Or, As always – what to do? Let us state at once that there is no principle of “preservation of territorial integrity” in international law. The fourth clause of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations (UN) declares only the following: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”. This clause does not have anything to do with the preservation of “territorial integrity”, that is, the inviolability of the territory of any state. According to an authoritative commentary on the law on foreign relations of the United States, it is simply a clause against invasion, a “prohibition of use of force” (Restatement of the Law (3rd). The Foreign Relations Law of the United States, The American Law Institute, Washington, 1987; v. 2, § 905 (7),  p. 389), and it merely calls upon refraining from “the use of force by one state to conquer another state or overthrow its government” (Ibid, p. 383). The phrasing “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state” found its way into the UN Charter upon the request of certain smaller states, as a certain guarantee that “force could not be used by the more powerful states in violation of the ‘territorial integrity or political independence’ of weaker states” (Leland M. Goodrich, Edward Hambro, Charter of The United Nations, Commentary and Documents, [second and revised edition], Boston, 1949, p. 103). It is evident that this clause does not contradict the principle of self-determination of peoples and has absolutely nothing to do with the contrived, so-called principle of “preservation of territorial integrity” which does not exist in international law, but is thrown about due to political considerations (Ara Papian, On the Principles of Self-Determination and so-called “Territorial Integrity” in Public International Law, (The Case of Nagorno-Karabagh), Noravank Foundation, "21st Century", # 2, 2010 http://www.noravank.am/arm/jurnals/details.php?ELEMENT_ID=5189). A legitimate question may arise, then: what to do? What to do when there are differences of opinion on a point of international law or its interpretation? The response is simple and clear – one must appeal to a body that has the corresponding authority and competence to interpret the given issue and, more significantly, to make a ruling on it. That very body for international law is the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which, in accordance with clause 2(b) of Article 36 of its Statute, has jurisdiction over discussing and deciding on “any question of international law”. It has become clear today that, when it comes to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the supposed contradiction between the principle of “self-determination of peoples”, its manifestations and complexities, and the invocation of the so-called “preservation of territorial integrity”, has ceased to be a purely legal issue. The question of life and death for thousands of people are at stake. Without rendering similar the understanding of the principle of “self-determination of peoples”, it would be impossible to deal with these issues. Without making clear what is meant by “territorial integrity”, and from what it may be preserved to what degree, it would be impossible to come up with a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Accordingly, the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, as member-states of the United Nations, must jointly appeal to the court of the UN, namely the International Court of Justice, with more or less the following questions: 1. Does international law contain a “principle of self-determination of peoples”? If yes, then, does the “principle of self-determination of peoples” apply to collective unit of a people who are found outside of a nation-state of that people already existing? If yes, then are there any limitations to that self-determination? 2. Does international law contain a “principle of preservation of territorial integrity”? If yes, then does that principle limit a “principle of self-determination of peoples”, denying the collective unit in question the right to political self-determination? Both the Armenian parties and the Azerbaijani side have on numerous occasions expressed with confidence that their positions are based on international law. But they are not the ones who decide such matters. Even the mediators do not possess the authority to do so. There is a competent body in international law with jurisdiction over such questions. I believe that the time has come for the mediators to approach the sides with the request to present such appeals to the International Court of Justice. They should then be combined and put forth at the ICJ as per its procedures. If one of the sides should decline, then it would imply that its rhetoric on how its position is based on international law is meaningless. The international community should pursue the matter accordingly. In that case, the mediators should themselves, on behalf of the UN Security Council and as per Article 65 of the ICJ Statute, approach the ICJ for a clarification and advisory opinion on the aforementioned questions. As difficult as it would be to come to a decision for a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it would doubtless be twice as difficult to actually implement it. And so, a clarification by the International Court of Justice on certain basic points of the conflict and a decision on them would create a legal and beneficial basis for a solution to the conflict, as it would eliminate the differences of opinion on principles of fundamental legal issues as presently borne by the parties to the conflict. Ara Papian Head of the Modus Vivendi Centre 28 January, 2011