When it comes to discussing a possible timeframe for the ratification of the unfortunate Armenia-Turkey protocols, certain officials who claim to be politicians have declared with self-satisfied voices that the process of normalisation (according to them) must take place “within a reasonable timeframe”. Accordingly, the question necessarily arises: is there a clearly-defined limit to “a reasonable timeframe” in international law?

The term “reasonable timeframe” has, albeit of seldom use, but nevertheless a certain application in public international law. For example, Articles 5 and 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights guarantee the trial “within a reasonable time” of individuals in custody or under arrest (“Everyone arrested or detained … shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or release pending trial” - Article 5.3; “Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time” - Article 6.1) (Basic Documents in International Law, (ed. Ian Brownlie), Oxford, 1989, p. 323). It is clear that such wording is sufficiently flexible to provide the possibility of the aforementioned multi-lateral document to be more inclusive and applicable in various judicial systems. However, any mention of “reasonable times” in bilateral agreements, where only mutual obligations are codified, does not make any sense and is undesirable. Even more so when one considers the centuries-old tradition of the Turks to deny their domestic obligations and renege on their own promises, such a move would be generally unacceptable in relations with them. A well-known contemporary Belgian legal specialist, Olivier Corten, rightfully considers the “profound ambiguity” of the term “reasonable” to be its main characteristic (Oliver Corten, The Notion of “Reasonable” in International Legal Discourse, Reason and Contradictions, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, (Cambridge University Press), vol. 48, No. 3 (Jul. 1999), p. 613). That is, the usage of such a deadline in international relations does not bring in any clarification in the application of a bilateral document. In the Tunisia vs. Libya case over their continental shelf, the UN International Court of Justice provided the following commentary on this question of interest to us: “what is reasonable and equitable in any given case must be depend on its circumstances” (Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) I.C.J. Re. 1982, para. 60). Thus, the highest tribunal of the UN has clearly stated that the term “reasonable” is strictly relative and that there cannot be a universal and outright understanding of it in public international law. And so, if, for the Armenian side, a “reasonable” timeframe would logically be, say, three months, then with just as much logic the Turkish side could have a “reasonable” timeframe of three years.

Ara Papian

Head of the Modus Vivendi Centre 4 January, 2010