The analysis presented by Levon Ter-Petrosyan (LTP) at the last public rally organized by the Armenian National Congress (ANC) regarding the present settlement stage of the Karabakh conflict settlement contained certain aspects of panic. 

According to the logic of the First President, President Sargsyan, in an attempt to resolve his legitimacy problem on the world stage, is assuming such a set of obligations directed at the Karabakh conflict settlement and the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations, that are totally weakening the positions of the Armenian side and are increasing the possibility of heading down the road leading to major concessions.

At first glance this view appears to be quite impressive, especially against the backdrop of the unprecedented intensification of visits made to Armenia by various western and eastern diplomatic missions. 

In reality, however, an impending break-through in the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) conflict settlement in another version and according to principles that LTP noted in detail in his speech, doesn’t seem that realistic for a few reasons at least. 

I – First, what is being discussed today isn’t the actual settlement itself but rather a discussion on reaching an agreement on the principled questions for such a settlement. The well-known Madrid principles simply define that general platform on which all the settlement details, individually, must be clarified on a specialists’ level. In other words, without selecting these details there can be no talk of a settlement in general. In particular, those principles do not specify: 

1. In what order will “Azeri administrative lands” under the control of Armenian force be returned and what status will the Lachin area, in particular, the Lachin corridor, have in this context?
2. After the demobilization of these lands how will the security of Nagorno-Karabakh be insured until the possible referendum is staged?
3. If international peacekeepers are to assume solving the above problem, what body will implement such a mission and in what format?
4. Who will monitor the return of Azeris to those lands, particularly to Nagorno-Karabakh itself, and what form will this process take? Will the issue of Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan be discussed?
5. During this entire period of time, what will be the internationally recognized status of Nagorno-Karabakh?
6. Under whose supervision will the future referendum be implemented and, in specific terms, how will the referendum question be formulated? Will the referendum only be held within Nagorno-Karabakh proper or will Azerbaijan be included as well? Will the Shahumyan region also be included in the referendum?
7. What will be the time frame before the referendum is held?

These questions, despite their importance, are just one portion of the unresolved questions to be confronted. Of course it is possible that the procedure of reaching an agreement as to principles will not bypass the details since the Madrid process, in essence, assumes the model of a package solution. However, the desire of at least two Co-Chairs to spur the negotiating parties to reach an agreement as soon as possible, at least regarding the issue of principles, leads one to conclude that the negotiating process in terms of details will still continue. 

II – There doesn’t exists within the region such a state of consensus amongst the primary global powers through which it would be possible to reach solutions to the conflict that would be acceptable to all the parties involved. The five day South Ossetia was created an entirely new state of affairs in the South Caucasus. The move by the United States and the European Union to present Georgia with huge amounts of financial assistance was like ‘drawing a line in the sand’ against Moscow. 

In this way, Georgia has turned into a state totally dependent on the West which will play a role in its Potsdam blockade of the Russian Federation. This is why the West didn’t blink regarding sacrifice of Abkhazia and South Ossetia which kept Georgia not as much dependent on the West as on Russia. Put another way, on one end the West forced Georgia into a situation where it would receive billions in financial aid as compensation for its sacrifice. Alternately, the West forced Russia to content itself with its gains and once and for all accept the reality that it had lost Georgia. And it seems that Moscow has reconciled itself with this reality even though it has understood that it lost more, in a strategic sense, than it gained in the region. 

In these conditions, the other two nations in the South Caucasus, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been thrust onto center stage. For the West, especially for the European Union, the only obstacle for the free flow of Azeri oil, via Georgia, through to Turkey and the Ukraine and from there on to the whole of Europe, essentially remains the unresolved Karabakh conflict; or more correctly, the Russian influence in the region stemming from its inclusion in the conflict’s resolution process. 

If the West succeeds in wringing concessions from Armenia in the Karabakh settlement process then Russian influence in the region will be mostly neutralized. Perhaps, these realities were the basis for the trip of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Dick Cheney to Baku which was followed by the statements of Matthew Bryce, the American Co-Chair of the Minsk Group, who didn’t mince any words or resort to diplomatic maneuvering when he declared that the NK conflict must be settled with in parameters of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. The trips by Bryza, who is Daniel Fried’s assistant, to Armenia were especially aimed at putting pressure on Yerevan regarding the issue. The main tool used to exert such pressure was the matter of the internal legitimacy predicament facing the regime. Perhaps LTP had this reality in mind when he proclaimed that the opposition might unwittingly become a tool in the hands of the West to wring concessions from the Armenian government regarding the NK affair. 

However, concurrently, Moscow is clearly showing that it is not reconciled to having its hands tied in light of the stubborn moves of the West. Moscow made the first steps in the direction of Azerbaijan which had obtained pivotal significance for it. In this light, the trip of Medvedev to Baku was an extremely important step despite being not too successful in terms of results. It is not by accident that the proposal made to Baku by the Kremlin to be willing to purchase the entire amount of Azeri gas produced for export went unanswered by Baku. In Azerbaijan they understand that if they take this bait they might loose Karabakh forever since in that case it would be in Russia’s favor to maintain the present conflict status-quo. Baku made it clear that the price of making such a decision could only be if it received Moscow’s unconditional assistance in the Nagorno-Karabakh matter. It is right here that the real threat is born; to confront the entire Minsk Group apparatus, Azerbaijan and Turkey all alone. However, the few ‘conciliatory’ statements made by Dimitry Medvedev during his visit to Yerevan nevertheless prove that in Russia they do not wish to overlook the interests and concerns of Armenia. In particular, while in Yerevan the Russian Federation President declared that tripartite negotiations in Moscow, involving Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia, regarding a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh 

Conflict, were scheduled for the near future. 

Let us point out that throughout the entire history of the conflict there has not been a single case of the NK issue being discussed within such a format. This initiative by Moscow is nothing if not a display of its ambitions to replace the Minsk Group. Naturally, this is merely a diplomatic-propaganda assault against the West to make it perfectly clear that it will not be that easy for them to rid themselves of Russia in the region. 

At the same time, Russia cannot be certain that after assisting Azerbaijan in the NK issue it will be able to bring that country under its total control. In the opposite case, and not accidentally at this time, the idea to build a new military and radio-location base in the Armenian town of Ijevan, on the Armenian-Azeri border, wouldn’t have been circulated by the Kremlin. By judging the remarks coming out of the Armenian President’s Press Secretary a preliminary agreement has already been reached on the issue and this has given rise to an atmosphere of panic in Azerbaijan. What is interesting is that Russia already has such a radio base in the region, the famous Gabala base inside Azerbaijan. In essence, there wouldn’t be a need to build another such installation if Moscow was certain that it could oversee band control the one it has without impediment and if a certain degree of agreement between Moscow and Baku regarding the NK issue had been reached.

Put another way, Russia is cutting off the water that is needed to power the West’s water-mill in the NK issue. This fact goes to prove that, in reality, a change in the balance of powers, hasn’t taken place because Russia, allowing for the settlement of the NK conflict, whatever the scenario, can possibly loose the whole of the Southern Caucasus. In that case, even the building of ten new military bases in Armenia won’t be of any significance. 

III – Even if we accept that the interests of the West and Russia dovetail regarding a settlement of the NK conflict than no one can guarantee that any document signed by Serzh Sargsyan will ever be implemented. The fact is that this conflict has twice already been the ‘victim’ of the implementation of such a scenario. First in Armenia, in 1998, LTP, by handing in his resignation, aborted the solution being forced upon the Armenian side and later, in 2002-2003, Heydar Aliyev delayed the possible conflict settlement based on the principles laid out in Key West and Paris so much that in the end, after his death, his son, Ilham Aliyev, demanded that the negotiations start afresh. 

Serzh Sargsyan cannot but take the possibility of such developments into account. And there is a serious reason for this. The present army, especially its top-ranking officer core, despite certain counterbalancing steps taken by the former President, is comprised of Karabakh War participants who, to put it mildly, are not that inclined to unconditionally defend the adopted course of the regime regarding the handing back of the territories. And this contains the extremely serious potential to destabilize the domestic state of affairs. Serzh Sargsyan has already felt the impact of that potential when after the February presidential elections, during the ongoing rallies of the opposition; the army was momentarily free of any supervision on the eve of Robert Kocharyan’s return from Russia. 

The NK question is that pivotal problem that can restore the unity of the “Yerkrapah” (Defenders of the Land) organizations and not under the banner of the regime. Thus, Serzh Sargsyan can simply not afford to underestimate this factor and do as he pleases at the negotiating table 

On the other hand a question arises – how will any given process aimed at settling the NK conflict be implemented if the people of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) express their opposition to it? What levers does Armenia have at its disposal to force the people of Karabakh to give up the gains it has obtained at the price of shedding its blood? The fact that the NKR, is stubbornly refused a place at the negotiations table, merely increases the potential of such a scenario; that any conflict settlement agreed to by the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan will come up against a strong, if artificial, wall in Karabakh proper. 

Thus, it is possible to conclude that if Robert Kocharyan, in order to maintain the status-quo, was conducting a more passive political line, the current President, in order to solve the same problem, is pinning his hopes upon a more activist political policy. And this, in reality, is the primary result that official Yerevan eagerly awaits out of the present regional disorder.