, they are desperate to regain the areas of Azerbaijani proper, outside of the Karabakh borders, in order to restore their border with Iran, as a strategic necessity. Yet such thinking in Baku regarding the Karabakh issue is not widely held and is challenged by the threat or demands of powerful Azerbaijani nationalism, and reflects a sense that with the influx of its oil wealth, Azerbaijan is not happy at having “lost” Karabakh.

Q - In your estimation, given these conditions what is the possibility that Azerbaijan will resume military operation vis-à-vis Karabakh?

A - I firmly believe that Azerbaijan is dangerously committed to launching a new war to retake Karabakh.  To me, it is no longer a question of if there will be an Azerbaijani military offensive, but a question of when.  But given the poor state of the Azerbaijani armed forces, which is seriously undermined by corruption and poor conditions, Azerbaijan is at least 8-10 years away form becoming a serious military power. 

Moreover, despite the benefits of three consecutive years of defense budgets of more than $1 billion, Azerbaijan accomplished little in terms of procuring advanced weapons systems or investing in modern equipment.  Of its three branches of service, both the army and air forces have continued to suffer from neglect, with continued shortages of spare parts and poor maintenance of existing stocks.  The one exception has been the Azerbaijani navy, which has significantly increased its capabilities.  Yet even the development of its naval forces has resulted from the training and equipping from the U.S. “Caspian Guard” program, which has bolstered the naval capabilities of both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in an effort to match a naval buildup by both Iran and Russia in the Caspian. 

The development of the Azerbaijani navy, including the standing up of an impressive new maritime Special Forces unit, has provided Azerbaijan with important new counter-proliferation capabilities to combat the trafficking of both weapons and most crucially, of drugs through the Caspian Sea.  But it has not endowed Azerbaijani with any offensive capabilities beyond an enhanced command and control and radar-based surface monitoring system, thereby depriving Azerbaijan of its most valued prize- the ability for real power projection. The Azerbaijani army, traditionally the core service of the armed forces, also lacks power projection capabilities and is far from attaining even a minimum level of combat-readiness. 

But time is on their side and their future emergence as the strongest military power in this region is a very, very serious possibility.  And even more distressing is the fact that Azerbaijan sees a different lesson from the recent conflict in Georgia.  Many leading Azerbaijani officers see that the most serious Georgian mistake was not in Saakashvili’s decision to launch a military campaign to retake South Ossetia, but rather, Georgia’s strategic mistake was launching military operations before they were ready. 

Thus, the Azerbaijani view is that they have learned from the Georgians that it is better for them to wait until they are strong enough and ready to wage war to retake Karabakh.  And this is a dangerous sign from Baku and a development that Yerevan and Stepanakert must recognize and respond to in order to ensure the security of Armenia and Karabakh before it is too late.  Armenia is the dominant military power in the region, but this dominance is in danger of being temporary, and Armenia must take steps now and accelerate its defense reforms now to prepare for the possibility of a stronger Azerbaijani military in the coming 8-10 years.